Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

2017

The Rhetoric of Hospitality: Conditions of Death in America
Margaret Anne Callahan
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
Callahan, Margaret Anne, "The Rhetoric of Hospitality: Conditions of Death in America" (2017). LSU
Doctoral Dissertations. 4305.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/4305

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.

THE RIGHT OF HOSPITALITY:
CONDITIONS OF DEATH IN AMERICA

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of English

by
Margaret Anne Callahan
B.A., The University of the Incarnate Word, San Antonio, 2010
M.A., Texas Tech University, Lubbock, 2012
May 2017

For Mom, Dad, and Brendan
for teaching me to make the best of what’s around

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………...………iv
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION…………….……………………………………………….. 1
2 BODIES ON DISPLAY:
AGENCY AND HOSPITALITY IN WESTERN BIOMEDICINE……………..20
3 AGENCY IN DYING:
THE ‘GOOD’ DEATH OF SOCRATES………………………………………. 58
4 “IF I HAD A CHOICE, I’D PREFER NOT TO DIE, THANK YOU VERY
MUCH”:
DIGNFIED DEATH……………….…………………………………………… 88
5 LOOKING DEATH IN THE FACE:
BRITTANY MAYNARD…………………….………………………….……. 123
6 A SECOND OPINION:
MEDICAL ‘GAMES’ OFFER ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES…………. 147
7 CONCLUSIONS……………………………………………………………..170
WORKS CITED…..…………………………………………………………………... 179
VITA………………………………………………………..…………………………..187

iii

Abstract
The Right of Hospitality: Conditions of Death in America calls Western
biomedicine’s approach to death into question. Death unifies all human experiences and
is always possible, despite the human tendency to deny its existence and, instead, orient
the self towards a futurity that is always out of reach. This project investigates the
structures influencing how death in America occurs, and traces the roots of Western
culture’s rejection of death to the execution by hemlock of Socrates’ immortalized in the
Phaedo. Western biomedicine’s institutionalization of medicine requires that both
patients and doctors enter into imbalanced hospitable relationships, and these pressures,
along with the rejection of discourse about death, make for a difficult and dehumanizing
end-of-life care system in America today. Case studies of contemporary experiences of
death—including Oregon State’s Death with Dignity Act, Brittany Maynard’s end-of-life
activism, and a patient’s dissatisfaction at the extension of his life—provide opportunities
for teasing out the ethical issues surrounding end-of-life. Ultimately, the options
presented to patients at end-of-life are not simply a matter of hospitality; they are a
human rights issue. This issue promises to dramatically alter the experiences of the
world’s rapidly growing number of humans kept alive by modern medicine, and if it is
left uninvestigated, will force Americans into woefully insufficient end-of-life care.

iv

Chapter 1
Introduction
In When Breath Becomes Air, neurosurgeon Paul Kalanithi writes: “What patients seek is
not scientific knowledge that doctors hide but existential authenticity each person must
find on their own. Getting too deeply into statistics is like trying to quench a thirst with
salty water. The angst of facing mortality has no remedy in probability” (135). Kalanithi
composed When Breath Becomes Air during the final year of his neurosurgical residency
at Stanford University. He was 36 years old, and had just been diagnosed with terminal
stage IV lung cancer. When Breath Becomes Air reads as a coming-to-terms with death,
but even more so with his newfound, and identity-shattering, experience as a doctor
turned patient. Kalanithi writes that, “While being trained as a physician and scientist had
helped me process the data and accept the limits of what that data could reveal about my
prognosis, it couldn’t help me as a patient. It didn’t tell [my wife] Lucy and me whether
we should go ahead and have a child, or what it meant to nurture a new life while mine
faded. Nor did it tell me whether to fight for my career, to reclaim the ambitions I had
single-mindedly pursued for so long, but without the surety of the time to complete them”
(139). For Kalanithi, these questions of prioritization are ones he finds himself incapable
of answering on his own—he needs professional opinions in order to gauge his
abilities—and “rebuild my old life—or find a new one” (139).
Kalanithi’s memoir reveals two key issues that this project hopes to illuminate
and solve. First, there is a startling lack of discourse about illness and death in
contemporary American culture. Kalanithi frequently comments on what this project will
call the generic social response to illness, or the rhetoric of warfare that is pervasive in
1

contemporary medicine and treatment: a discourse in which the ill are encouraged to
fight, told to be strong, and either implicitly or explicitly shamed for moments of
weakness and hopelessness. In Kalanithi’s memoir, even his brother, himself an
accomplished physician, encourages him to maintain hope in the face of his incredibly
aggressive terminal illness—to which Kalanithi “sighs,” and thinks that “He meant well,
but the words rang hollow” (120). And this interaction brings us to the second knotty
issue that this project hopes to begin untangling: even medical professionals, the selfproclaimed and culturally perceived experts on death and dying, find mortality (and,
perhaps more succinctly, medicine’s inability to conquer illness and death), a difficult pill
to swallow. Kalanithi writes that, “Death, so familiar to me in my work, was now paying
a personal visit. Here we were, finally face-to-face, and yet nothing about it seemed
recognizable” (121). These two problems are basically one of language and one of
comprehension; they act cyclically, and have prevented real progress towards developing
a discourse about terminal illness and end-of-life. In reality, the contemporary experience
of end-of-life is a complicated series of contradictions. Just one example: while a recent
study by the Stanford School of Medicine found that approximately “80% of Americans
would prefer to die at home, if possible” (“Where do Americans die?”), the study also
found that despite this desire, “60% of Americans die in acute care hospitals, 20% in
nursing homes, and only 20% die at home” (“Where do Americans die?”).
But few Americans understand the reality of these alternatives and how difficult
access to services like hospice might become at end-of-life. Still fewer recognize the
limited personal agency they will likely experience when they enter into the final phases
of life—either from a “natural” process of progressing and aging, or from an “unnatural”
2

chronic or terminal illness. Whether death is perceived as natural or unnatural, it is an
experience that unifies and impacts everyone. And whether we are educated in the ways
of modern medicine or not, it is likely that attempts to rationalize our mortality and
calculate our remaining time will conjure up the sensation of disconnect that Kalanithi
describes so poignantly: “nothing about it seemed recognizable” (121).
This project hopes to illuminate the issues preventing a more open end-of-life
discourse and, in doing so, reinvigorate conversations about death and dying and
individual agency in the face of mortality. These chapters blend rhetorical criticism and
rhetorical theory with popular contemporary sources in order to make an end-of-life
discourse more recognizable, and ultimately, a more persuasive endeavor for modern
audiences. As Cheryl Geisler writes, “Most scholars acknowledge…explicitly or
implicitly, that recent concern with the question of rhetorical agency arises from the postmodern critique of the autonomous agent” (10). In a post-modern world, traditional views
on personal agency are called into question. Geisler suggests that “Specifically, a
rhetorical agent seen to make choices among the available means of persuasion is an
agent rhetoricians can educate to make the best choices. The post-modern agent is not so
obviously educable and, if not educable, what agency do we as rhetoricians have?” (15).
The question of rhetorical agency is critical to the discussion of end-of-life because it is a
question of “who has agency—and therefore responsibility”; as such, in order to pin
down a post-modern sense of individual agency, it is “through work in a variety of nontraditional contexts [that] promises to enrich our foundational understanding of rhetoric”
(11-12). In our post-modern society, rhetoric’s ability to educate necessitates that it cross
boundaries and draw from untraditional sources. Although it is rooted in ancient
3

traditions, rhetoric must adapt. In order to develop a discourse that will be persuasive,
scholars must draw inspiration from the not so obviously educable. The artifacts analyzed
within this project were selected based on two criteria: authorial willingness to address
end-of-life issues that met some public success and attention to individual agency as a
critical facet of contemporary end-of-life discussions. Together, these considerations help
construct a starting point for rhetorical intervention. Before delving into the case studies,
it is essential to understand the cultural misconceptions that limit society’s full
participation in conversations about death and dying, and thereby increase the ethical
imperative of this project.
Misconceptions
If they consider it at all, most Americans consider death in the abstract, only gaining a
more concrete understanding about what death is when it encroaches upon their otherwise
death-free existence. As bioethicist George J. Annas writes, “We are a death-denying
culture that cannot accept death as anything but defeat. This means we will prepare for
any disease and screen for every possible ‘risk factor,’ but are utterly unable to prepare
for death” (12). Due to the dramatic technological advances of the twentieth century,
today, “terminal [illness] can be detected earlier and earlier in a patient’s life, rendering
the disconcerting reality of a terminal illness with few or no symptoms” (Dyehouse 208).
Increasingly, death is present despite our rejection of it; recognition of this brings about a
kind of paranoia over the definition and knowability of health. Jeremiah Dyehouse’s
discussion of illness in “Writing, Illness, and Affirmation” suggests that the experience of
illness in American society—and other “societies with increasingly effective medical
care”—makes interactions with modern medicine “equally strange for [the] doctors and
4

nurses” (209). In trying to familiarize and demystify this strangeness, locating the
unknown is imperative.
There is a cultural perception that nursing homes, hospice, and other
institutionalized forms of palliative care are widely available, easily accessible, and that
they will be there when patients are in need of them. They are socially presented as
viable, efficient options for end-of-life care. There is also a sense that they will provide
individuals with a dignified death (dignity being an extremely loaded term that is highly
individualistic and will be explored in depth within this project’s case study chapters).
However, the availability of hospice and alternative care is not as widespread, and not the
solution, that most Americans believe it to be. By and large, the locations where people
actually die are hospitals, which many believe “dehumanize patients by silencing their
voices and stripping them of their biographies” (Kaufman 95). In reality, each of these
institutions has a tendency to shake up the individual’s sense of self and prevent their full
participation in their care plans. Understanding how they function—and how they limit
agency—is key in understanding end-of-life discourse.
The National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization (NHPCO), monitors
hospices and certifies them only if they comply with federal regulations and meet basic
standards of care. The NHPCO claims that “considered to be the model for quality,
compassionate care at the end of life, hospice care involves a team-oriented approach of
expert medical care, pain management, and emotional and spiritual support expressly
tailored to the patient’s wishes” (“About”). This expressly tailored care can be provided
within the patient’s home (an option selected by approximately two-thirds of hospice
patients), or in an institutionalized “home-like” setting in a hospice program’s facility.
5

Hospice care is covered by insurance, but is only made available to “patients who meet
certain criteria”—namely, individuals who are terminally ill with a life expectancy of less
than 6 months (“About”). According to the Preamble for NHPCO’s “Hospice Standards
of Practice for Hospice Programs,” hospice “affirms the concept of palliative care as an
intensive program that enhances comfort and promotes quality of life…when cure is no
longer possible” (“Preamble”). Additionally, “hospice believes that death is an integral
part of the life cycle and that intensive palliative care focuses on pain relief, comfort and
enhanced quality of life as appropriate goals for the terminally ill” (“Preamble”). But this
seemingly idyllic site of acceptance and compassion is heavily regulated and less easily
accessible than it may seem. While Medicare’s federal website makes it clear that in
order to enter hospice an individual must be given a prognosis of terminal illness with 6
months or less to live, what is made less clear is what is implied by entering into a
required contractual agreement with hospice: “By signing up for hospice, patients
generally agree to stop all disease-fighting treatments, such as chemotherapy or
radiation” (Mayer 1). For individuals dependent upon Medicare, “you can get hospice
care for two 90-day benefit periods, followed by an unlimited number of 60-day benefit
periods,” but “at the start of each period, the hospice medical director or other hospice
doctor must recertify that you are terminally ill (with a life expectancy of 6 months or
less)” in order for the individual to continue receiving care from hospice doctors in home
or at a hospice facility (“How Hospice Works”). If an individual’s illness goes into
remission, then they no longer qualify for hospice and must leave. However, they can reenter hospice at any time “if they are eligible”—meaning, if their illness has once again
become terminal. Hospice offer the opportunity for an individual to remain in their own
6

home with occasional visits from healthcare professionals specializing in hospice’s brand
of pain management and palliation, but in order to receive this care, the individual must
cease treatments which stave off illness. Hospice’s primary concern is in eliminating
pain—not in curing illness or fighting disease. Increased health and effective treatment
eliminate the individual from being qualified for hospice care.
Nursing homes are also thought of as a viable option and location for the final
phases of life. But nursing homes were established to do exactly what they advertise:
nursing, not curing. As institutions, their prioritize matters like “avoiding bedsores and
maintaining residents’ weight—important medical goals, to be sure, but they are means,
not ends” (Gawande 75). Despite the fact that patients live within them, nursing homes
are run more like hospitals than hospitable home-away-from-homes, and control over
patients’ actions is key to their functioning as an institution. Not all nursing homes are
created equal, though. As Atul Gawande explores in Being Mortal, “In the horrible ones,
the battle for control escalates until [patients] get tied down or locked into your Gerichair or chemically subdued with psychotropic medications” (76). In all too common
nursing home horror stories, patients who annoy nursing home workers are stripped of
dignity because of their individual needs. Gawande discusses how an elderly patient who
needed assistance with frequent trips to the restroom was put on a schedule for urination
and, when that did not succeed, put in diapers (78). “In the nice ones, a staff member
cracks a joke, wags an affectionate finger, and takes away your brownie stash. In almost
none does anyone sit down with you and try to figure out what living a life really means
to you under the circumstances, let alone help you make a home where that life becomes
possible” (76, emphasis my own). This making one’s self at home is critical to the
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experience of an individual’s agency. To quote Jacques Derrida in Of Hospitality, “This
is where the question of hospitality begins” (15). But unspooling the tremendous impact
that the laws of hospitality have on end-of-life care can only begin once the structures
inhibiting that hospitality (both socially constructed and literal ones), are more fully
examined and understood.
Diane Davis offers another perspective on hospitality in Inessential Solidarity:
Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations. For Davis, the question of openness to the other is one
that necessitates “examining the implications of this always prior relation to the
foreign(er) without which no meaning-making or determinate (symbolic) relation would
be possible” (2). Rhetoric is not purely epistemological; Davis pushes instead for a
different kind of rhetorical thinking, asking readers, “What would it mean for rhetorical
practice, theory, and analysis if we were to acknowledge that communication in the most
simplistic sense—as symbolic exchange—does not first of all lead to solidarity or
‘community’ but instead remains utterly dependent upon a sharing and a response-ability
that precede it?” (2). Response-ability, for Davis, means that an individual is beholden to
all others because of their openness. Hospitality is itself a kind of ethics. As Davis posits,
for there to be any meaning sharing or meaning making between individuals, “a more
originary rhetoricity must already be operating, a constitutive persuadability and
responsivity that testifies, first of all, to a fundamental structure of exposure” (3). In this
exposure, both the host and the guest are bound together by an ethics of behavior—but
not conditions. As Derrida writes, “Between an unconditional law or an absolute desire
for hospitality on the one hand and, on the other, a law, a politics, a conditional ethics,
there is a distinction, a radical heterogeneity, but also indissociability. One calls forth,
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involves, or prescribes the other” (Of Hospitality 47). But as Brooke Rollins carefully
distinguishes, “There would be no conditional laws of hospitality, in other
words…without an open and giving disposition toward the other before any instance of
recognition or identification” (11). Conditions exist because the ethics of existing require
openness—an exposed sort of living which leaves both parties too much at risk. Being
too exposed, they must regain some control over interaction by implementing conditional
interactions and leaving room for violence if it becomes necessary. Hospitality’s
necessary conditionality undergirds the contemporary Western biomedical model, where
encounters between exposed individuals become heightened by the very real risks
involved. In entering the hospital, the patient is not warmly welcomed in a real way.
Instead, by crossing the threshold, they become patients, and submit themselves to the
rules of their hosts.
Disconnects in Existing End-of-Life Discourse
Given glimpses into the available institutions of care in the United States, a vast gray area
emerges. At their most basic level, modern hospitals are meant to keep you alive and
hospice services are meant to help you to die. Still, “while most Americans would like to
die at home, most die in institutions due to a chronic illness where death was the expected
outcome” (“Preamble”). Institutionalized Western biomedicine has pathologized, or made
abnormal, the process of dying to the extent that an individual’s death often reads as a
failure. And this failure is not just one of the body, but is often discussed as a moral
failing of sorts, too. One of the most well-known examples of this stigmatization of dying
is Susan Sontag’s Illness as Metaphor. Sontag writes that, “Illness is the night-side of
life, a more onerous citizenship. Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship, in the
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kingdom of the well and in the kingdom of the sick. Although we all prefer to use only
the good passport, sooner or later each of us is obliged, at least for a spell, to identify
ourselves as citizens of that other place” (3). While we all rationally accept that illness
might happen to us, and we might even take measures to prevent it from creeping in, it is
not a reality that we spend a great deal of time discussing. Sontag suggests that rather
than giving into the customary “punitive or sentimental fantasies concocted about”
illness, a more appropriate response would be to recognize that “illness is not a metaphor,
and that the most truthful way of regarding illness—and the healthiest way of being ill—
is one most purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric thinking” (3). Instead, we should
view death for what it is and, in our viewing, attempt to relieve ourselves of our guilt in
dying. But this approach can require too much magical thinking—a sin that even Sontag
was allegedly guilty of. Four years after her death, her son David Rieff wrote a piece in
The Guardian called, “Why I had to lie to my dying mother.” In it, he shares a favorite
phrase of Sontag’s: “’There are some survivors, even in the worst cancers,’ she would
often say during the nearly two years she received what for that time was an extremely
harsh regime of chemotherapy for the breast cancer. ‘Why shouldn’t I be one of them?’”
(1). Sontag had three different cancer diagnoses from 1972 until 2004. The first two
occasions required drastic medical interventions, but Sontag survived. But rather than
approach illness with the stoicism she prescribes for others, Sontag became a believer in
her ability to overcome death. Rieff describes her as being “So terrified of death that she
could not bear to speak of it” but also “obsessed with it” (2).
Sontag’s third diagnosis was myelodysplastic syndrome (MDS), a form of
leukemia that is typically only treated by a successful bone marrow transplant. Sontag
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believed that she could always be the “exception,” since she had twice come to see
herself as the exception—and, therefore, to see her life as exceptional. Rieff writes, “my
mother was about as far from Kubler-Ross’s famous and influential (not least among
doctors themselves) five-stage theory of dying—denial, anger, bargaining, depression,
and acceptance—as it was possible for a human being to be” (2). Sontag did not see
dying as a process that she could go through, but as “extinction”—an option that was
unspeakable and unfathomable. Despite her weighty consideration of death and the
correct approach to illness in an intellectual realm, Sontag could not ready herself for her
own death. Rieff writes:
But I was in her hospital room in Seattle when, months after the transplant, when
she could not roll over in bed unassisted and was hooked up to 300 metres of
tubes infusing the chemicals that were keeping her alive but could do nothing to
improve her condition, her doctors came in to tell her that the transplant had failed
and the leukaemia was now full-blown. She screamed out in surprise and terror.
‘But this means I’m dying,’ she kept saying, flailing her emaciated, abraded arms
and pounding the mattress. So do not tell me she knew all along (2).
Sontag’s approach to illness as a reality for others contrasted with her impulse to
rationalize away the possibility of her own impending death. “In her eyes, mortality
seemed as unjust as murder,” her son writes (3). And, he also writes of the trauma
induced by his mother’s inability to admit that she was dying—to herself, and to the
loved ones she did not allow the chance to come-to-terms with her dying. While we
might tell ourselves that dying is just another process in life, we cannot guarantee how we
will approach our own death.
Those in need of the hospital’s curative medicine and those in need of hospice’s
palliative care have more clearly defined medical needs than most. For those individuals
whose health concerns fall anywhere on the spectrum between a quick hospital visit and a
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quick hospice death, developing a care plan can be difficult. The needs of those patients
are less clear and less easily defined. In The Ethics of Need: Agency, Dignity, and
Obligation, Sarah Clark Miller describes fundamental needs, writing: “Not responding to
fundamental needs results in serious harm to the individual” (47). And as Barbara
Herman explains, “fundamental needs are ends that rational agents cannot forgo, namely,
ends ‘that are necessary to sustain oneself as a rational being’ such as the continued
‘exercise of one’s agency as a rational being’” (qtd. in Clark Miller 47). These needs
change the agent’s position from one who can operate for themselves to a one who is at
least partially dependent: as Joan Tronto explains, to have a need is to require care (120).
For individuals like Sontag, who might be able to conceptualize of dying as a thing that
happens, but are not able to recognize it as a thing that happens to them, providing the
right kind of care becomes imperative. And, “though care ethicists have provided many
different definitions of care, Diemut Bubeck’s definitions of ‘caring for’ is perhaps the
most accurate and complete” (Clark Miller 47). Bubeck’s caring for is “the meeting of
the needs of one person by another person where face-to-face interaction between carer
and cared for is a crucial element of the overall activity and where the need is of such a
nature that it cannot possibly be met by the person in need herself” (Bubeck 129). Clark
Miller builds upon Bubeck’s definition, stating that, “The process of caring involves two
positions, namely, the position of the one who has a need (the ‘cared for’ or ‘care
receiver’) and the position of the one who meets the need of the other (the ‘carer’,
‘caregiver,’ ‘caretaker’). The process is inherently interactive” (47). Importantly, “caring
for oneself is not possible under Bubeck’s rubric,” since “care must necessarily be otherdirected…care need not involve the affection present between friends and lovers, though
12

it might” (47). Instead, care is about inhabiting a perspective “of taking the other’s needs
as the starting point for what must be done,” and then developing a plan of action with
those needs in mind (Tronto qtd. in Clark Miller 47).
Alternatives and Outline of Chapters
While Clark Miller’s depiction of an ethical style of caring-for is mainly geared
towards her research with elderly patients, it is helpful in guiding a much needed
conversation about all ill and dying individuals. An ethics-oriented approach to end of
life can assist in providing a more just type of death because of the options it makes
manifest. In reflecting upon his mother’s death, Rieff writes that Sontag’s inability to
discuss death openly meant that “instead of dying in physical agony, my mother would
have died in psychological terror, abject and inconsolable as she was in the first few days
after her diagnosis” (3). This project reads this psychological terror as a complete rupture
of the individual’s sense of self—a total loss of agency and control over one’s
circumstances—and considers it one of the most unethical ways of dying in today’s
society. Dying in psychological terror is arguably the most undignified way to die. It is a
manner of death enabled by a lack of conversation about the alternatives.
This project hopes to bring existing alternatives into light by discussing end-oflife from a variety of perspectives. This project believes that the culturally pervasive
rejection of death’s existence prevents individual agents from realizing the kind of death
that they would consider dignified. In their diminished states of illness, they are incapable
of making the same kinds of carefully weighed decisions that they would have made
when illness-free. Growing nearer to death might help crystallize or reorganize one’s
priorities, but rarely do these priorities include having full, frank discussions about the
13

kind of death one wants to experience and the kind of death that is attainable given the
individual’s circumstances. Issues of terminology arise when we consider who the agent
of a death is; this specificity is intended to shift responsibility away from the physicians
who are complying with the wishes of the patient or patient’s family, or are following the
care plan that they deem most ethically sound in that particular patient’s case.
Ascertaining the agent of death is crucial, and is one of the most important aspects of
determining cause of death. The homepage of the Death with Dignity Organization
defines some alternatives to ‘natural’ deaths, or deaths that do not occur in hospitals or
due to the removal of machinery. For individuals who wish to die another way, namely,
the terminally ill, there are some heavily loaded terminologies to parse through.
Physician-assisted suicide (PAS), or assisted-suicide, is “an inaccurate, inappropriate, and
biased phrase which opponents often use to scare people about Death with Dignity laws.
Because the person is in the process of dying and seeking the option to hasten an already
and inevitable death, the request…isn’t equated with suicide” (DeathwithDignity.org).
They stress that “the patient’s primary objective is not to end an otherwise open-ended
span of life” because something else is killing them. The American Public Health
Association concurs, stating that, “assisted suicide is inappropriate when discussing the
choice of a mentally competent, terminally ill patient to seek medications that he or she
could consume to bring about a peaceful and dignified death” (APHA.org). Suicide does
not work as a label, either, since it is intentional and voluntary but is a “permanent
solution to a temporary problem” and as such, “ends a life that would otherwise
continue” (DeathwithDignity.org). Euthanasia “refers to the act of deliberately causing
the death of another person who may be suffering from an incurable disease or condition,
14

commonly performed with a lethal injection” (DeathwithDignity.org). ORS 127 states
that, “Nothing in the [Oregon Death with Dignity Act] shall be construed to authorize a
physician or any other person to end a patient’s life by lethal injection, mercy killing, or
active euthanasia” (ORS 127). In order to fully understand the reasons why some
Americans choose to take advantage of a little-known legal end-of-life alternative, the
variations in how stakeholders define these alternatives are key. Death with Dignity does
not neatly fit under the umbrella of PAS or assisted suicide, suicide, or euthanasia
because by the time individuals come to seek out and take advantage of Death with
Dignity, all other active options have been exhausted.
By analyzing existing fragments of end-of-life conversation from disparate
sources, this project creates a working discourse about death and dying. This project is
interested in the attainment of the ‘good death’ as an elusive concept which is pervasive
in contemporary society but rooted in a cultural preoccupation with Socrates and Plato’s
rendering of Socrates’ death. Today, understanding the ‘good death’ requires critical
analysis of where individuals die, how death is determined, and how ‘natural’ death is
obfuscated in favor of a more controlled end-of-life. In Chapter 1, Michel Foucault’s
theories of bodily control within institutions add definition to the experience of the
individual within Western biomedicine. Foucault’s work helps to illuminate the ways in
which individual agency—for both healthcare professionals and patients—can become
sublimated and even lost within the structure of the institution. Additionally, Foucault’s
crystallization of the bio-power inherent within such institutions adds definition to
existing controversy over end-of-life rights. Chapter 1 also ties these bio-power and the
constraints of the institution to Jacques Derrida’s work on hospitality. The laws of
15

hospitality that govern typical human interactions are often disregarded within Western
biomedicine, since taking the experience and wishes of the other into consideration
would require individualized attention that the institution, as an institution, is not built to
offer. Together, the confines of the institution, the pursuit of bio-power, and lack of care
for the needs of the other create inhospitable system of care that prevents open discourse
about end-of-life.
Chapter 2 seeks out the definition of the good death by analyzing one of the most
venerated deaths in Western history: the Phaedo’s depiction of the death of Socrates. As
one recent exploration of Socrates’ death captures: “The charges, as far as we can
reconstruct them, were vague: impiety, worshipping new gods, corrupting the young. It is
startling that such accusations led to a death sentence: Athens was a radical democracy
that prided itself on freedom of speech, and all that Socrates did was talk” (“Why
Socrates Died: Dispelling the Myths” 1). Socrates’ death has long been viewed—even
celebrated—as a rational approach to an irrational situation. Upon being sentenced to
death, he gladly accepted his fate and encouraged his followers to follow him to death as
soon as possible. Despite the widely accepted reading of Socrates’ death as an embrace of
personal extinction, I offer an alternative reading of Phaedo as a document haunted by
Socrates’ anxiety over his own dying. This reading dismantles the contemporary end-oflife movement’s embrace of death as a rational decision, and instead seeks to present a
more honest conception of circumstances that could make a good death achievable.
Chapter 3 explores the contemporary end-of-life movement through Peter
Richardson’s 2011 documentary film How to Die in Oregon. Oregon became the first US
state to legalize an end-of-life alternative. The law, which is known as the Death with
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Dignity Act, allows healthcare professionals to prescribe terminally ill patients with
medications that help them die. How to Die in Oregon follows numerous healthcare
professionals and social workers who discuss the impact the law has on the care provided
in the state of Oregon. Perhaps more importantly, the film captures the experiences of
terminally ill patients who are seeking out the law to aid them in achieving the kind of
death that they deem most dignified. Their narratives of illness dying are analyzed within
this Chapter and complicate the place of hospitality in contemporary end-of-life
situations. For those within How to Die in Oregon who work to provide this alternative,
caring-for the other is rooted in providing access to whatever death that individual deems
most dignified.
Chapter 4 focuses on the case of a 29-year-old Californian woman, Brittany
Maynard. Maynard was diagnosed with an aggressive, incurable brain cancer at the age
of 28. Although she initially attempted to seek treatment and surgery to eliminate the
cancer, she received a prognosis of less than six months to live and a slew of grueling,
debilitating treatment options. Rather than undergo treatments that she found
unacceptable and inhospitable, Maynard and her family relocated to Oregon so that she
could avail herself of the Death with Dignity Act. Simultaneously, Maynard became an
outspoken advocate for increased end-of-life options. In the final months of her life,
Maynard’s image was splashed across popular publications and featured on numerous
websites and news outlets. Chapter 4 discusses how Maynard’s attempts to reinvigorate
the end-of-life conversation have had a surprising impact since her death in 2014. Her
rejection of inhospitable treatment from her home state of California, and the agency
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afforded by her relocation during the final months of her life, add complexity to the endof-life discussion—especially given the fact that most Americans wish to die at home.
In Chapters 3 and 4, illness provides individuals with a more purposeful kind of
living due to their newly realized limits. This purposeful living is undercut by a profound
sadness at all of the things that will be left undone. However, in Chapter 5, this notion is
complicated by analysis of “Games,” an episode of the American television show House,
M.D., in which a renowned oncologist finds himself in the unique position of being able
to tell a terminal patient that the original diagnosis was incorrect: the patient is
completely cancer-free and is not going to die. The patient’s reaction to the doctor’s
‘good news’ is unexpected. Rather than embracing his new lease on life, however, the
patient rejects it and is infuriated. Simply put, terminal illness had set him apart and made
him special. Having a limited amount of life left had refocused his priorities and given
him a freedom to fully live for the first time. Now, it is the limitlessness of life that is
unacceptable and inhospitable.
As Vernon W. Cisney and Nicolae Morar wisely deduce, “the mechanisms of
power always have a way of covering their tracks” (1). These chapters capture narratives
that individually confront differing aspects of the contemporary end-of-life debate. When
taken together, this project makes the importance of a new discourse of caring-for the
end-of-life clear and lays bare the mechanisms of power which serve to encourage some
discourses and eliminate others. By weaving together the written history, the
documentary film, the autobiographical, and the fictionalized accounts, this project takes
pieces of contemporary culture that society is already familiar and comfortable with and
arranges those pieces in a way that produces meaning, rendering the subject matter
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educable. This project does not advocate for any particular end-of-life method. Instead, it
advocates for more transparent discussions concerning power and increased conversation
about an individual’s rights.
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Chapter Two
Bodies on Display: Agency and Hospitality in Western Biomedicine
Michel Foucault’s The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical
Perception, begins: “This book is about space, about language, and about death; it is
about the act of seeing, the gaze” (ix). Centuries after its inception, Western biomedicine
remains deeply invested in space, language, and the act of seeing. One of the side effects
of these investments has been an insulation of medicine, making the gaze—which
Foucault defined as a specialized sight gained exclusively through medical training—a
mechanism of control. In most instances, this kind of control over the body is beneficial
for patients; however, when it comes to a patient’s right to die, things become
complicated. In “Controlling Death: Bio-Power and the Right-to-Die Controversy,” Todd
F. McDorman explores how those possessing the medical gaze attempt to use their
specialized sight to determine not just an individuals’ particular health issues, but an
individual’s right to die. He writes, “At the forefront [of end-of-life] debates has been a
power struggle between a social movement in favor or patient decision-making and
institution entities reluctant to relinquish ‘control’ over the body” (257). Control over
bodies is the purpose of modern healthcare. Whether healthcare professionals research
and labor in order to keep bodies alive or to provide them with a dignified death, control
is the motivating factor. Concern arises when the means of gaining control overwhelm
the ends—and the individual being subjected to methods of care.
This chapter begins with an examination of Foucault’s work on the history of
institutions and the institutionalization of bio-power. Together, these two concepts serve
as the foundation for the modern biomedical model. Society’s dependency upon Western
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biomedicine (the institution) and its agents (the bio-power) for care sublimates the needs
of the individual in pursuit of doing the least harm for most of the people. As this chapter
will explore, Western biomedicine’s definitions of care can vary greatly. This is where
Jacques Derrida’s work on hospitality (and the scholarly endeavors inspired by that work)
comes in: despite becoming increasingly dependent upon technology, individuals
operating within the institution of modern medicine are still beholden to the countless
others they come into contact with, and the countless others who their decisions will
impact. This chapter brings the connections between the institution, bio-power, and
hospitality into focus.
Medical facilities are spaces where patients seek help with medical issues, but
they are also places where individuals with different levels of agency must interact and
come to terms with their responsibility, or perhaps more accurately, response-ability, to
one another. Whether intended or not, in caring for their patients, healthcare professionals
make decisions with tremendous ethical consequences. The ethical dilemma arises when
decisions are made on behalf of the patient, rather than by the patient or with the patients’
wishes in mind. The distinction between making decisions and having decisions made by
others calls the priorities of modern healthcare into question. As this chapter will discuss,
research shows that an individual’s sense of agency is at the greatest risk in times of
crisis. Recent studies have illustrated the ethical concerns of medical professionals and
how end-of-life in particular creates occasions for uncertainty. In, “Exclusive Ethics
Survey Results: Doctors Struggle with Tougher-Than-Ever Dilemmas,” evidence of
doctors’ ethical struggles within their professions was revealed. In the study, some 7,000
physicians were surveyed. Over half of the respondents felt that end-of-life issues placed
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them in the most difficult ethical dilemmas and presented “the biggest quandaries,” with
over a third of the respondents answering “it depends” to questions about providing lifesustaining therapy when it was futile, and ceasing or providing life-sustaining therapy
due to familial demands (Kane 2). Additionally, 45.8% believed that physician-assisted
suicide should be allowed “in some cases,” and 13.5% answered “it depends” to the same
question. This means that almost two-thirds of the respondents felt that it was within the
realm of possibility that their position as a practicing medical professional could include
making decisions about ending a patient’s life or providing patients with access to
particular life-ending materials (2). Dr. Thomas H. Murray, the President of The Hastings
Center, a bioethical research institute, stated, “In medicine, doctors can do far more than
they could in the past. They can do interventions that were unimaginable a few decades
ago. Every time you give those kinds of power they come with difficult situations and
tough ethical choices” (qtd. in Kane). Along with the rigorous training needed to become
healthcare professionals comes the doctor’s involvement in some of their patients’ most
stressful life experiences. The medical gaze equips healthcare professionals with a
heightened sight. Foucault aligns trained discernment with medical knowledge, writing:
“Medical rationality plunges into the marvelous density of perception…The eye becomes
the depository and source of clarity; it has the power to bring truth to light that it receives
only to the extent that it has brought it to light; as it opens, the eye first opens the truth”
(xiii). In order to discern the causes of disease and illness, the viewer must be able to
open up the obfuscating body and reveal the inner truth. The institution of medicine
privileges this sight and in doing so, elevates the position of those who possess the
medical gaze.
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Agency Within the Institution
The medical gaze gives healthcare professionals both the ability and the authority
to make medical decisions. Despite the confidence that might make these decisions
possible, the consequences of these decisions are not always readily transparent to
healthcare professionals and patients. In fact, hospitals often have a significant
disorienting effect on patients while simultaneously privileging the perspective and
beliefs of hospital staff. Medical and legal scholar Hazel Biggs writes, “In any
institutional setting individuals may be unusually insecure, and unfamiliar surroundings
with unknown personnel and routines will almost inevitably impinge upon a person’s
ability to act as an autonomous agent. In situations involving medical care, illness, lack of
understanding, and fear may compound and intensify these insecurities” (99). While
power over decision-making is something that most patients claim to want, during
unexpected health crises or even the anticipated final stages of a chronic or terminal
illness, individuals and their families often find themselves in vulnerable positions. The
fear, anxiety, and lack of understanding studied by Biggs prohibit patients and their
families from meaningfully advocating for themselves—a troubling side-effect of
contemporary medicine that leaves the dependent parties unsure of how to verbalize their
desires or negotiate their positioning, and therefore unable to participate in their own
treatment. For most of these patients, discussions of death never occurred and interactions
with Western biomedicine were limited.
Lacking a discourse with which to discuss their options or communicate their
wishes, patients and loved ones can experience end-of-life as extremely disorienting and
markedly inhospitable. In “Re-Examining the Agentic Shift: The Sense of Agency
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Influences of the Effectiveness of (Self)Persuasion,” cognitive behavioral psychologists
from the Netherlands and Germany present their research on the autonomy of individuals
who had recently experienced a threat or injury to their sense of self. Through their
research, they defined the somewhat abstract term ‘sense of agency’ as “the ability to
recognize oneself as the controller of one’s own actions and to distinguish these from
actions caused or controlled by other sources” (Damen 1). Their research revealed that an
individual’s sense of agency becomes reinforced over time. It is through repeated
behaviors and decisions made by that individual and, later, evaluated and reflected upon
by that individual, that a sense of self is constructed. Therefore, an individual’s identity is
formed, and reformed time and again, because of behaviors that they are able to perform.
While a person might report maintaining a high sense of agency throughout long periods
of their life, one’s sense of agency is not fixed; instead, “a sense of agency represents a
state construct that binds together our thoughts, actions, and action-effects to give rise to
the personal sense of having successfully influenced the immediate environment” (3).
The study found that once a threat to an individual’s identity, or a decreased sense of
agency, had been experienced, the individual was less sure of him or herself and
measurably more susceptible to outside forces, especially when it came to suggestion and
persuasion. Additionally, Len Doyal writes in “Medical Ethics and Moral
Indeterminacy,” that there are weak and strong autonomies. Doyal’s research suggests
that “all who have the ability to make ordinary everyday decisions in their lives possess
weak autonomy, while strong autonomy attaches only to those who are able to scrutinize
the information they receive in terms of impact and outcome, and thereby make fully
informed choices” (Biggs 99). However, once an individual’s sense is ruptured, they will
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be forced to recognize new limitations on their autonomy. So, these limitations on agency
may be temporary, or they may become the new normal over a period of time. While
medical professionals and patients both claim that patient involvement in decisionmaking is a priority for modern healthcare, what they fail to fully explain is when those
decisions should be made. Ideally, decisions over one’s health would be made when one
has the capacity to fully understand and weigh their options—an approach that would
allow for healthcare professionals and individuals to work towards common goals.
However, due to the demands of the institution, this is not currently the case. Healthcare
professionals do not uniformly recognize their ability—and responsibility—to equip all
members of society with a thorough understanding of their medical options. Within
Western biomedicine, healthcare professionals must meet the demands of two divergent
camps that ultimately fail to acknowledge the human component of patient and doctor
interactions. One views medicine as a business, and the other views it as a purely
scientific pursuit. While both may be justified in their views, they also dramatically limit
the kind of options available within the hospital setting. Within these two camps is an
ever-present ethical concern over decision-making power.
Institutional Stakeholders
At administrative levels within Western biomedicine, regulations exist to protect
both patients and healthcare professionals and to provide the highest standard of care for
all patients. On one hand, “stakeholders, including insurers, state and federal
governments, and consumer advocacy groups, are expecting, and in many cases
demanding, acceptable levels of performance in healthcare organizations,” (Goldsmith
27). On the other hand, these various groups “want to make sure that services are
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provided in a safe, convenient, low-cost and high-quality environment” (28). Emphasis
on cutting costs and avoiding patient “lingering” take a toll on the standard of care,
though. An example of this is Roemer’s Law, a dictum that “famously and simply states,
hospital beds that are built tend to be used” (Delamater et.al. 1). For patients and their
advocates, Roemer’s Law could be used to increase the space hospitals devoted to patient
care. Instead, the law bolsters the “belief that excess hospital beds leads to an
overutilization of hospital services, when the observed demand outpaces the population’s
actual need for services. Hospital utilization rates rise, therefore, due to higher levels of
inpatient admissions which may or may not lead to longer stays, contributing to higher
costs” (1). As an issue of space, this prevents hospitals from admitting and caring for
patients who might be in need of professional medical interventions on the basis of lack
of space. It also encourages hospitals to discharge patients who could benefit from more
time spent within the hospital and under the care of hospital professionals in an effort to
free up more beds more quickly.
Roemer’s Law adds complexity to one of the major conundrums within end-oflife care today: the location of death plays a significant role in the type of death that an
individual experiences. Although they want to be cared for within hospitals, neither
patients nor hospitals want the hospital to serve as the location of death. In 2000, a report
was published in which Medicare claimed that the number of their chronically and
terminally ill patients who were dying at home was on the rise. Since “public opinion
surveys in the United States report that a majority of people would prefer to die at home
if they were terminally ill,” Joan Teno and a team of medical ethicists conducted a
decade-long (2000-2009) study on the site of death in order to understand what was
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creating this new trend (Teno 470). In “Change in End-of-Life Care for Medicare
Beneficiaries: Site of Death, Place of Care, and Health Transitions in 2000, 2005, and
2009,” Teno and her team share a decade of careful research. Essentially, their research
showed that while Medicare could justifiably report that more people were dying at home
and approximately 65% of its dependents were dying in hospice care (doubling from
21.6% in 2000 to 42.2% in 2009), during the 10 years covered in the study, the number of
times each patient was moved during their last 90 days of life tripled (Gleckman 128).
Terminally ill and chronically ill patients were required to move, on average, three times
during their last three months of life. This prevented hospitals from being the site of death
on an individual’s death certificate, and allowed Medicare to make claims about
improved end-of-life care without fully revealing their methods.
Additionally, the forced migration of terminally ill bodies prevented patients from
“lingering,” a common practice in hospitals during the first half of the twentieth century.
Lingering allowed patients who were very ill to remain in the hospital until they died—a
process which could take weeks or even months (Kaufman 90). One particularly striking
case: a nurse who began her lengthy career in healthcare spoke of a lingering patient she
cared for in 1971, which was her first year as a nurse. The patient was a “young woman,
dying of cancer, [who] stayed in the hospital several months to receive what would now
be considered ‘comfort care’—turning, washing, toileting, and occasional pain
medication injections” (91). The patient was not isolated from family during this time,
but “had a husband and three young children, and no one expected her family to be able
to care for her at home. She died in the hospital” (91). When lingering was a part of
hospital protocol, nursing staff and doctors made attempts to help the lingering patients to
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pass peacefully and humanely. However, Medicare’s 1983 payment reforms left no room
for “lingering”, which was deemed “not a specific medical condition listed in the
prospective payment system codes” and as such, “could not be reimbursed” (Kaufman
91). Today, regardless of the patient’s individual circumstances, they cannot remain in
the hospital unless they are receiving treatments (Kaufman). While it was common
practice for decades, lingering would now be evaluated in terms of the availability of
resources and the strain placed upon the institution if it were required to allow patients to
linger. This reluctance to allow hospitals become the site for dying places the burden of
care on other sources, such as hospices and nursing homes. As hospital protocols
discharge patients who are too sick and unable to endure procedures—but are not yet
succumbing to their illnesses—patients often find themselves without many viable
locations for assistance. Within the contemporary hospital structure, there is no clear
space in which the dying can experience the final phase of their lives. Much of the
rhetoric surrounding end-of-life today represents dying as an inconvenience that Western
biomedicine would rather not deal with, and it is reasonable to assume that patients
recognize this lack of support while they hover in the in between, not encouraged to seek
out hospitals for the relief of their pain or symptoms, but not always well enough to care
for themselves. This lack of suitable location is one of the most overwhelming problems
within contemporary healthcare. For those who are at the end-of-life due to old age or
some terminal health issue, being forced to change locations so often is a clear sign that
they are unwelcome. The lack of sensitivity shown to these individuals at their time of
greatest need is a significant ethical dilemma, and one of the problems of the businessminded hospital model.
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The other approach to Western biomedicine treats the endeavor of healthcare as a
scientific pursuit. Barbara Heifferon and Stuart C. Brown write that, “As Western
biomedicine developed into a scientific discipline, its humanistic origins and impulses
have been downplayed. Empirical assumptions in the biological (including clinical)
sciences have contributed to a dismissal of rhetorical attention” and increased focus on
“‘scientific objectivity, student passivity, and dichotomous divisions such as subjectivity
and objectivity’” (Heifferon and Brown 3). Medicine has long been seen as a science.
Foucault presents his history of medicine with a “deliberately both historical and critical
approach…in determining the conditions of possibility of medical experience in modern
times” (BoC xix). What Birth of the Clinic reveals about that the institutions established
to provide healthcare is that their structure does not bode well for the needs of the
individual body. Foucault discusses how medicine’s scientific focus, “gave to the clinical
field a new structure in which the individual…was not so much a sick person as the
endlessly reproducible pathological fact to be found in all patients suffering in a similar
way…the plurality of observations was no longer simply a contradiction or confirmation,
but a progressive, theoretically endless convergence” (BOC 37, emphasis my own).
Despite the fact that modern medicine has debunked the idea of disease as ‘endlessly
reproducible’, disease is often considered to present in universally similar ways across
groups of people. Scientific medicine allows for these signs to be dissected by the
expertise of the physician at the risk of the individual’s experience of illness.
Bio-Power
What becomes obvious in parsing out the common interests of the more businessoriented approach to Western biomedicine and its more scientifically-oriented
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counterpart is how invested both approaches are in reproducibility and doing the least
harm for the most people. For both camps, medicine is successful if one approach works
for all individuals—which is where Foucault’s concept of bio-power comes into focus.
Cisney and Morar suggest that, “The question of power, then, is traditionally one
of domination, or the overextension of power’s reach. However, as Foucault rightly
notes, domination occurs in myriad ways, at all levels of society” (2). So, “to truly get at
the heart of power…requires not a general and totalizing interrogation of established
systems of power, but rather a close and particular analyses of the fundamental,
constitutive relations and mechanisms at work in localized settings, which make the
establishments of domination possible” (3). Power, like an individual’s sense of self, is a
fluid concept. It is not an external entity that pushes down upon individuals within a
society, but a living thing that “flows through the lives of human beings, constituting the
individuals themselves” (3). While “A number of sociologists and philosophers such as
Marx, Nietzsche and Weber, have discussed the notion of power and have generally
defined it in terms of repression and prohibition,” Foucault “defined it as a positive and
productive force” (Perron et. al. 536). In particular, Foucault’s work on bio-power
“encompasses many indicators of interconnectedness between individuals and the state”
or institution (536). Bio-power is characterized by “the interconnection of two axes:
anatamo-political (discipline of the body) and bio-political (population management)”
which, when taken together, focus and organize power over life. Bio-power scales to fit
any population, and in the case of the Western biomedical institution, it serves to both
discipline the body and exercise control over matters of life and death.
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Bio-power is not used to control through repression and prohibition. Instead, it is
a tool for the improvement—and, really, the standardization—of the masses. In biopower, “The human body comes to be seen as a machine, complete with functions and
utilities, inputs and outputs, predictabilities and precisions”—a disciplined and
disciplining location of power (Cisney and Maror 4); when taken together, these
disciplined bodies form “a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic
of birth, death, production, illness, and so on” (HoS 193). When bio-power emerged in
history (around the middle of the eighteenth century, the same approximate time as the
birth of the clinic), so too emerged “a host of disciplines and bodies of knowledge whose
task is to calculate, interpret, and predict the overall health of society writ large” (Cisney
and Maror 5). Power becomes centered “not on the individual living body but on the
species-body” (5). Through discipline and regulation, “the modern incarnation of power
relations, labeled as biopower” emerges (5).
However, the idealistic vision of bio-power as a regulatory mechanism of social
good is undermined by the body’s susceptibility to failure. As Foucault discusses, “The
sick man is no doubt incapable of working, but if he is placed in a hospital he becomes a
double burden for society: the assistance that he is given relates only to himself, and his
family is, in turn, left exposed to poverty and disease” (BoC 18). Additionally, he writes
that “the hospital…creates further disease in the social space in which it is placed. This
separation, intended to protect, communicates disease and multiplies it to infinity” (19).
When they were started, hospitals were places where disease spread like wildfire in spite
of efforts to exercise control; the bodies depending upon the institution and the institution
writ large were vulnerable to disease and illness. But Foucault’s analysis also illustrates
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that a man’s value is often calculated based upon whether he is healthy and whether his
healthy body can be put to work for the good of the state/institution. Rather than focusing
on curing the individual, “the patient, with his peculiarities of age, sex, and personal
history, represented an interference that had first to be abstracted before the pure
nosological essence of the disease could be revealed” (Sheridan 28). The emphasis on
bio-power gave way to “a new form of political and social organization…dependent on
the pushing to the limits of all human capacities;” bio-power “seeks the consistent and
ongoing increase in the forces of life without thereby suffering the loss of control over
these forces—power in the service of vitality” (Cisney and Morar 6). Within
contemporary society, bio-power permeates citizens at both the individual and the
societal level; bio-power stems from and engages with “an explosion of numerous and
diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of
populations” (140). In order to thrive, individuals must become part of a group.
Institutions dependent upon bio-power for their survival—including Western
biomedicine—“normalize, structure, optimize, and subordinate the forces of individuals
to enter them into the machine of the economic system, to make them productive
members of society who will happily defend it to the death if necessary” (7). One’s
willingness to fight to the death to protect their rights to remain a productive part of a
society is particularly interesting when we consider that for many of the individuals in
society who find themselves struggling with terminal illness or end-of-life, the fight is not
intended to hasten death, but to gain control over it. Often, this control is an
individualized one that effectively removes the individual from its subjectivity as a
productive member of society and reconstitutes them as a subject apart—a member of a
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different type of group, even. In a society that privileges health writ large, individuals
who become terminally ill become the living dying. Centuries ago, when individuals were
not contributing and their needs risked the collapse of the familial bio-power, they were
institutionalized, or set aside in order for the group to move forward (BoC 19). In
contemporary culture, they are welcomed into hospitals—but only if they submit their
bodies to the hospital’s regulations. Often, regulations include undergoing any and all
procedures suggested by nursing staff and physicians. Patients may no longer be admitted
to institutions against their wills, but they are now precariously dependent upon those
institutions for access to remedies. For the living dying, discipline and regulation must be
reconfigured.
Healthcare professionals are just as susceptible to the pitfalls of bio-power as their
patients are; after all, they too are human. As recent research suggests, it is this
humanistic impulse that forms some of the conflict in the practice of Western
biomedicine. With increasing frequency, healthcare professionals are reporting serious
ethical dilemmas during the performance of their jobs. Paul J. Weithman writes that,
“The Harvard Classics edition of great papers in the history of science reprints a version
of Hippocrates’ famous Oath” (548), and that included in the Oath are commitments to a
certain set of behaviors and standard of care. Among them: “I will follow that system of
regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my
patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous,” “I will give no
deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I
will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion” (Hippocrates qtd. in Weithman
548). What is striking within this excerpt is how significantly life has changed since the
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Oath was written. Still, the Hippocratic Oath remains one of the major ethical
arrangements in present day. Doctors who violate any part of it (in its contemporary
state) are deemed unsuitable to practice medicine; with a violence, they have rejected the
laws governing the practice. These are not the only rules that doctors risk breaking. The
tremendous responsibility associated with the practice of medicine holds doctors hostage
to a standard of behavior, and of responsibility. One of the main problems within Western
biomedicine is the distrust that stems from doctors manipulating their responsibility by
not reporting when mistakes are made, or by making decisions without fully explaining
consequences to patients. Most medical professionals adhere to what Katherine Foss has
dubbed the “code of silence” (Foss 485). By not making medical errors a part of the
public record, medical professionals maintain an air of perfection: recent Institute of
Medicine (IOM) reports found that “flaws in the healthcare system, not incompetent
individuals, have created a situation that breeds medical errors” (qtd. in Foss 485). These
flaws are not widely reported, though; doing so would undermine the façade of control
created by regulatory bio-power. Additionally, further research suggests that “the medical
profession’s tradition of hierarchical medicine may discourage physicians from listening
to patients’ concerns and may encourage medical residents and junior health
professionals to attempt new procedures in order to ‘prove’ themselves as physicians”
(Emanuel and Emanuel). These findings bring about important questions. For starters, if
the professionals working within Western biomedicine are required to strive for
unattainable perfection, how can the system be fixed to accommodate a more humane
approach for all of the disciplined bodies within bio-power? Currently, medical errors—
when admitted—are seen as deeply incongruous with the public’s image of medical
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perfection. It follows that in being held to impossibly high standards whilst being
protected by the auspices of Western biomedicine, healthcare professionals might be
missing the reality of the patient experience. Because “Discipline, it is true, intervenes
directly on the forces of the body itself to challenge and optimize them. At the same time,
it does so precisely to the end of situating that particular body within a hierarchy that
precedes it” (Cisney and Morar 9-10), the endeavor to discipline bodies that are not
capable to be optimized makes matters worse. After all, “Disciplines constitute a system
of control in the production of discourse, fixing its limits through the action of an identity
taking the form of a permanent reactivation of the rules” (AoK 224). If individuals cannot
be disciplined through curative medicine or other life-saving measures, their bio-power is
diminished and their position in society precarious. As the next section of this chapter
will discuss, the fixed limits best suited for discipline are made manifest in both literal
and abstract ways, since, “A discipline, in other words, serves as an apparatus for
producing discourse by controlling the way in which the discourse is produced”
(McGushin 628, emphasis my own). By striving to control and discipline bodies, society
has allowed the institution of Western biomedicine to exercise almost complete control
over end-of-life, right down to the words used to discuss it.
Hospitality + Bio-Power
Bio-power’s influence over contemporary life is apparent, and the structure of
contemporary healthcare is an institution that functions because of its ability to discipline
and regulate. These facets of healthcare are intended to help the masses, but in attempting
to construct a system that benefits all subjects dependent upon it, the power wielded by
Western biomedicine has taken a more prohibitive, repressive approach. In order to
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liberate Western biomedicine, its practitioners, and its patients from the institution’s
overextended power, it becomes necessary to liberate the individual. Doing so means
turning towards theories of the self and hospitality, and utilizing research on sense of self,
agency, and institutions to help untangle some of the knottier aspects of contemporary
Western biomedicine. In the remainder of this chapter, exploring what is made possible
by the openness of the subject is integral in moving towards this project’s main goals:
reclaiming control over bodies that subvert standard discipline, thereby establishing a
discourse with which to discuss end-of-life.
In Inessential Solidary: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations, Diane Davis writes:
“For there to be any sharing of symbolic meaning, any construction of a common enemy
or collective goal, any effective use of persuasive discourse at all, a more originary
rhetoricity must already be operating,” and this opening must be “a constitutive
persuadability and responsivity that testifies, first of all, to a fundamental structure of
exposure” (3). In being, being-with, and being-towards the Other, individuals open
themselves up in ways that expose, that lay bare individuality, and create vulnerability. In
being rhetorically open, subjects open themselves up not just to the Other, but also to the
customs and regulations which discipline life and construct society. Ethics should serve
as the guiding principle for the construct of the self; since, as Foucault writes,
“constituting an ethics of the self…is an urgent, fundamental and politically
indispensable task” (CdF82 241). McGushin builds upon this claim, stating that, “Given
our current political and ethical situation, an ethics of the self would represent one critical
point of resistance” to existing power structures (630). He continues: “What’s more, a
proper understanding of power and the points of resistance to power must work with a
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notion of a ‘subject who would be defined by the relation of the self to itself.’ In other
words, according to Foucault, we need a concept that functions both at a discursive or
theoretical level, allowing us to comprehend the function of power, and that functions at a
‘real,’ practical level as a tactical intervention in the deployment of resistance to power”
(McGushin 631, Foucault 241). For individuals who enter an institution in need and with
some goal in mind, hospitality serves as both a theoretical principle and a practical point
of resistance.
As discussed earlier, an individual subject’s sense of self is fluid and, due to the
individual’s exposedness, vulnerable. When we enter a medical facility for assistance in a
medical issue, for example, we are aware that we are entering an institution with
structured rules. In order to receive the treatments we desire, we must abide by these
‘house rules.’ In this sense, the space of medical decision-making has much in common
with hospitality. In 2000, Jacques Derrida stated in the Angelaki essay “Hostipitality,”
that “hospitality is opposed to what is nothing other than opposition itself, namely,
hostility…The welcomed guest is a stranger treated as a friend or ally, as opposed to the
stranger treated as an enemy (friend/enemy, hospitality/hostility)” (4). The relationship
between enemy/friend, hospitality/hostility, represents a blurring of the fluid boundary
between the two, or what Derrida called “hostipitality.” Derrida states that, “hospitality is
certainly, necessarily, a right, a duty, and obligation, the greeting of the foreign other as a
friend …on the condition that he maintains his own authority in his own home” (4).
Additionally, within the hospitality/hostility binary, the host “thereby affirms the law of
hospitality as the law of the household, the law of his household, the law of a place
(house, hotel, hospital, hospice, family, city, nation, language, etc.)…namely, the being37

oneself in one’s own home, the condition of the gift of hospitality” (4). In a sense,
patients enter the hospital and become guests, which is why in Western biomedicine
today, “doctor and patient are caught up in an ever-greater proximity, bound together, the
doctor by the ever-more attentive, more insistent, more penetrating gaze, the patient by
the all silent, irreplaceable qualities that, in him, betray—that is, reveal and conceal—the
clearly ordered forms of disease” (BoC 16). Upon entering the domain of the hospital,
doctor and patient are inextricably linked in a hospitable relationship; but, since the
patients are heavily dependent upon the specialized sight that only the trained medical
professional can provide, the power within the relationship is asymmetrical. This
imbalance in power has been around for centuries, and is one of the primary ethical
dilemmas within contemporary medicine.
Hospitality requires us to admit the existence of the ‘foreign other,’ or the entity
who is simultaneously different and separate from us, and whose existence makes it
possible for us to understand our own being-oneself. Derrida makes clear that,
“hospitality is a self-contradictory concept and experience which can only self-destruct
<put otherwise, produce itself as impossible, only be possible on the condition of its
impossibility> or protect itself from itself, auto-immunize itself in some way, which is to
say, deconstruct itself—precisely—in being put into practice” (5). Much like beingtowards-death, hospitality functions because it operates under the theoretical assumption
of its infinite possibility, but it is made real in its recognition of its finitude. The spaces
that Derrida claims as spaces of hospitality become both figurative and literal, as Derrida
makes clear in an aside during “Hostipitality,” when he asks his audience to consider “the
figure of the door,” and clarifies that, “for there to be hospitality, there must be a door.
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But if there is a door, there is no longer hospitality. There is no hospitable house. There is
no house without doors and windows. But as soon as there are doors and windows, it
means that someone has the key to them and consequently controls the conditions of
hospitality” (14). In the realm of the real, hospitality is not a figurative door, but a literal
one. As Brooke Rollins describes, states and institutions have long offered foreigners “a
system, a status, and even certain protections and honors that constitute what Derrida
calls ‘hospitality by right’” (Rollins 7). Hospitality by right “pulls welcomed guests into
an economy of reciprocity—even violence. When the state extends rights to foreigners,
that is, it does so by virtue of its sovereignty and by requiring the foreigner to recognize
and submit to that sovereignty” (7-8). These conditional rights, then, require that visitors
submit to the rules of the space they wish to inhabit and find protection within. And
within particular spaces, one’s role is altered—one’s identity is shifted from that of
subject with independent agency to that of a subject/guest who is beholden to another,
sovereign subject/host. These shifts make it necessary to know the customs of hospitality,
and to prepare one’s self for the violence of hostility in the event that a misstep is made
or that transgressions of violence occur.
When patients and loved ones enter hospitals for treatment, the repetition that
stabilizes their identities is interrupted. They are now subject/guests who are dependent
upon healthcare professionals/hosts and the sovereign hospital—not agents free to act as
they wish to in the world outside of the institution. By entering the space of the hospital,
individuals are stripped of certain rights, but privy to new protections. This is the trade
struck in pursuit of staying alive, and it marks the beginning of the difficult-to-escape
cyclical relationship that is contemporary Western biomedicine. Additionally, since the
39

sense of self is particularly vulnerable in situations and spaces that are new and
disorienting, an intervention on behalf of patients and for the protection of their rights
becomes necessary. If not handled with care, patients’ sense of self within the setting of
the hospital can become deeply injured during a hospital stay. While patients know that
they need what the hospital is offering, they do not know what the means to the end will
be. And, patients and their loved ones do not always possess the skill set, wherewithal, or
time to make the most informed decision in their particular circumstance. In terms of
conditional hospitality, contemporary hospitals place myriad restrictions upon a patient’s
agency while asking/requiring that the patient willingly submit to whatever treatments
and procedures the doctor decides upon.
The social constructs disciplining each individual’s behavior also play a role in
the conditioning of their bodies. In medical interactions, bodies enter into an occasion of
hospitality where the stakes are often, and quite literally, life and death. If, as Davis
explores, a collective or community “consists not in shared essence or common being (or
even a common purpose or interest or practice or value) but in a sharing out (partage) of
being itself,” then Western biomedicine as a construct can only exist through the sharing
of those individuals depending upon it (Davis 5). It is this sharing outward that marks the
beginnings of hospitality; the outcome of this hospitable interaction is the metric that can
and should be evaluated for its aptitude in caring-for all the others in its facilities. Issues
of health and illness are among the most identity-shaking and agency-rupturing
experiences endured by members of modern society. Medicine has both a comfortable
and a foreign power over human bodies. Foucault posits an interesting approach to
medical authority within Birth of the Clinic. He asks, “Is a medical experience, diluted in
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the free space of society reduced to the single, nodal, and necessary figure of the family,
not bound up in the very structure of society?” (19). He goes on to discuss the ideal
medical model: one where “a certain supervision would be exercised over the doctors
themselves, abuses would be prevented and quacks forbidden to practice, and, by means
of an organized, healthy, rational medicine, home care would prevent the patient’s
becoming a victim of medicine” (20). But no structure, once placed in the hands of man,
operates ideally. In medicine, the medical gaze provides doctors with a specialized
vision, a kind of superpower which allows them to discern things about and within the
body which the individual cannot know about himself. Instead of educating citizens about
their bodies and bodily conditions, Foucault writes that the gaze shifted from the old
practices of guessing, interviewing the patient, or a reading of outward symptoms, to
something more institutionalized:
“[T]he medical gaze…was no longer the gaze of any observer, but of a doctor
supported and justified by an institution, that of a doctor endowed with the power
of decision and intervention. Moreover, it was a gaze that was not bound by the
narrow grid of structure…it was a gaze that was not content to observe what was
self-evident; it must make it possible to outline chances and risks; it was
calculating.” (89)
The calculating nature of the medical gaze provides doctors with the training and
institutional backing to make claims as to what the patient’s maladies are and how they
can best be solved. The authority to visualize illness lies with the medical professionals
who can diagnose, order tests, and interpret results—as does the right and responsibility
to select what kinds of tests and procedures will be offered to patients. This ability to
discern and interpret is of great importance in certain medical situations, and when used
responsibly for the greater good, the medical gaze is an invaluable tool. Through the
medical gaze, surgical processes can safely (and accurately) occur and patients’ lives can
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be saved. Microscopic evidence of illness can be analyzed, and symptoms can be
validated through the scientific training of the professional healthcare staff. However,
because the medical gaze depends heavily on the individual doctor’s abilities as a careful
calculator, reliance of the masses upon the calculations of the few create a strange
dynamic which still governs—for better or worse—much of our contemporary medical
model.
Hospitality + Healthcare
Research on patient and doctor relationships suggests that autonomy and personal
agency are critical in providing patients with dignified care, and dignified end-of-life care
in particular. As explored earlier in this chapter, within American culture, dignity is very
closely tied to the ability to make decisions on one’s own, or to maintain a high sense of
agency. In “The Common Harm in Bioethics and Public Health,” authors Wasson and
Cook write, “Western society allows people to undertake risk or harm to themselves to
some degree without intervention,” but that public policies are put in place “to limit the
common harm rather than promote the common good” (Wasson and Cook). It follows
that if patients cannot fully analyze the information they are being given at what is
potentially a very emotional, difficult time, their choices may not be fully informed. And,
since the common good is the motivating factor behind medical decisions, individual
needs receive less and less attention.
As previously discussed, location of death is important. Timing is as well. But in
a culture that is thoroughly death averse, conversations about end-of-life care between
patients and their doctors—or patients and their families—do not always take place in a
timely manner. If they do occur, they are not always fruitful. Patients do not always ask
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questions, and “even when patients do ask for information, they ask general rather than
specific questions, which are likely to yield general rather than specific answers” (Feeser
3). Living wills or advanced directives are in place for some patients, but in terms of
specific care options given specific medical circumstances, most “patients and families,
when faced with health crises and the surrounding plethora of medical options, do not
know what to want, other than recovery” (Kaufman 34). In addition, there is “confusion
over what actually constitutes comfort care or palliation, and whether that set of practices
can be separated from unnecessary, optional, or unwanted life-prolonging interventions,
creates dilemmas for physicians” (38). A recent study suggests that, “The advantages of
hospice care are diminished for terminally ill patients who enter either prematurely or too
late. In general, premature hospice referral represents a lost opportunity for the patient to
receive potentially effective and life-prolonging treatment. Conversely, late hospice
referral is not desirable and negatively impacts both the quality of end-of-life care and the
quality of life of patients and their families” (Gil-Herrera et.al. 2). However, individuals
are not always fully aware of the optimal window in which they should take advantage of
hospice care; this is further complicated by terminally ill patients’ dependence upon their
insurance coverage. Even if their insurance covers end-of-life care, “according to
Medicare regulations, patient eligibility for hospice care is contingent upon a life
expectancy of less than six months, as estimated by the attending physician and certified
by the medical director of the hospice program” (2). One of the main motivations for
entering hospice is that option’s alignment with one’s personal values, which “determine
the choices they make from a range of” readily available “end-of-life treatments” (Norton
and Miller 252). But hospice is not easy to be admitted to, and in the event that the
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patient does not die within their 6 month window, things can become complicated. For
instance, hospice caregivers deal with patient death up close, and in one study, revealed
that they suspected patients of taking advantage of unapproved methods to end their lives
(252), such as when a “bottle of morphine and a fifth of gin” are easier to attain than
materials needed to medically end life in a quicker way. Others discussed hospice’s
difficulty in providing patients with the end-of-life they desired, stating that sometimes,
even those patients who were of sound mind, “deliberate,” and “had already negotiated
with themselves about what their terms of living and dying might be” were unable to
achieve their desired death because of practical limitations (253). For the terminally ill
and the dying, hospice seems like a humane and comforting way to die. However, it is
still an institution of medicine and has its own standards to uphold. And these standards
include avoiding behaviors which might speed up dying process. For individuals who
assume hospice will be available for them at the end of life, there seems to be a lack of
understanding about what hospice is and what it can provide.
And lack of transparency about healthcare coverage and possibilities for
admission into hospice are only made more difficult because of the diagnostic and
prognostic methods used by practicing healthcare professionals. In “Rough set theory
based prognostic classification models for hospice referrals,” Gil-Herrera et. al.
performed reviews of prognostic methods and discovered that, “despite the importance of
accurate prognostication within the spectrum of medical care objectives, there is a lack of
accessible and accurate prognostic models available to physicians in practice” (3). This is
particularly problematic because of patient dependence upon those methodologies at the
end-of-life. It is crucial that patients be given a clear understanding of what will occur
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during end-of-life, and realistic expectations about what medical interventions can
accomplish. However, while “ethical, legal, and societal concerns greatly affect the
framework under which medical data may be used,” the “US model encourages the use of
de-identified, minimal risk medical data for research purposes, specifically data collected
during routine treatment of patients” (3). Additionally, there is a lack of clarity in the
translation and transmission of information, since “patient-specific disease progression
over time is not considered,” leaving room for too much ambiguity in patient’s
approaches to their own experience with their singular disease.
At the end of their study, Gil-Herrera et.al. offers a cost-benefit analysis to their
mathematical model of prognostics. It serves as an uncharacteristic aside within the
journal BMC Medical Informatics & Decision Making, under the heading “Decision
analysis for hospice referral.” They write: “Consider the costs—economic, emotional,
and physical—associated with the decision to enter hospice care. These costs are justified
for patients who either enter hospice care at the appropriate time or for those who do not
enter hospice care when they could benefit from curative treatment” (18, emphasis my
own). The article defines these instances as “true positive and true negative” outcomes,
but then moves on to a discussion of the more likely occasions—those in which “a higher
emotional and physical cost is born by patients sent to hospice care but who ultimately
survive six months—a false positive” (18). Still worse, though, comes the “highest cost
of all, emotionally, economically and physically,” which is “born by the patient and his
or her family when costly treatment is prolonged for a patient who should have been
referred to a hospice care program—a false negative. In this last case, some or all of the
benefits of hospice care would be lost while the stresses and economic burden of
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aggressive treatment are endured” (18). For these false negative patients, remaining time
left to live can become squandered on treatments that only hasten death and increase
suffering.
As the patient safety officer at Maine Medical Center recently stated, “Forty years
ago, hospitals were looked at as trusted friends. But there has been a relative decline in
positive feeling about hospitals, because of all the attention to medical errors, the fear of
hospital-acquired infections and the commercialization of medicine” (Salvador qtd. in
Pear). While hospice is a viable option for many individuals, its usefulness is limited.
And the fear associated with hospital deaths is not completely unwarranted, given the
lack of individualized care. In order for hospices or hospitals to provide a dignified death
for every single individual, patients would need to die in a perfectly orchestrated way—
the kind of death reflected in the prognostic materials which do not take individual
experience or needs into consideration, but instead de-identify unique, personal diagnoses
and prognoses. Basically, individuals would need to enter the hospitals with dying as
their purpose—not curative medicine. While hospice is often a place ill individuals go
with dying in mind, and although it aims to be hospitable, as an institutionalized method
of care, it only welcomes in a very particular kind of guest. And, in welcoming them, the
institution cannot guarantee the guest’s experience. As host, it cannot protect the guest
from death, but instead promises only to make death a little less painful, a little less
lonely, a little closer to a dignified ending. Hospice hospitality only succeeds if it is a true
positive—which is not as easily orchestrated as most Americans would like to believe.
Ironically, even when hospice patients have found in-home hospice solutions to ease their
end-of-life experience, there are many risks due to the lack of oversight occurring within
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the home setting. As Gershon et. al. report in “Home Health Care Patients and Safety
Hazards in the Home: Preliminary Findings,” despite home health care being the “fastest
growing sector in the health care industry,” it also poses some serious issues due to
“home care delivered under conditions that may be uncontrolled…health care providers
[with] limited training or expertise in the area of patient safety and [who] often have little
or no direct supervision,” and because while each individual’s home might technically be
a “worksite, all the necessary health care workplace protections for both workers and
patients may not be in place or readily available” (2). Home health care and home
hospice offer a liberation from the institution, but it is also that liberation which makes
the quality of care offered by in-home services problematically ambiguous. This only
further complicates the relationship between patients and caregivers, leaving a vast
ethical end-of-life gray area in which experts, patients, and loved ones are currently
stuck.
Dying is not always a medical emergency. In many cases, death occurs in a way
that is “natural,” or that can be interpreted as an ending to short- or long-term suffering,
or in some fortunate cases, an ending that is free from suffering altogether. But when
death does not occur naturally, a situation which modern medicine has caused to become
increasingly common, patients need to understand what conditions they will be
responsible for adhering to upon entering the hospital. And, they need to be able to speak
the language of the hospital in order to explain themselves. In the 1984 study
“Paternalism and Partial Autonomy,” O’Neill writes: “One patient can indeed be
expected to come to an informed and autonomous (if idiosyncratic) decision; another may
be too confused to take in what his options are. A third may be able to understand the
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issues but be too dependent or too distraught to make decisions” (O’Neill 177). Biggs
builds on O’Neill’s research, writing that, “when stripped of clothing, familiarity of
surroundings and emotional support, patients can find it difficult to express doubts and
fears about the efficacy of proposed forms of treatment” (Biggs 99). Hospitals are
disorienting places and when individuals enter hospitals, they are often not completely in
control of their emotional or physical wellbeing.
Douglas Davies writes in A Brief History of Death, “most ordinary folk do not
have the luxury of being able to [express themselves] in response to death. Whatever
their private thoughts may be, the public world stands as the arena in which those
relationships have to be expressed, catching as best it may the nuances of personal
experience” (Davies 4). Sociologists and psychologists have long described mortality as
an important human experience that we can only fully understand as we mature and
recognize the mortality of those around us and, inevitably, our own. But, as psychologist
Nima Golijani-Moghaddam reports in “Practitioner psychologists in palliative care: Past,
present, and future directions,” Westerner’s “familiarity with death has decreased over
recent generations” and “increased life expectancies and the relocation of death from
family homes to care institutions mean that direct experience of death is typically avoided
until mid-life” (Golijani-Moghaddam 32). Death is dramatically less visible in Western
culture today than it was in Western culture just 50 years ago. Sociologist Tony Walter
suggests that this is due to the change in the location of death: instead of dying at home,
Westerners now view death as a stage of life that occurs in a hospital or institution.
Walter characterizes this shift in location as a shift in culture—from the ‘traditional’
model of the family caring for their dying loved ones to the ‘modern’ model where the
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dying are cared for by doctors, heavily medicated, and where suffering and death is
hidden from the public view (Walter). This cultural shift has removed death from the
public sphere, but has one more striking consequence: it has prevented individuals from
developing a full understanding of their mortality and how it might naturally progress.
Due to this shift to the ‘modern’, contemporary people are ill-equipped in dealing with
death because it is culturally invisible. Before this shift, death was something that
individuals learned about as they aged and people around them also aged and died; first,
much older people who were distant relatives and gradually, individuals who were closer
in age and station to the individual himself succumbed to the natural order of things
(Goljani-Moghaddam 34-35). Once dying was confined to institutions and made less
visible, the culture shifted from concern over saving people from diseases that might kill
them within a few days to what Tony Walter describes as a cultural struggle to learn “to
die more slowly from the degenerative diseases of old age” (Walter). While healthy
individuals might take advantage of contemporary medicine’s ability to provide them
with solutions to manageable health issues, for the terminally ill, dying more slowly is
not always an option.
In pursuit of a more hospitable model of death in America today, we must find a
language that assists in creating transparency. However, developing a discourse about
death and end-of-life presents its own challenges. In 2009, Americans had begun to warm
to the idea of educating themselves about death when the House of Representatives
attempted to pass new healthcare legislation, HR Bill 3200. A provision, 1233, was one
small piece of the HR Bill 3200. 1233 effectively spelled out how to train physicians in
end-of-life patient conversations, but also presented options for incentivizing these vital
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conversations (HR Bill 2300). Additionally, it encouraged doctors to voluntarily provide
their patients with information about end-of-life, living wills, advanced directives, and
other medical and legal options. But the bill unraveled when then-Republican Vice
Presidential candidate Sarah Palin referred to the provision as creating “death panels,”
which would allow physicians to decide which patients were “worthy of medical care”
(Palin qtd. in Millman). Although Palin’s claim was refuted by all medical, political, and
legal sources involved with the bill and provision, the public uproar caused the provision
to be removed in order for the rest of the bill to be passed. It wasn’t until five years later
in 2014 that the Institute of Medicine called for an “overhaul” of how end-of-life care is
dealt with in the United States. Additionally, a December 2014 Newsweek article claimed
that 2014 was, “The year we finally learned to talk seriously about death” (Millman).
Despite this hopeful declaration, there have been no substantial alterations in how death
is coded or in how it is discussed.
Contemporary medicine is now confronted with the largest group of Americans
over the age of 65 in history. In the face of this new societal structure, one of the
questions medicine should be asking is this: How can dying be made more hospitable and
approachable? A 2011 report in Clinical Teacher found that various medical school
curricula recognized a growing “lack of opportunity for students to explore death as
members of society rather than future practitioners” (242), and Trinity College in Dublin
in particular found it necessary to introduce a completely new set of courses on Death
and Dignity in order to assist students in providing better end-of-life care. The report
describes their need, saying, “[r]ather than discussing well-worn roads of ethics of
euthanasia and palliative care, this course afforded students an opportunity to perceive
50

death as a normal societal event, rather than an event that required intervention by the
medical profession either by preventing, prolonging, or easing death” (242, emphasis my
own). If current and future doctors struggle to recognize the normality of death, then it
follows that their methods of care might be influenced by this lack. A recent study in the
“communicative competence” of healthcare professionals in the delivery of “bad news,”
found that “Bad news is typically defined as information that ‘negatively alters’ the
patient’s perspective of his or her future” (Gillotti et. al. 1013). In comparison to other
doctor-patient interactions, the “interaction still involves information giving and seeking,
as do most medical consultations, but the emotional component and subsequent patient
retention are different than other medication interactions” (1013). In attempting to
develop a better methodology for the delivery of bad news from doctors to patients,
Gillotti and her co-authors admit, “not much is known about the actual training of health
care professionals in this area” (1013). It should come as no surprise, then, that research
has shown “one of the most difficult situations faced by physicians involves strong
emotional displays from patients,” (Platt and Keller; Gillotti 1014). Not surprisingly,
medical professionals who were recorded delivering bad news as part of the study were
perceived as being “not very empathetic” (1019). Gillotti’s study reveals a significant
need for revision in communicative practices.
When communication between doctors and patients fails, there are severe
consequences that cannot be ignored. And this communication, and those who try to
assist in bridging the gap between patient and doctor, is not easy—especially within the
rigid structures of Western biomedicine. Ethicist Amy M. VanDyke, who has worked as a
consultant within hospitals for years, reports on the pressures that physicians are under in
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diagnosing, treating, and releasing patients from the hospital. She writes that, “Physicians
and other healthcare professionals occasionally try to impede ethical discussions for a
variety of reasons,” and that the attempts to “squelch or divert ethical discussion can
come up in many forms, some more difficult to manage than others” (10). Some of these
reasons include physicians’ attempts to make decisions on behalf of patients who were
without decision-making capacity (10), which would constitute physician’s assumption of
the role as a surrogate for the patient. Another reason for preventing ethical discussion
between outside experts and patients is that physicians do not want to “slow down the
clinical process,” and fear that presenting patients with more options. In a particular
experience with a doctor whom VanDyke had a “solid working relationship for years,”
she “got an unpleasant response…because an ethics consult was requested” (11).
VanDyke shares: “He made a face at me and said something to the effect of, ‘Great, I
guess I will be here for another several hours while you get done doing your ethics stuff.
Then I can finally finish up with the patient’s discharge’” (11). What VanDyke saw as
her assistance in navigating the divide between doctor’s orders and patient’s needs was
rejected by the physician because ethics was “an unwelcome intrusion” in the
performance of his job (11). While there are many ethical doctors who seek out
additional input in order to more humanely and compassionately perform their jobs,
VanDyke’s experience within the hospital setting speaks to the concern over imbalanced
power.
The Risk of Unclear Hospitality Roles: Memorial Medical Center
While there are many factors motivating this research, there is one particularly
shadowy ethical corner of medical inhospitality that vividly illustrates the importance of
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this project and the kinds of ethical dilemmas a more open end-of-life conversation can
prevent. In 2009, the New York Times published Sheri Fink’s, “The Deadly Choices at
Memorial,” a lengthy study and collection of interviews with healthcare workers,
patients, and family members who were at Memorial Medical Center in New Orleans,
Louisiana, when Hurricane Katrina hit. During Katrina, Memorial lost power, running
water, and was virtually inaccessible due to the height of the waters surrounding it.
Temperatures were over 90 degrees, and doctors and nurses worked to evacuate patients
as soon as they realized the severity of the storm and the inhabitable conditions within the
hospital. However, dozens of patients and a handful of staff remained in the hospital
without adequate conditions for days after the hospitals’ backup generators stopped
working.
In the direct aftermath of the storm, the healthcare professionals working at
Memorial were left asking some difficult ethical questions, among them being: “How
long should health care workers have to be with patients who may not survive?” (Pou qtd.
in Fink). As Fink points out, though, “The story of Memorial Medical Center raises other
questions: Which patients should get a share of limited resources, and who decides? What
does it mean to do the greatest good for the greatest number, and does that end justify all
means?” (Fink). And, perhaps most jarringly, “Where is the line between appropriate
comfort and mercy killing?” Mercy killing might be the best description of the events that
transpired at Memorial days after the storm—events that, even years later, come to the
surface in fragments and fail to present a clear reason why certain choices were made in
the face of difficult circumstances. Many of the patients who could not evacuate
Memorial Medical Center were part of a particularly vulnerable patient population: most
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were elderly, obese, or on some kind of life support. Many were in the hospital’s
LifeCare wing recovering from surgeries or treatments, but were confined to their beds.
In addition to being vulnerable, their conditions at the time of the storm were
inconvenient. However, they might not have remained in those states if given the chance
to evacuate. When hospital workers realized they needed to leave the hospital, these were
the patients who were given lethal doses of medications.
For those in the medical profession, the situation at Memorial is a worst-case
scenario, a nightmare of shocking proportions. It presents an occasion where real life and
death choices had to be made, and where healthcare professionals tasked with saving
patients’ lives could not agree on a singular plan or ethical solution to their dilemma. In
fact, Fink’s article reveals just how disparate the opinions of attending physicians were
during the crisis. For example, she discusses the testimony of various personnel who saw
Dr. Anne Pou bring “numerous vials of morphine to the seventh floor” where patients
recovering in the LifeCare wing were given “additional morphine and midazolam—a
fast-acting drug used to induce anesthesia before surgery or to sedate patients for medical
procedures” (Fink). When healthcare personnel and, in some cases, patients themselves,
questioned Dr. Pou’s methods, she answered that she was giving them something to “help
with…dizziness” or “something to help make you feel better” (Fink). But medical
professionals are often especially careful about administering these specific drugs, and
particularly because it is well-known that together, these drugs slow patient breathing and
can lead to death. Other doctors grew angry at the insinuation that bedridden patients
should be given these lethal doses of medications and refused to remain at Memorial,
instead venturing out into a city ravaged by flooding, looting, and suffering. Others
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stayed, deciding to take part in a “discussion of ‘things that only doctors talk about’”—
namely, the euthanization of patients (Fink). These discussions energized some of the
sleep-deprived healthcare professionals, who doubled their efforts to help patients up a
narrow outdoor staircase and onto the hospital’s helipad in the event that help arrived. Dr.
John Thiele stated that at Memorial during Katrina: “The laws of man had broken down,
[I] concluded, and only the laws of God applied” (Thiele qtd. in Fink). Toxicology
reports revealed that 17 patients at Memorial Health Center received lethal doses of
morphine or midazolam, or both. In the years since Katrina, many of the doctors involved
in the Memorial Health Center care during the hurricane have retired or moved. Anne
Pou was charged with four counts of manslaughter, but was not convicted. Instead, she
has become a proponent of increased legislation to protect medical professionals from
prosecution if they are faced with difficult ethical decisions during the performance of
their jobs.
Hospitality Revisited
Hospitality exists for the protection of all those involved in the interaction. While it could
be argued that the healthcare professionals at Memorial Medical Center violated their
obligations to act as protective, benevolent hosts toward their guests, it could also be
argued that those working within the hospital were themselves held hostage by their
responsibility/response-ability towards their patients. Davis uses the term response-ability
to define an exposedness that makes response possible; responsibility, then, is what ethics
drives individuals to create out of that possibility. Fink reports that some doctors and
nurses refused to participate in certain acts, and decided to flee the hospital instead.
Applied from this angle, it would seem that the hospitable course of action would have
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been to remain present, prevent human rights violations, and assist all patients and
healthcare professionals—in essence, seeing the hospitable relationship through to its
agreed upon ending. In being able to the situation with one’s full sense of self intact, it
seems irresponsible to reject that capability and remove one’s self from the situation. The
removal is a rejection of responsibility. As Derrida wrote, “hospitality is opposed to what
is nothing other than opposition itself, namely, hostility…The welcomed guest is a
stranger treated as a friend or ally, as opposed to the stranger treated as an enemy
(friend/enemy, hospitality/hostility)” (4). The relationship between enemy/friend,
hospitality/hostility, represents a blurring of the fluid boundary between the two, or what
Derrida called “hostipitality.” This confusion, or blurring, is made manifest when host
and guest engage in hospitality together; in that simultaneous opening up towards the
other, both host and guest open themselves up to the possibility of violence. While the
interaction may proceed according to the laws of hospitality, hostility and enmity can
seep in and sour an otherwise amicable interaction at any point; they are ever-present. For
the healthcare professionals who remained at Memorial Medical Center as the water rose
and the power failed, their well-established roles as respected hosts were dramatically
altered by the conditions of their crumbling home. They, too, were held hostage by the
tragedy. While they may have accelerated the deaths of their patients, their methods were
as non-violent as such an intervention could be; the doctors and nurses could not escape
the safe haven-turned-living hell of the hospital, but some of their patients could find
relief. Their actions may have been taken with their roles of host in mind; a more
interesting reading is that they freed their fellow guests from an inhospitable space.
Hospitality within contemporary healthcare is more complex than a simple doctor-patient
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relationship. There are myriad pressures upon many guests—all with differing conditions
places upon them—to successfully fulfill their obligations to the masters of the home.
Hospitality governs these interactions, but makes it difficult to locate power with
certainty. Think of it this way: all guests (patients, healthcare professionals, loved ones)
inhabit different conditional guest positions as they visit the hospital. However, the
conditions of their visitation are always subject to change, making their interaction with
others unstable. For the healthcare professionals who allegedly hastened patients’ deaths,
by liberating the most disadvantaged guests from their stay at the hospital, they
essentially released those individuals from the conditions of hospitality. But when guests
start freeing one another, hospitality is ruptured.
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Chapter Three
Authenticity in Dying: The ‘Good Death’ of Socrates
Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:—the attendant who is to give you the poison has been
telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are not to talk much, talking, he says,
increases heat, and this is apt to interfere with the action of the poison; persons who
excite themselves are sometimes obliged to take a second or even a third dose.
Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give the poison twice
or even thrice if necessary; that is all.
–Plato, Phaedo
The eyes of others our prisons; their thoughts our cages.
–Virginia Woolf, “Monday or Tuesday”
Even centuries after his death, Socrates’ influence as one of the founders of
Western philosophy can be seen throughout contemporary culture. Robin Waterfield
writes that, “Everyone has heard of Socrates, and even if they know little or nothing else
about the man, they usually know that he was put to death…The events surrounding
Socrates’ death have become iconic—more discussed, portrayed or merely mentioned—
than any except those surrounding the death [of Jesus] some four hundred years later”
(xi). Traces of Socrates’ legacy shape modern philosophy, teaching, ethics, and law, and
in recent decades, Socrates’ status as an icon of philosophical inquiry and rational
thought has been co-opted by human rights movements. By conjuring up both the legacy
and the intellectual heritage that Socrates is still considered the father of, these groups
attempt to align themselves with Socrates’ brand of considered and ethical activism.
One particular movement affiliated itself with Socrates and celebrated him as an
embodiment of rationality, not only for how he lived, but also because of their
interpretation of how he died. The group, the Hemlock Society USA, was established in
1980 in Santa Monica, California. Founders Ann Wickett and Derek Humphry chose the
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name Hemlock Society because of its connections to “that fellow and poisoner Socrates”;
the group even notes that their organization was almost named the Socrates Society
(Humphry). They write that they were inspired by the level of choice they see within
Socrates’ final days. They claim that, “Socrates’ death…was a noble and self-chosen one,
and he spent hours discussing with his colleagues whether he should accept the death
sentence inflicted by the courts for corrupting the youth of Athens or accept a lonely,
barren exile. Essentially, that is what the Hemlock Society was about—not hasty and
hurtful suicide, but thoughtful and rational reasons for an accelerated death” (Humphry,
emphasis my own). In order to reach a wider number of Americans, the group merged
with various other end-of-life advocacy groups in 2003 and changed its name to
Compassion & Choices. While the group’s “Good Life, Good Death,” motto was
abandoned in the merger, what remained were the various groups’ unifying desires to
improve end-of-life care and end-of-life options for contemporary patients and to present
those (often, not always) medicalized alternatives as rational choice. As William Batt
describes, hemlock as a unifying principle remains apt for members of these
organizations because, “first…it symbolizes the principle of personal choice central to
Socrates’ action,” secondly because, “Socrates faced choices unacceptable to him much
like terminally ill people today,” and lastly, “because it focuses centrally on the place of
the self in society in a way that was vital to Socrates in his time as well as for living
people today” (Batt qtd. in Humphry).
The Rationale for Rationality
However, this chapter will argue that this cultural/scholarly impulse to perpetuate
the myth that Socrates was an infallibly rational individual creates problems—chief
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among them being that in striving for a Socratic death, individuals are actively seeking an
un-rational attitude to threats of personal loss, harm, and suffering—experiences that, in
reality, naturally bring up feelings of fear and anxiety. In pursuing a hyper-rational ideal,
groups like the Hemlock Society are failing to recognize the divisions between the
historical Socrates and the Platonic one, differences that are perhaps more apparent in
Phaedo than in any of the other dialogues. By prescribing Socrates’ death as the best
possible scenario for the terminally ill, the Hemlock Society undercuts its own purpose
and fails to recognize the other things the Phaedo has to say about end-of-life.
There are issues of authorial voice within scholarship on Phaedo. “The search for
the historical Socrates, like the search for the historical Jesus, continues to generate an
even more enormous literature, a vast sea of speculation and learned controversy” (Stone
4). The historical Socrates is a figure patchworked together mostly out of surviving
fragments of texts written by two of his students, Xenophon and Plato. The other sources
consist of fragments that appear in Ancient Greek, “contemporary portraits of Socrates,”
one from Aristophanes’ Clouds, a play devoted almost solely to Socrates, and “just two
generations later,” some “useful glimpse[s] of Socrates” appear in the works of Aristotle
(5). It is widely accepted that myth assists in the development of cultures. As Hart and
Daughton highlight in their work on cultural criticism, there are a few key types of myths
which function within our contemporary culture. Among them are cosmological stories,
told to explain “why we are here, where we came from, who are ancestors were,” societal
myths, or those which “teach the right way to live…and become more heavily drenched
in meaning each time they are told”, and eschatological myths, which “help a people
know where they are going, what lies is store for them in the short run as well as the long
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run” (Hart and Daughton 243). The works that help the picture of the historical Socrates
come into focus meet all of the criteria for myth building. Together, the pieces of Plato
and Xenophon’s work help to immortalize the importance of Socrates work, and the
works of Aristophanes and Aristotle give that mythology its color. But as with any
mythology, the images that readers gain from these artifacts can be imprecise and open to
interpretation.
What is widely agreed upon by scholars and historians is that there is no way to
truly know Socrates or his thoughts; what we latch onto in Western culture is an
amalgamation of various authorial agendas. So, while “we may have a greater number of
words about Socrates than about any comparable ancient Athenian…every single word
needs to be weighed and treated with caution” (Waterfield xii). When Socrates scholar
Gregory Vlastos reinvigorated analytical approaches to classical philosophy during the
late twentieth century, he spent a great deal of energy re-classifying the early, middle,
and late Socratic dialogues, and noted that, “only a ‘schizophrenic’ could hold such
divergent views simultaneously” (Vlastos qtd. in Dillon 551). What Matthew Dillon and
other recent scholars of ancient philosophy have deduced is that by the time the Phaedo
(which falls into the middle dialogues on Vlastos’ timeline) was likely written, Plato
would have “matured as a philosopher in his own right, under the influence of thinkers
besides Socrates…and that consequently it then becomes impossible to ascribe, with
certainty, a given belief to the ‘historical’ Socrates’” (526). The divergent views that
struck Vlastos as impossible, coupled with the indistinct time of the Phaedo’s
completion, cast doubt on the possibility of a fully developed understanding of the
historical Socrates. After all, Socrates himself wrote nothing until his imprisonment, and
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what he wrote was not philosophy but an altogether different project. Instead of writing
down his work, he became immortalized by his disciples, many of whom were driven to
write by their desire to “exculpate their mentor—to make their fellow Athenians wonder
why they had ever condemned him in to death” (Waterfield xi-xii). Take, for example,
the significant activities of Socrates’ final day. Socrates, “dying from the feet upwards,”
spends his final hours emphasizing to his disciples that, ‘those who truly grasp
philosophy pursue the study of nothing else but dying and being dead’” (Dillon 525,
Plato 64a). Matthew Dillon writes that, “In the course of explaining this remarkable
assertion,” Socrates then “goes on to develop at great length an even more remarkable
thesis—remarkable, at any rate, for one of the founding fathers of the Western
philosophical tradition: after the death of the body, the immortal soul is reborn according
to the merits of its former life, gradually purifying itself as it evolves into pure essence,
leaving all corporeality behind” (Dillon 525). Plato is careful to show only a composed
Socrates to the very last minute, and reinforces this image of Socrates by contrasting it
with the actions of the disciples. In his final moments, Socrates lamented the “loud
weeping and complaining” his disciples had broken into, telling them that scene was
distasteful and “why I sent the women away…because I’ve heard that one ought to die in
peace” (117e). From its first moment until its last, the Phaedo represents Socrates as the
lone reasonable man in the prison.
The project of the Phaedo is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, the
Phaedo is in the same vein as other Socratic/Platonic dialogues in that it values reason
over emotions or desire. As Halvard J. Fossheim writes, “In our tradition, Socrates, as he
figures in the work of Plato, stands for rationality. In one way, of course, the tendency to
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treat him as rationality incarnate is not too far off the mark; for Socrates does indeed
introduce into our thought and discussions a demand for argument, for stringency and
consistency” (851). For many critics, the Phaedo stands apart because of its “treatment of
desire—desire, that is, for corporeal stimulation or satisfaction. According to the
‘standard’ Platonic account, this sort of desire forms a distinct ‘part’ of the soul, of which
another part is reason” (Boys-Stones 4). In the other Platonic accounts, such desire, like
reason, could become a “psychological determinant of action” and cause individuals to
act either according to reason or in direct contrast to it (4). But in the Phaedo, the
standard Platonic approach changes in a nuanced way; “Plato appears to be trying
something different. According to the Socrates of the Phaedo, desire is not of the soul at
all, but of the body” (4). In the Phaedo, the soul is pure reason, and desire is no longer a
part of the soul, but located completely in the body instead. This allows for this particular
Platonic dialogue to advocate for reason and control over all else and to lead readers to
believe that the desires plaguing the soul and preventing reason could be left behind in
death. Despite the Phaedo’s difference, throughout the Platonic dialogues, “reason is
capable of maintaining control—in the first place precisely by avoiding situations of
intense pleasure and pain which might impede its own activity” (Boys-Stones 8, Plato
83b). But Fossheim argues that Socrates often engaged in activities that could be labeled
irrational. He claims that, “the manner in which Socrates carries out his historically
influential elenctic activity belies the shortcomings of this oft-quoted and inspirational
picture” of the purely rational Socrates (851). In a particularly persuasive passage,
Fossheim paints philosophical engagements with Socrates as interactions which promised
the risk or reward of pleasure or pain. He describes Socrates’ “refutational dialectic” as
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“painful,” and writes that, “Taking a dialectical beating from Socrates demands of you
that you actively decide to enter a game which might take hours. Not least, it requires that
you stay alert and engaged, that you remain willing to play—and to play by Socrates’
rules” (852). This description of Socrates’ philosophical inquiries as an arena of
conditions echoes the rules of engagement in hospitable relationships. In philosophical
engagement as in hospitality, both parties have ‘skin in the game’; the extent to which the
risks are taken and the point at which payoff occurs, though, is in the control of the host
who, claiming ignorance, knows all the questions and their answers.
It is crucial to note that the Phaedo depicts the death of Socrates as an almost
constant struggle between the very same intense experiences of pleasure and pain that
Socrates/Plato warn might cause a true philosopher’s grip on reason to fail. In relaying
the story of Socrates’ death, Phaedo tells Echecrates that “it was simply a strange
experience: an unusual combination of pleasure mixed with pain at the thought that he
was soon to die. Everyone there felt much the same. Now we would laugh and sometimes
we’d cry” (59a). This connection between pleasure and pain, enchainment and release, is
an echo of Socrates’ own statements on the day of his death. As Phaedo relays, when his
friends arrive in his cell on the day of his execution, Socrates is seated and soothing an
area on his body where his chains have just been removed. He greets his visitors, (who
enter to find him “rubbing and bending his leg),” by stating, “How strange, gentlemen, is
this thing people call pleasure! How strangely related to its seeming opposite, pain: They
refuse to occur in a man together, yet if you pursue and capture the one, you’re nearly
always forced to take the other, too, as though they shared a single head” (Plato 60b).
Socrates then continues, commenting on the pleasure-pain relationship that if, “Aesop
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had noticed them, I think he’d have composed a fable” (60b). Within the first pages of the
text, Plato has created a correlation between the dynamic of physical pleasure-pain and
emotional physical-pain; that correlation is largely based on the experience of the
Mobius-like pleasure and pain as strange—simultaneously foreign and familiar. In a text
that seemingly advocates for reason and a rational approach to dying, Plato’s Phaedo
illuminates the two experiences which can undo reason—intense pleasure and/or pain—
and gives them starring roles in the dramatic retelling of the death of Socrates.
Why Socrates?
When he was found guilty of impiety and corrupting Athenian youth in 399
B.C.E., Socrates was 69 or 70 years old. Upon receiving the verdict, he asked the jury of
500 of his fellow Athenian citizens to release him so that he could return to his life’s
work. Instead, they condemned him to death by hemlock, a standard method of execution
in Ancient Greece. But Socrates’ sentence was not carried out immediately. Instead, his
existence was suspended between life and death for nearly a month while he waited for
events outside of his control to transpire. The events controlling his fate would have been
familiar to ancient readers, but are worthy of some summarization here.
Ancient Greeks were wary of executing citizens during festivals that honored the
gods. Socrates’ sentence was handed down at the start of a festival honoring Apollo.
During the festival, a sacred ship sailed from Athens, around the island of Delos, and
back to Athens in commemoration of the journey that had carried Theseus to Crete when
he killed the Minotaur. According to Ancient Greek mythology, prior to Theseus’
actions, each year the city of Athens sent fourteen teenagers, seven girls and seven boys,
to Crete as sacrifices to the Minotaur living within the island’s labyrinth. In order to free
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the city from its obligatory human sacrifices, Theseus and a few of his soldiers stowed
away on the ship and when they landed in Crete, they slayed the minotaur. Plato writes
that, “after a voyage begins, the city must be kept pure and no one can be executed until
the ship has reached its destination and returns” (Plato 53). This particular voyage was of
great cultural importance to the Athenian citizens and to The Eleven, a group of officials
tasked with Socrates’ imprisonment and execution; as such, the custom of waiting until
the ship’s return was honored. As fate would have it, Socrates “lingered in prison for
thirty days, awaiting the return of the official Athenian ship from the festival (it set off
for Delos the day before his trial and its return was delayed by adverse winds). Apollo,
the god to whom Socrates felt the closest, was looking after him to the last” (Waterfield
6). In Athens at that time, though, “Imprisonment was not, as now, a common
punishment,” and so “prisons were used less as places of long-term internment than as
temporary holding-stations” (6). If Plato’s/Phaedo’s account of Socrates’ imprisonment is
to be believed, he spent his final month “conversing with friends and family members”
and making his only known attempts at writing (in the form of poems, or songs) (6).
Prior to his imprisonment, Socrates had often found himself in disadvantaged
positions. This was due, at least in part, to his fundamental disagreements with how
Athenians lived and which pursuits they spent their time on. Aristotle would later write
that “a cityless man is ‘like a solitary piece in checkers’” (Stone 98). Since meaning is
only derived when the game pieces are seen alongside their counterparts, Aristotle’s
meaning is clear: people have value when they are members of something larger than
themselves. For ancient Greeks, this meant the polis. But for Socrates, this endeavor was
foolish; instead, “Socrates preached and practiced withdrawal from the political life of
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the city” and declared his absence “necessary for ‘the perfection’ of the soul” (98). When
we consider the greater context, we see that “the conflict between Socrates and his native
city began because he differed so profoundly from most of his fellow Athenians and,
indeed, from the ancient Greeks generally, on the basic philosophical question of the
nature of the human community. In essence, Socrates’ pedagogical project was a
rejection of the mission of the polis (Stone 9-15). In the Athenian polis, citizens governed
themselves. Socrates advocated, instead, for a government that was “ruled by experts”
(12). In Xenophon’s Socratic dialogues, Socrates “went on to show,” that “on a ship the
one who knows, rules, and the owner [of the ship] and all the others [on board] obey the
one who knows” (Memorabilia). Additionally, the “classic ideal was to perfect oneself in
perfecting the city” (Stone 115); however, in the Apology, Plato’s Socrates tells his
accusers that, “I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care
for your bodies but for the protection of your souls” (qtd. in Stone 115). In their attempts
to forge a democracy, Socrates seems to have been worried that Athenians had lost sight
of the real purpose of living. Through his practices in philosophy, he promoted an
alternative to the polis by fostering a carefully curated inner circle and life—in which he
strove for expertise through philosophical practice, and consorted closely with others who
had been persuaded by his approach and who were dedicated to their own philosophical
pursuits—often trying to unravel Athenian democracy in the process (Waterfield).
However noble his initial purpose might have been, as a guest within Athens and a citizen
beholden to the sovereignty of the Athenian city-state, Socrates was quick to criticize and
irritate his hosts. Additionally, he was quick to instigate mutinies among his fellow
guests—a crime that he was eventually convicted of.
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His methods aside, Socrates disagreed with the methods used by Athenians in
constructing their society and building the polis as well as the very constructs they had
developed to rule themselves. These power dynamics seemed problematic to him; despite
what Socrates considered their lack of practicality, they were particularly useful in
allowing Socrates to develop a meaningful morality of his own. In the dialogues, Socrates
is often seen using his self-proclaimed lack of knowledge to establish his position as a
subject. In the case of his trial and conviction, for example, Socrates asks “for hospitality
in a language which by definition is not his own, the one imposed on him by the master
of the house, the host…the nation…etc. This personage imposes on him translation into
their own language, and that’s the first act of violence” (15). Derrida recounts in the first
pages of Of Hospitality that within Plato’s Statesman, “Socrates’ first words, from the
first sentence of the dialogue, are to thank Theodorus for having introduced him…but
also, at the same time,” to invoke the notion of the foreigner and the accompanying laws
of hospitality (11). Derrida elaborates, citing that in The Apology of Socrates, Socrates
“declares that he is ‘foreign’ to the language of the courts…he doesn’t know how to
speak this courtroom language…he doesn’t have the skill, he is like a foreigner” (15). I
argue instead that Socrates develops this strategy for dealing with difficult dynamics of
power. By repeatedly invoking his status as foreigner and requesting the protections and
allowances given to foreigners in ancient Athens, he was intent on reminding his
audience that he was not the expert here. However, his deftness at finding and, in many
cases, exploiting these disadvantageous social and political positions calls his lack of
expertise into question. Consider Socrates’ use of the metaphors of enslavement. In “The
Manumission of Socrates: A Rereading of Plato’s Phaedo,” Deborah Kamen aligns
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Socrates’ death with manumission, which is the release of slaves from slavery. She draws
a distinction between Plato’s descriptions of “good slavery” and “bad slavery”, writing
that in Phaedo and other places, “Socrates declares that if the better elements of one’s
mind prevail, they enslave that which causes evil in the soul and ‘set free’ that which
causes virtue” (89). Additionally, “in the Republic, Socrates says that in a man who has
committed an injustice and been appropriately punished, the beastly part of his is tamed
and the gentle part ‘set free’” (Republic 591b qtd. in Kamen 89). Socrates, despite his
desire to align himself with these plighted groups, was neither a slave nor a foreigner in
Athens. Socrates had been proclaimed the wisest man that had ever lived. It is difficult to
believe that, on occasions when he admitted ignorance, his fellow citizens did not find it
interesting and worth listening to—which I argue is a powerful move on the part of the
(apparently unwilling) rhetor Socrates. On occasions where Socrates claimed ignorance
or foreigner status, the common thread running through the manipulations of power is
this: guest-host relations both require that one party submit to the will of another—
particularly in order to survive and to gain agency. But with agency comes the potential
for violence. In opening himself up to the citizens of Athens, Socrates opened himself up
to the possibility of violence from not one, but 500, disappointed hosts. This openness
was ultimately part of his undoing. As the rest of this chapter will show, it is too
simplistic to read Socrates’ actions and recorded conversations as pure reason. The
motivations to have the discussions, the manner in which they are carried out, and the
continuous and arguably insatiable need to open towards the other are more than reason:
they are rooted in strong emotion—passion, even.
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In this chapter I argue that the Socrates of the Phaedo has been misunderstood
and his death misconstrued. For decades, his death has been treated as one of rational
choice rather than taking the facts into consideration. The death was a state-sanctioned
execution. It was also, in some way, a suicide. Despite the vague nature of his death,
Socrates’ end-of-life has been celebrated as an example of the “good” way to die; this
chapter will show that this particular view is too narrow. Instead, Socrates’ death can
illuminate the end-of-life debate in America, but not because of the ‘singular rational
choice’ celebrated by the Hemlock Society. Rather, Socrates’ death can be read as a
coming-to-terms; in his final days, Socrates experienced anxiety that catalyzed final
efforts to make amends. His death, then, is less about rationality than about securing a
future immortality for his soul and encouraging his disciples to do the same. Suspended
between life and death and confined to a prison cell, Socrates made attempts to right past
wrongs, glorify the gods, and leave his loved ones with final lessons on how to attain
peace. One of the key factors influencing our idealization of Socrates’ death is the
perception of his control over his own life’s uncontrollable forces, especially in the face
of his unfortunate circumstances. But for too long in these interpretations, Socrates’
control over his attitude and language has been conflated with control over his actions.
Additionally, I argue that his conversations with friends at the end of his life, as depicted
in Plato’s Phaedo, illustrate the impossibility of complete being-towards-death. As this
chapter will show, it is crucial to explore the distinction between a self-chosen death and
acceptance of a government-sanctioned one. While Socrates may have experienced a
lifetime of openness to being-for the other and striving towards reason, death’s
limitations make being-toward-death in a rational way an absolute kind of hospitality, a
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violence without boundaries or defense, and an impossibility. Rather than treating his
death as a self-chosen one, this chapter argues that in the Phaedo, Socrates had given up
his habits as the city gadfly and was instead working within the standards of hospitality.
While imprisoned, Socrates more fully inhabited the role of the dutiful guest. He did not
try to escape, by all accounts he was gracious towards his captors and they were even
mournful of his passing. His motivations at the end-of-life read less like a rational
embrace of the inevitable, and more like someone who, given limited time to remedy
wrongs, is suddenly energized by the anxiety of the unknown.
Socratic Anxiety
The tension within Phaedo stems from the waiting. With Socrates’ execution held
up until the arrival of the ship from Delos, Socrates was a powerless captive. His friends
and family, too, co-existed with his death looming over them—making the day-to-day
interactions strange (59a). (Just imagine how different and how much less natural your
interactions with others would be today if you knew they may die tomorrow?) This
strangeness rendered Socrates a member of the living dying, individuals who know their
death is almost here, but can do nothing to hasten or prevent it. This in-between is where
today’s terminally ill individuals fall, too; they may still be alive, but post-diagnosis, they
inhabit a very different reality than they did pre-diagnosis. While he awaited his death,
Socrates’ position as a dead man talking would have been obvious to his friends and
Athenian citizens.
Given a month to live in an unfamiliar house with less than generous hosts,
Socrates was fueled by a productive kind of anxious energy. In Phaedo, Socrates shares
with his visitors that his days in prison have been spent composing music, or demotic
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poetry, out of Aesop’s fables. After having dreams and visions urging him to compose
music for years, in his final days, Socrates became worried that his lifelong practice of
philosophy, which he regarded as the “greatest music,” was not what the muses/gods had
actually meant (60e). In order to please Apollo, the god whose festival had delayed his
execution (and a god that many scholars claim Socrates had a special connection with),
he made music—first a song in tribute to the god, then music out of fables because he
“knew them by heart” (61b). Consider these endeavors through the lens of hospitality: it
is as though when confronted with death, Socrates realized that he might have been
ignoring the wishes of his ultimate host for years. If prison was a house of sorts for
Socrates, it was always one with a limited stay. In reflecting on his life, Socrates seems to
have recognized that the gods were his hosts all along and that his body was the house he
inhabited at their pleasure. He even suggests as much when discussing bravery and
goodness with Cebes. Socrates suggests that “initiations,” or mystery religions might “not
be completely inept, but were hinting all along that whoever gets to Hades unitiated and
imperfected will lie in mud, whereas the purified and initiated will live with gods” (69c).
Socrates tells Cebes and the others that these men who believe in the sanctity of the
perfected soul and its immortality are “proper philosophers” and, “in my life I’ve left
nothing in my power undone but have been in every way eager to join them” (69d). In
this part of the conversation, Socrates’ commitment to his status as pure philosopher is
fluid: he moves between being ready for death and seeing it as the highest achievement
for real philosophers and anxiously attempting to complete final tasks before he dies. But
in the same breath that he declares that he has left nothing undone, he states, “Whether
my eagerness has been properly placed and we’ve accomplished anything, we’ll know
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clearly, god willing, when we get over there; quite soon, I imagine” (69d). If Socrates did
think that he had accomplished all of his earthly tasks and fully purified his reason-soul
for its impending exit from its desire tainted body, then why waste time and effort on
composing songs? I argue that he expends energy trying to remedy this grievance—this
refusal—that he may have made against the gods while he was still a guest out of fear.
Socrates dedicates himself to the task, describing his efforts as “obedience to the dream”
(61b). These acts of obedience—as a citizen of Athens and as a temporary guest within
the prison—stem from the intense fear. When faced with death, Socrates’ wisdom and
reason could not provide him with a certainty over his fate. Instead, out of control over
his circumstances, he busied himself with tasks that he hoped would gain favor with
whatever beings did have the control. Therefore, since Socrates believed that the most
likely hosts were the gods, he appealed to them through song.
Anxiety manifests in myriad ways, but it is deeply individualistic. In Being and
Time, Martin Heidegger reignited critical interest in the concept of being. In the book’s
opening pages, he claims that, “The question” of being “has today been forgotten,”
despite the fact that the question “is hardly an arbitrary one” (1). Instead of being
arbitrary, the question of being it is the very question which “sustained the avid research
of Plato and Aristotle but from then on ceased to be heard as a thematic question of
actual investigation” (1). In order to understand anxiety, then, it is necessary to consider
being and how one might come-to-terms with larger anxiety-inducing existential
questions—especially when confronted with the closeness of one’s un-being. Being, for
Heidegger, is actually the most important focus of philosophical inquiry—and the most
elusive one, since “being is always the being of the being,” (8). Heidegger calls the
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essence of being being, but human existence becomes Dasein (which in German
translates to ‘presence’), an experiential kind of being that is “made known to the
understanding of being that belongs to Dasein itself” by peering through the “basic
structures of the very being of Dasein” itself (38). Dasein, in which “the essence of being
lies in its to be,” which is its has to be (39), is, therefore, the being that “is the
transcendence, plain and simple” (34). The transcendence of being to Dasein is
“distinctive” transcendence “since in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most
radical individuation. Every disclosure of being as the transcendence is transcendental
knowledge” (34).
For Heidegger, the question of being-in-the-world requires work on the part of
the Dasein. The Dasein must exist in the world, “this world that is always already from
the outset my own,” and understand itself as separate from others so as to ascertain the
purpose and usefulness of others in the inevitable event of an encounter (Heidegger 118).
But Heidegger cautions that, “the characteristic of encountering the others is, after all,
oriented towards one’s own Dasein. Does it not, too, start with the distinction and
isolation of the ‘I,’ so that a transition from the isolated subject to the others must then be
sought?” (118). But rather than emphasizing difference, the necessity of distinguishing
between one’s own Dasein and others is done in recognition that “they are, rather, those
from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is, too. This
being-there-too with them…the ‘with’ is of the character of the Dasein, the ‘also’ means
the sameness of being as circumspect, heedful being-in-the-world. ‘With’ and ‘also’ are
understood existentially, not categorically” (111). Davis latches onto this definition of
Dasein when discussing belongingness in a hospitality context. She writes: “Heidegger is
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clear that Dasein names (a) being that is first of all in-the-world and with-others—
‘world’…being always a ‘shared world’” (90). Heidegger defined Dasein as a more
specific state of belonging in the world; Dasein is “first of all an intrinsic part of the
world, though it becomes ontological through its primary and unique concern with its
own identity” (Blackwell 3). The time necessary to such self-awareness is obviously most
crucially perceived in the advent of one’s own death. The fact of dying for and by
ourselves is what gives the self authenticity, making it a ‘being-toward-death’” (3,
emphasis my own). Recognition of otherness is also recognition of the similarities
between the self and all others, and as such, a recognition of the separateness—and the
possibility of the outer limits—of the self. Put plainly, individuals share the world with
countless others who, through their existence and interactions with one another, add
definition and a sense of singularity. It is in this close proximity to others that we
recognize death, and this recognition of death pushes us to “reach absolute authenticity in
an ecstatic being-toward-death,” revealing “less a sense of alterity than the area in which
I come into what is absolutely and precisely mine, mineness” (3).
The notion of being-towards-death requires that one overcome anxiety that arises
in the face of death. Anxiety is a force that is indefinable, but also all around. It supplants
the Dasein’s self control with “radically generalized fear, fear for one’s own being, one’s
own being-able-to-Be, and the suffocating force that oppresses Dasein in anxiety turns
out to be Dasein itself, calling in as the voice of conscience from its future authenticity”
(Davis 92). Anxiety’s greatest power is this disruption of the self’s control over itself.
Once Dasein recognizes that it is not in control, anxiety overwhelms it. At the point of
realization of anxiety, the Dasein is not capable of locating and strengthening its own
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boundaries; boundaries wouldn’t do, anyway, since the anxiety is wholly contained
within the Dasein. Anxiety is the recognition of the “not-at-home” (Davis 94). In this
state of unwelcome, the Dasein that is “nostalgic for the comfort and safety of what it
thought was home,” (94), typically takes “flight” (Heidegger 184), “scrambling towards
an ‘at home’” (Davis 94). Heidegger states of this flight: “existentially the authenticity of
being a self is closed off and repressed in entanglement, but this closing off is only the
privation of a disclosedness which reveals itself phenomenally in the fact that the flight
of the Dasein is a flight from itself. That which Dasein flees is precisely what Dasein
comes up ‘behind’” (185). This fleeing and seeing is only possible because of the
disclosedness of the Dasein; the Dasein is the only singularity that can truly know itself.
The turning away enables the Dasein to “grasp” what it is fleeing from—essentially, the
turning away of the Dasein from itself enables it to come self-to-self with itself within the
safety of its closedness. Anxiety is the thing that can be grasped in these encounters,
since in turning away from its finitude and its angst over its limitations, the Dasein can
come up behind the fear and grab a hold of it to gain a closer look. This experience is not
devoid of reason; given the introspection that Socrates was certainly doing during his
final month of life, the grappling with the self that Heidegger so succinctly captures in his
discussion of Dasein seems completely reasonable. It is that Dasein’s approach to beingtoward-death that creates an even stronger case for Socrates’ possible anxiety at his endof-life.
As Davis writes, “being-toward-death is a mode of being in which anxious
Dasein gets its mortality in its sites in an understanding way and so achieves power over
it—Heidegger’s definition of understanding, it should be noted, is ‘being-able’” (95). It
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could be said that this power, this being-toward-death, provides those who achieve it
with agency at the end of their lives. But some, Levinas among them, challenge the
notion that being-able somehow gives one power over one’s anxiety about death.
Christopher Fynsk writes that in thinking that death can be confronted and fully accepted,
“We glimpse here one of the oldest ruses of philosophy, an appropriation of the very
event of disappropriation, an overcoming of the most radical form of otherness and
negativity in the essentially tragic gesture of confronting death. Death has become a
possibility” (Fynsk 38). Fully experiencing one’s own death is the impossibility, but
accepting one’s death as fact, as realistic and inescapable option, is the “the possibility
that opens [Dasein] to all other possibilities” (Davis 94). Making death a possibility
makes it strange and does not mean that the individual or Dasein has successfully gained
control over anxiety. It simply means that, for better or worse, the Dasein has distanced
itself from the certainty of death by recognizing and grabbing a hold of its angst.
In reading Socrates’ death through this lens, the dance between the philosopher
and anxiety comes into focus. Socrates’ claims vacillate between reassuring his friends
that he is fine with dying—that he “lightly and cheerfully” downs the poison, even
(117c)—and attempting to spin his death into an enlightened release of the soul from the
prison of the body. For example, he urges his followers, if they are sensible, to “follow
me as quick” as they can to their deaths (61c). He claims that his friends, will “be willing,
like any decent philosopher” to die, though it might be unwise to “use force on himself”
since “they say that’s unlawful” (61d). The illegality of suicide is then considered when
Socrates states:
Though perhaps it will surprise you if, of all things, this alone is absolute: if,
unlike everything else for man, it never turns out to be better for some people to
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die than to live; and it may also surprise you that it’s impious for these people—
who would be better off dead—to do themselves the favor, and they have to wait
for some benefactor to do it for them. (62a)
This must have been a difficult truth for Socrates’ friends, individuals who had planned
an escape and exile for Socrates at the time of his sentencing, to accept. But Socrates,
accused of breaking the law and corrupting his home’s young people, chose to go through
with his execution. There are numerous opinions on why Socrates might have done this;
some suspect that by following through with his sentencing, Socrates was trying to
display his strong sense of duty and citizenship and his love for Athens; others think that
his death allowed him an opportunity to continue his argument with the Athenians who
had accused him—that in dying nobly, he was not allowing them the satisfaction of his
confession or guilt. But these opinions still fall short of capturing the gravity of Socrates’
decision, and his motivations. Instead, I argue that within Phaedo, Socrates employs his
rhetorical skills in order to alleviate the tension in those around him (and the guilt that the
living will feel), but more so in order to assuage the anxiety that his death brought about
in him. By reading Socrates’ final dialogue as one final rhetorical strategy, the power of
Phaedo, and its possible power for the contemporary end-of-life movement, can be
illuminated.
An Alternate Ending
In an attempt to de-mythologize Socrates’ death, I offer a re-reading of his ending
with the notion of anxiety in mind. Throughout his teachings, trial, and imprisonment,
Socrates made it clear that he was willing to die for what he believed. The foundation of
Socrates’ work was his perpetuation of the belief that through his knowledge, wisdom,
and the pursuit of the good, he could correctly and fully ascertain truth. When his
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audience gathers just hours before his death, Socrates embarks on a conversation/lesson
full of his trademark rhetorical moves: questioning, leading his audience to answers, and
doling out wisdom. As the guest who is about to be executed, his hosts have given him
some leeway, and he takes full advantage of it, providing his audience with a remarkable
set of final thoughts to ponder and take comfort in. In order to successfully show his
mastery over death and convince his audience that his approach was the correct one, a
great deal of time is spent in discussion of the body’s evils. For the Phaedo’s Socrates,
the body is the boundary keeping the soul from realizing its full potential—which is to
grasp the truth and to fill the soul with reason. He suggests that the soul cannot “seize
truth” in life (65c) because of the body’s lack of purity, stating that, “When body and soul
are together, nature directs the body to be rules as a slave, the soul to rule as the master.
So going by that, which do you think is more like the divine and which like the mortal?”
(80a). When Cebes and others agree that according to this claim from Socrates, it follows
that the soul must be immortal, Socrates agrees. Burger points to this point in the
discussion as a turn in Socrates’ purpose because he begins to make efforts to persuade
his audience that “there is something or the dead and, as it is said of old, something better
for the good than for the bad” (63c). She claims, “It is to such a hope—which has hardly
been confirmed in the preceding series of arguments—that Socrates now returns” (189).
Socrates tells them that they are right, and that, “the soul is most like the divine,
immortal, intelligible, single-formed, indissoluble, and the ever selfsame in every
respect” (80b). Bodies greatly limit the individual’s attainment of peace and knowledge,
since “the body and its necessary upkeep presents endless distractions, and if we fall prey
to disease, that, too, hinders that hunt for what is...Because of our bodies, we can’t even
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hear ourselves think” (66c), and also because bodies “shrivel”, decay, “collapse” and
suffer (80c-d). John Sallis writes that in his attempts to discuss the meaninglessness of
the human body and its removal of the soul from a place of knowledge, Socrates
purposely aligns “the figure of philosophy with that of death” (370). Socrates tells his
friends that when the soul attempts to “touch the truth,” or when it “attempts to look at
something along with the body, it’s clear that then it’s deceived by the body” (65b). This
is how death becomes the release of the soul. Enlightenment can only be realized if the
body is no longer blocking the soul’s strivings.
But there are flaws in this line of thinking, mainly stemming from an unresolved
anxiety over the possibility of one’s finitude. I read the pleasure and pain of Socrates
friends-turned-mourners as this anxiety made manifest. Whitehead suggests that rather
than being shocked by Socrates’ sentencing and reasonable approach to death, his
followers and friends would have realized that the philosopher had “been living on
borrowed time ever since the defeat of the Thirty in 403” (193). They could not have
been caught too off guard since for years, “there had been dark mutterings about the
influence of Socrates over the baneful characters” like Alcibiades and Critias and the
oligarchic set of the 420s and 410s who had been educated in large part by Socrates
(194). Whitehead also suggests that as a figurehead who chose to remain in Athens when
things were going terribly wrong with his students in positions of power, Socrates had
opened himself up to prosecution. In an Athenian society that was invested in
maintaining democracy, prosecution was only the next logical step. If Socrates had
wanted to avoid prosecution or execution, he would have done left the city sooner.

80

With this in mind, Sallis suggests that some of Socrates claims about the body as
boundary are actually intended to be comic relief, or are attempts by Socrates to lighten
the heavy atmosphere surrounding his death. Perhaps it is possible that his followers
understood the very reasons why he was not only prosecuted, but sentenced to death, and
needed to be made to understand why Socrates had not chosen to save his life by leaving
earlier. At any rate, Sallis hypothesizes that in Phaedo, Socrates might be trying to
relieve his followers of their anxiety, especially when he leads them to pretty dire
conclusions. For example, when his fellow ‘true-born philosophers’ work themselves up
to the frenzied realization that, “in our considered opinion, if we’re ever to have clean
knowledge of anything we must get rid of the body and observe the things themselves
with the soul itself. Then, it seems, we’ll have our desire and what we say we love:
knowledge—when we die, not while we live” (66e). If, as Sallis suggests, it is meant to
illicit laughter, then the joke is part gallow’s humor and part trickery. Socrates suggests
that his friends develop a longing for death, follow him quickly to it, and look forward to
a time when their souls will be able to examine truth more fully. Sallis clarifies his
reading of death-philosophy-as-joke, pointing out how often Phaedo mentions Socrates’
grounded position—feet firmly planted on the ground, connected to the earth, prepared to
give his body over to it. This is perhaps because, as Socrates alludes to later in Phaedo,
there is no way of knowing what happens to the soul upon death. Rightfully so, some
may “fear that when the soul leaves the body, it perishes and is destroyed and…released
from the body, instantly flies away and scatters like wind or smoke and no longer exists
anywhere” (70a).
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Here is the risk involved for Socrates: If he gives into anxiety and fear about
death, if he acknowledges that the soul might not be an immortal entity that can achieve
enlightenment once it is, “freed from wandering and folly, from fears, from cruel
passions, and all other human evils” and can “truly spend all future time with the gods”
(80e), then what is the purpose of life? This would only call into question his entire life’s
work, and would destabilize, or create anxiety within, the knowledge and enlightenment
that he has been guiding his followers towards. Instead, Socrates tells his friends that a
philosophically inclined soul “departs pure, dragging with it nothing of the body because
in life it never willingly partnered with it, but fled the body and gathered itself to itself as
its constant practice—which is precisely the right philosophy and the true practice of
facing death lightly” (80e). Souls that unsuccessfully maintain their separation from the
body “depart defiled and uncleansed of the body because it always consorted with it,
loved it, catered to it” and are “patched with corporality” (81b-c). Socrates urges his
audience to imagine these threadbare souls as “weighty, earthly, heavy, and visible, so
that such souls are dragged back to the visible region by the fear of Hades and the
invisible”, where their souls are also likely to wind up incarnating the bodies of lesser
beings; or worse, where they end up haunting the living (81d-e).
There are a number of possible motivations for the dialogue that transpires in
Phaedo. As mentioned previously, Plato and others have used Socrates to create a mythos
of rationality. The “distinction Socrates presents in reflecting on the status of his mythos,
addressed to a man with sense, should be no more surprising than his separation of the
pious, whose reward has been described most beautifully, from the philosopher, whose
fate after death has been shrouded in silence” (205). Within this mythos, one of Socrates’
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motivations might be alleviating the feelings of guilt and sadness that his friends are
having difficulty hiding. He might be trying to get them to accompany him in his leap of
faith. And, he also might be attempting to gain control over a narrative and over the
perceptions of a group of people because such mechanisms of control have long been his
sources of power. Rather than allowing death to render impotent his life’s work, Socrates
uses the position(s) of the condemned, the enslaved soul, and the guest, in order to regain
agency.
As evidence of Socrates’ human reaction to death, consider the heightened
activity that took place when Socrates’ final day was drawing to a close. When Crito
mentions in 63d-e that the executioner needs Socrates to be calmer in order for the
hemlock to work, Socrates tells him to “Forget it,” and have the executioner “make
enough for two or three times what’s needed” (63e). Rather than strictly adhering to his
captor’s wishes, then, Socrates pushes the limits so that he can calm himself through
philosophical discussion—a field that he was completely at home within. I read this as
Socrates at a moment of high-anxiety; with the eyes of his followers upon him, he cannot
refute the seriousness of his situation. But he can distance himself from confronting his
mortality, he can make them all marvel at his intellect, and he can carve out a familiar
home within the final hours of his life. When it came time for his execution, Socrates
allegedly “drained the cup in one breath” (117c), perhaps because of the purity of his soul
and the certainty of his convictions, but also perhaps because of a completely normal
desire to relieve the sense of not being at home, the sense of not having a place. At the
time, hemlock was not the standard method of execution (Waterfield 7). Hemlock as a
form of “execution had been introduced only a few years earlier, and had not yet replaced
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the most common method (a kind of crucifixion), perhaps because it was considered
expensive; at any rate, the preparation of the dose was paid for by friends or relatives of
the condemned criminal rather that by that state” (7). While it used to be considered a
particularly “painful and ugly” death “with spasms, choking and vomiting…we now
know…that the particular species used for this purpose in ancient Athens was effective,
but not especially violent” (8). So in paying for the dose of hemlock, what Socrates’
benefactors were really purchasing was “a more benign death for their friend” and a death
that “freed the state from the miasma of guilt” because it was bloodless and selfadministered (7).
Good Death?
Plato’s depiction of Socrates as calm in the face of death is complicated by the
actions that Socrates is shown to take part in. Levinas writes that death is “absolutely
unknowable…foreign to all light, rendering every assumption of possibility impossible,
but where we ourselves are seized” (OTB 71). Davis builds upon Levinas’ work, writing
that, “According to Levinas, death un-powers me and is in no case mine—even when it’s
‘mine,’ even when it’s happening to ‘me’” (97). This unknowability only emphasizes the
lack of control that the dying—any dying, all dying—experience upon their deaths. The
death of Socrates was marginally unique in that it did not happen suddenly or by
accident. His death sentence was intentional, as was his forced waiting. And in that
waiting, he was given a gift that few dying people are given: conditional hospitality,
access to friends and family, and an opportunity to follow the urgings of his soul up until
the very end. While those actions may have quieted his anxiety and assisted in his sense
of control, they did nothing to enlighten him to what dying was going to be like. And,
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they did not guarantee that he was correct about the nature of dying. Instead, Phaedo is
offered up as a text of consolation, as a call of warmth, to those who lost their friend and
teacher. Heidegger writes that the call, “does not come from someone else who is with
me in the world. The call comes from me and yet from beyond and over me” (BT 320).
In reality, Socrates’ circumstances presented a giving-over of the Dasein and a
kind of impossible choice rather than a rational one. It is impossible to know one’s own
death, and therefore impossible to approach it with clear-headed rationality without
having intense feelings come about. All that one can truly say is that this death is a
certainty, a completion of the entire experience of Dasein. One can only rationally accept
that one has no idea what will happen upon death, and then endure the anxiety that
accompanies such a realization. Approaching death with this attitude might be more
persuasive to those for whom the anxiety of being-towards-death is significant. For many
individuals who, with good reason, experience anxiety when considering their deaths, this
purely rational approach is alienating. The rationality is strange—which is why it is
represented as such in Phaedo. For those struck by the strangeness, the cheerful
extinguishing of the life by an individual who ‘drains the cup in one breath’ raises
concern. Critics of aid-in-dying worry over the legitimacy of a person’s rational thought
when suicide is their desired option, a debate elucidated in chapters 3 & 4. While
“Western society allows people to undertake risk or harm to some degree without
intervention,” accepting one’s death is one thing (Wasson and Cook). Becoming a
cheerful agent of one’s own death is another.
In the final passages of Phaedo, Phaedo tells Echecrates, “I was so overcome that
I burst into tears, buried my face in my cloak, and wept for myself—not for him, but for
85

my own misfortune at losing a companion like him…no one could keep from breaking
down except Socrates himself” (117d, emphasis my own). In this particularly vulnerable
situation, tears are wept not for the dying, but for the living. Davis writes, “I am a subject
to the precise extent that the ungraspable Other has already inspired ‘me’ in the most
fundamental sense…Even my generosity does not come from me…but amounts instead
to ‘a command performance issued by some unknown force that I can only welcome’”
(Davis 108). Throughout all of our interactions in life, the unknown force of the Other
calls us to act, to perform our version of ourselves at that moment, and we respond to that
call. Socrates performs the ‘good death’ that his audience commands because of this call.
For the audience, their presence is not intended as comfort, but as one final opportunity to
lay claim on Socrates the friend, teacher, and condemned. Their presence is less about
him and, as Phaedo admits, more about their own grappling with his loss and their lost
ability to inspire him to provide them with the version of him that they desire. Levinas
describes this call as a “claim laid on the same by the other in the core of myself, the
extreme tension of the command exercised by the other in me over me, a traumatic
hold…which does not give the same time to await the other” (OTB 141). Although we
live our own lives, we are constituted by and in our relationships with the other. And, in
our deaths, we perform the final acts of our Being and the required acts of generosity for
the others who remain when we are gone.
In trying to situate this chapter’s more nuanced version of Socrates’ death within
the contemporary debate over end-of-life, it is necessary to look at the impacts of that
death. For those present inside the prison cell with Socrates, the emotional impact of
watching their friend die was overwhelming. If we consider our contemporary sentiments
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towards death, it seems likely that Socrates’ friends wanted to believe that his death was
one of rational choice because it suited their image of him—and perpetuated that image
to the masses. It comforted them to consider that Socrates died in a fashion that was
similar to how he lived, and therefore ‘authentic’ in some way. If this is true (or at least
closer to the truth), then Socrates’ attitude at the end of his life was largely for the benefit
of his audience. When we witness death, we do not weep for the unknown that the dying
individual is going into because we cannot possibly understand what that place or state of
being is. Like Phaedo and the others present at Socrates’ death, we emote for ourselves,
and because of the strangeness of the experience. Death is foreign, but in its foreignness,
it forces our Dasein into flight and into an existential predicament. So while we mourn
the absence of the dying individual, we also mourn the rupture of our own ignorance of
death. Once death has been witnessed, we can no longer deny its existence and we are
held captive by our anxieties. Whether or not he achieved community with the gods upon
his death, Socrates was freed in death. But what he was freed from were the
entanglements of citizenship, and the responsibilities of being-for the other.
Stone notes that, “If Socrates had been acquitted, had he died comfortably of old
age, he might now be remembered only as a minor Athenian eccentric, a favorite butt of
the comic poets” (3). But Waterfield’s research on the actual charges against Socrates
contextualizes his crimes, and suggests that his state-sanctioned death might have been
inevitable. Either way, in death, Socrates was elevated to iconic status by Plato. What
Socrates was released from by his death was not (or, not only) the confines of the body,
but the confines of his responsibility towards the other. This notion of being-for the other
comes into focus in the following chapters.
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Chapter Four
“If I had a choice, I’d prefer not to die, thank you very much”: Dignified Death
Peter Richardson’s 2011 documentary, How to Die in Oregon, opens with grainy
footage from a home video camera. A woman sits at a kitchen table and pours liquid from
a measuring cup into a glass filled with a white powder. She pours a little water, stirs the
mixture, pours and stirs as the metal spoon taps rhythmically against the glass. The glass
is rested atop a copy of the Oregon Historical Quarterly, and voices can be heard in the
background. A plate of food is near the glass, and the camera then zooms out to reveal an
average American kitchen. The camera then moves into the adjoining living room. The
back wall is made up entirely of large windows and look down into lush green, and the
room is filled with natural light. Seated on a rumpled bed in front of these windows is a
tall man with glasses. His name is Roger Sagner, and he appears to be in his 60s. We see
him on the bed, surrounded by family members and by a representative from the
advocacy group Compassion and Choices, Sue Dessayer Porter. The cameraperson has
walked in mid-conversation. Everyone’s eyes are on Sue. She explains to all there, “He
drinks the medication, and that will put him in a coma within a matter of minutes. After
that--“ Roger cuts her short. “We wait for me to die,” he says. “We can never predict how
long that’ll take” Sue adds softly (00:01:15).
A voice off-screen says, “Now Roger, I talked to the other woman in there and
said that you could have some juice or something in there...” (00:01:40). People begin
talking over one another, trying to discern which beverage Roger might want. In a warm
baritone, Roger shouts over them, “Bring me the goddamn glass!” Sue, a small woman
with short brown hair, holds one of her hands up in front of Roger. “Roger, now wait, I
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want to make sure before you take it: I’m going to ask you these two questions, and I am
serious. You have the right to change your mind” (00:01:54). “My mind’s not changing,”
Roger says. Sue proceeds, leaning down and looking Roger in the face. She asks, “And
what will this medication do?” (00:01:58) Roger’s response is, “It will kill me and make
me happy” (00:02:03). Sue then tells him that he can have the medication, and that they
ask that he consume it in 60-90 seconds, but that he not gulp it. “It tastes pretty bad, but
you have here a soft drink to chase it down with. Do you have any final words you’d like
to say to your family?” Sue asks. He says, “I thank you all for being here.” Many family
members speak up, uttering “We love you, Roger,” as all of their eyes remain on Roger,
who is still seated on the makeshift bed. Roger then continues: “I am thankful for the
wisdom of the voters of the state of Oregon for allowing me the honor of doing myself in
at my own volition to solve my own problems. So thank you all” (00:02:45-00:2:59).
When he is finished with his final words, Roger reaches out for the glass containing the
medications, and drinks it in 11 seconds. Roger Sagner was the 343rd person to die in
Oregon under the state’s Death with Dignity Act (DWDA). As he lies dying, he begins to
sing a slow rendition of “Old Black Joe,” and stops only to thank the team who prepared
the medicine. “Tell the next person, it tastes woody, but it is not rejectable. It was easy,
folks” (00:04:05).
***
This chapter offers in-depth analysis of the Death with Dignity Act’s appearance
on film in Richardson’s How to Die in Oregon. Whereas the previous chapter grappled
with the unknowns surrounding the death of Socrates, How to Die in Oregon depicts
deaths with haunting accuracy. As a text, the film provides a window into an often vague
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life experience: it does not attempt to gloss over the experience, but instead roots it in
reality and, in capturing it on film, keeps those who die within the film trapped in the
narrative presented by Richardson. The film incorporates the everyday lives of terminally
ill Americans as they undergo treatments to increase their lifespans, interact with medical
professionals, and attempt to live as normally as possible while being fully aware of their
limited time left to live. The film also takes great pains to include loved ones as partners
in the telling of the terminally ill patients’ stories. In the cases of a few of the individuals
featured in the film, the filmmaker is present at the time of death. While the deaths might
not be featured on camera, the preparation of the death-inducing chemicals is. In most of
the cases, at least audio of the death is made available and played during the film. How to
Die in Oregon as a documentary falls under the umbrella category of objectifying
documentary. An objectifying documentary is a text that has two main goals: “to
deconstruct the conventions of the realist style and reveal the artifice behind its supposed
immediacy and claim to provide ‘evidence’ of what happened” and “to tell a story for a
rational, ‘objectified’ point of view” (Capdevila 67). Therefore, the film takes on the
appearance of “an epistemological tool informed by scientific rationality” (67). As this
chapter discusses, while viewing the film, it seems that the authorial intention is less to
persuade or advocate than to present undeniable (visual) proof of what end-of-life really
looks. Even more so, in selecting the specific patients that his film follows, Richardson
builds a relationship between patient and viewer; using this relationship as a conduit, the
film also delivers information about what end-of-life feels like.
Together with the records from the Oregon State Department of Public Health,
How to Die in Oregon illuminates a not often considered method of dying. As this
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chapter will show, the contemporary Western biomedicalized experience of dying is not a
passive one. Patients no longer linger while waiting to succumb to their illnesses because
so many of the causes of death that impacted Americans in generations past have been
negated, or at the very least drastically slowed, by modern medicine. While this is a
tremendous feat, it contradicts the widespread cultural belief in medicine’s ability to
prevent death. Because while it may stave it off, modern medicine cannot eliminate death
from our lives. Instead, in the cases of the terminally ill individuals discussed in this
chapter, modern medicine has allowed diseased bodies to become immune to death but
unconditionally vulnerable to suffering. How to Die in Oregon is the most realistic
textual representation on death available today. In the film, the suffering denied by much
of Western society is made visible, as are the struggles that terminally ill patients go
through in subjecting themselves and their families to treatment options—and the often
misplaced hope accompanying medical intervention, in some cases—that might not
succeed. Together, How to Die in Oregon and the documentation from the Oregon State
Department of Health offer a more complete understanding of end-of-life in America
today. But in becoming an audience to the dying individuals in the film, Richardson
requires that his viewers play host to the dying. By making his viewers part of the
hospitality inherent within the Death with Dignity Act, Richardson forces viewers to
grapple with the conditions of the host-guest dynamic is arguably one of its most
unnerving manifestations: a host voluntarily assisting a guest with their end-of-life. This
particular manifestation is a form of hospitality that has removed many of the conditions
that kept violence at bay. How to Die in Oregon invites the violence in and calls it a
friend; by watching, the viewing audience becomes complicit in the violence, too.
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Death in Technicolor
Roger Sagner was the 343rd individual to end their life by taking advantage of a
law that Oregon passed in the mid-1990s. In 1994, Oregon passed the Death with Dignity
Act (DWDA), a law allowing “terminally-ill Oregonians to end their lives through the
voluntary self-administration of lethal medications, expressly prescribed by a physician
for that purpose” (Oregon.gov Public Health). The minutiae of the DWDA can be found
in Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) Chapter 127.897 s.6.01. The “Form of Request” is
officially titled, “REQUEST FOR MEDICATION TO END MY LIFE IN A HUMANE
AND DIGNIFIED MANNER” (127.897.S.6.01). In the ORS and on the Form of
Request, it is made clear that two physicians must agree that the individual requesting the
medication is terminally ill, has 6 months or less to live, and is of sound mind at the time
of making the request. At the time of the request, patients must have two witnesses who
are not related to the patient or their medical care sign a declaration of the patient’s
medical state, residency status, and presence of mind and body at the time of the
prescription. On the forms, patients are encouraged (but not required) to inform their
family about their decision, and are given space to initial next to one of three options: “I
have informed my family of my decision and taken their opinions into consideration”; “I
have decided not to inform my family of my decision”; “I have no family to inform of my
decision” (ORS 127). No less than 48 hours and no longer than 15 days can pass between
the request and the writing of the prescription (ORS 127). Physicians who sign off on
these forms and prescribe the medications that they legalize will not be held criminally
responsible for their actions (ORS 127.890); “No person shall be subject to civil or
criminal liability or professional disciplinary action for participating in good faith
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compliance to ORS 127.800 to 127.897. This includes being present when a qualified
individual takes the prescribed medication” (127.885.1). The medications consist of an
oral dosage of a barbiturate (pentobarbital or secobarbital), and “beginning in 2015, a
phenobarbital/chloral hydrate/morphine sulfate/ethanol mix has also been used”
(DeathwithDignity.org). A large percentage of the individuals taking advantage of the
Death with Dignity Act are enrolled in hospice (Miller et.al. 26), a place where “social
work is mandated. Although [it] is not specifically mentioned in the law, social workers
are a crucial part of the interdisciplinary teams that serve the dying” (26).
Since it was enacted in 1997, 1,545 terminally ill Oregonians have received
prescriptions for the medications. 991 of them have ingested the medications with the
purpose of ending their life (“Oregon Death with Dignity Act: 2015 Data Summary”).
This means that roughly 64% of patients utilize the prescribed medications in order to
end their lives, while 36% had the medications in their possession but chose not to
consume them (DWDA Report). The 2016 Oregon Death with Dignity Act Data
Summary report reveals that a vast majority of the patients—over 70%—had some form
of terminal cancer, and 78% of patients were age 65 or older at the time of their deaths.
The median age at the time of death was 73. Data collected by the Oregon Department of
Health reveals some significant lifestyle similarities among those citizens who chose to
take advantage of the Death with Dignity Act. According to the most recent yearly report,
issued in February 2016, the three most pressing end-of-life concerns for those
individuals who go through with getting the medications are: decreasing ability to
participate in activities that make life enjoyable (96.2%), loss of autonomy (92.4%), and
loss of dignity (75.4%). Nearly half of the individuals have a baccalaureate or advanced
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degree. Many live in metropolitan areas. The most recent study brought to light that over
90% are white—a static trend since 1997. Historically, about a quarter of individuals are
widowed and, at the time of their procurement of the medications, more than 90% of
individuals were enrolled in hospice care (“Oregon Death with Dignity Act: 2015
Summary”). Eight years into the DWDA, data revealed that “younger people, those
divorced or never married, and those with baccalaureate degrees or higher were more
likely to use DWDA,” and “Ninety-seven percent of those who have used the law were
White, two percent were recorded as Asian, and one person was Native American”
(Miller 29). Through taking this action, there is a certain argument made by the dying
individual who seeks out DWDA. This is an active relinquishing of control through a
method of control. By taking this measure, the dying individual signals that they are
exiting the hospitable agreement, the encounter and obligation to the Other, that gives
them identity.
While it passed in 1994, the Death with Dignity Act was only officially enacted in
1997, which was around the time when Dr. Jack Kevorkian was heralded as “Dr .Death,”
for his assistance in helping approximately 130 terminally ill individuals in the Midwest
to die (Murchison). Paul R. McHugh, M.D., was Director of the Johns Hopkins School of
Medicine Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences during Kevorkian’s
assistance to his patients, and when his essay “The Kevorkian Epidemic,” was published
by American Scholar in 1997. In it, he writes, “Although his acts are illegal by statute
and common law in Michigan, no one stops him. Many citizens, including members of
three juries, believe he means well, perhaps thinking: who knows? Just maybe, we
ourselves shall need his services some day” (15). McHugh goes on to diagnose the
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“madness” of all parties involved in the Kevorkian epidemic; Kevorkian, in his medical
opinion, is “’certifiable’ in that his passions render him…’dangerous to others’” (15).
Those soliciting Kevorkian’s services, McHugh claims, are “mad by definition in that
they are suicidally depressed and demoralized” (15). Kevorkian’s actions were
polarizing, but they reinvigorated the discussion of healthcare reform during the 1990s—
even if it was only because of the infamy that his actions gained. The problems within
Kevorkian’s methods were glaring: Kevorkian did not follow proper procedures, and in
some cases it was found that those he had assisted were not terminally ill—at least five
were not ill at all (Murchison). In contrast, end-of-life advocates in Oregon State were
able to more persuasively position Death with Dignity legislation because of the media
frenzy over Kevorkian’s lax handling of end-of-life. Simply put, whether directly or
indirectly, Kevorkian’s actions instructed Oregon on how to utilize the medical
profession in the most hands-off way necessary. Rather than enlisting doctors to build
Thanatrons (from the Greek, “death machine”), and Mercitrons (from the Greek, “mercy
machine”), for patients, medical professionals needed to guarantee that they would not be
retaliated against for their involvement in helping patients end their lives. If they were
going to take a risk to help suffering, terminally ill patients, they were not going to end
up like Kevorkian for doing it.
The Fine Print
For medical professionals, death has become increasingly vague in the face of
technological advancements tasked with keeping human bodies alive. Machines can
facilitate organ function in the event of failure or impairment, but they can also prolong
life after a person no longer has brain function or the ability to perform the signs of life
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on their own. Life support was once a stop-gap to provide more time in which patients
could recover control of their bodies and doctors could have more time to help them heal.
Now, it is so widely depended upon at end-of-life that many hospital deaths are referred
to as “pulling the plug.” If technology has increased the rate of deaths that occur in
hospitals, it has also blurred the lines between life and death. Robert Sade, M.D., writes,
“Everyone knows what ‘brain dead’ means: a person whose brain no longer works is
brain dead,” but that, “The term is used so frequently and in so many different contexts
that we should not be surprised that two thirds of people incorrectly believe that someone
who is brain dead is not legally dead, and more than half believe that a comatose patient
is brain dead” (Sade 146). Brain death is just one of the possible classifications of a
patient within the hospital’s framework, and even that classification is fluid. Sade points
out that, “some argue that not all the functions of the brain need to be lost for a patient to
be dead, only those that are critical in maintaining the integration of the body functions”
and that, “loss of these critical functions will inevitably lead over hours or day to cardiac
arrest, even with continuing intensive life-support” (146). Still, there are those medical
cases where brain death does not really mean death, where “the bodies of some patients
who meet all the criteria for brain death can survive for many years with all their bodily
functions intact except for consciousness and brain stem reflexes” (146). In situations
where a patient is dependent upon life-support for the sustainment of life, Sade posits that
“a generally accepted ethical norm is that withdrawal of life support does not cause the
patient’s death, rather, withdrawing life support allows the patient to die—it is the
disease that causes the patient’s death, not the physician” (147, emphasis my own). In
“Euthanasia: is it really a bad idea?” Arshad Taqi, M.D., writes an entire section on “The
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dilemma of defining death.” He writes that, “Introduction of artificial ventilation and
circulatory arrest have redefined the concept of death, which was synonymous with
cessation of breathing or circulation; as a matter of fact they were not mutually exclusive,
cessation of one would naturally lead to the end of the other” (227). Technology in the
hospital, has “enabled patients to live without the ability to breathe,” including brain dead
patients, and made “moment of death” a very difficult thing to determine (227). It was
“easier to define when people dropped dead due to cardiorespiratory failure; now we
understand death as a process rather than a moment” (227). In addition to the problems in
defining disease, death itself evades definition. Another problematic area for medical
professionals occurs when trying to discern how active a physician must be in providing
adequate care to a dying patient. What arises is a gray area in responsibility: is providing
drugs to a patient to help them die more quickly different from removing a ventilation
machine—and if so, how different? Doctors do not lightly answer questions like these;
for patients who have never discussed their desires with family members, the
responsibility of making the most hospitable decision is tremendous.
Other issues of terminology arise when we consider who the agent of the death is;
Sade is careful to put the blame on the disease. This distinction is intended to shift
responsibility away from the physicians who are complying with the wishes of the patient
or patient’s family, or are following the care plan that they deem most ethically sound in
that particular patient’s case. Ascertaining the agent of death is crucial, and is one of the
most important aspects of determining cause of death. The homepage of the Death with
Dignity Organization defines some alternatives to ‘natural’ deaths, or deaths that do not
occur in hospitals or due to the removal of machinery. For individuals who wish to die
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another way, namely, the terminally ill, there are some heavily loaded terminologies to
parse through. Physician-assisted suicide (PAS), or assisted-suicide, is “an inaccurate,
inappropriate, and biased phrase which opponents often use to scare people about Death
with Dignity laws. Because the person is in the process of dying and seeking the option to
hasten an already and inevitable death, the request…isn’t equated with suicide”
(DeathwithDignity.org). They stress that “the patient’s primary objective is not to end an
otherwise open-ended span of life” because something else is killing them. The American
Public Health Association concurs, stating that, “assisted suicide is inappropriate when
discussing the choice of a mentally competent, terminally ill patient to seek medications
that he or she could consume to bring about a peaceful and dignified death” (APHA.org).
Suicide does not work as a label, either, since it is intentional and voluntary but is a
“permanent solution to a temporary problem” and as such, “ends a life that would
otherwise continue” (DeathwithDignity.org). Euthanasia “refers to the act of deliberately
causing the death of another person who may be suffering from an incurable disease or
condition, commonly performed with a lethal injection” (DeathwithDignity.org). ORS
127 states that, “Nothing in the [Oregon Death with Dignity Act] shall be construed to
authorize a physician or any other person to end a patient’s life by lethal injection, mercy
killing, or active euthanasia” (ORS 127). In order to fully understand the reasons why
some Americans choose, like Roger Sagner, to take advantage of a little-known legal
end-of-life alternative, the variations in how stakeholders define these alternatives are
key. Death with Dignity does not neatly fit under the umbrella of PAS or assisted suicide,
suicide, or euthanasia because by the time individuals come to seek out and take
advantage of Death with Dignity, all other active options have been exhausted.
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Modeling Choice
Instead of passively awaiting death, individuals taking advantage of Oregon’s
Death with Dignity Act are shown to be actively trying to prepare themselves in the event
of a worst-case scenario. How to Die in Oregon focuses on a number of individuals who
are terminally ill and are considering using the Death with Dignity Act to obtain the
prescription for the life-ending medications. Per Oregon regulations, volunteers from the
Compassion and Choices Organizations counsel the individuals hoping to take advantage
of the law. After Sagner’s home video, the next segment of the film follows the
counseling activites of, Sue Dessayer Porter, one of the group’s most active volunteers
and the woman who counseled Roger Sagner prior to his death. Richardson follows her to
a number of appointments where she visits with people considering the DWDA as an
end-of-life option and those who have already taken the steps to procure the medications.
En route to one appointment, Porter shares:
When I am going to visit someone, there is always some anxiety. I think that
anxiety is productive, and I would never want to become laissez-faire about this
whole process. And what I think about is, are they going to understand exactly
what it is they’re pursuing and what the process is? And also, what is always
foremost on my mind is that they know they’re in charge and that they’re the
boss” (00:07:34-00:08:31).
This invocation of anxiety is important; in discussions of death, there is typically some
anxiety over saying the wrong thing. For those guests who seek out the special kind of
relationship offered by the DWDA, there is anxiety concerning their end-of-life. Thre is
also anxiety experienced by those attempting to be benevolent, kind hosts. The line
between helping someone die in their own way and advocating for a specific method of
dying is a thin one. In each interaction, Porter opens herself up to the other—the other
who could take her offer of assistance as a threat of violence.
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Hospitality governs much of the discourse surrounding the Death with Dignity
Act in How to Die in Oregon. During one of the visits shown, an elderly woman shares
with Dessayer Porter that she does not want to end her life, but that her life has ended.
Now, DWDA will help her to wants to “exit life” (00:08:45-00:08:55). Another shares
that she wants the medication “for control” (00:09:18), a sentiment that Dessayer Porter
says is common amongst those she counsels. Peter Scott, a 69-year-old man who has just
received his diagnosis, hopes to use DWDA when his ALS prevents him from being able
to walk and he becomes too much of a burden for his wife, Gail (00:09:30-00:10:34).
Gail admits that “this is the way he has thought for a long time,” and shares that she will
support her husband. Gordon Greene, 86, tells Dessayer Porter that his interest in DWDA
stems from watching both of his parents die horrible, drawn-out deaths. He says, “You
can only handle about so much garbage,” and then it is time to find a way out (00:13:13).
He refers to the DWDA as offering him a death that is quick and painless and does not
burden his family. “It’s the decent thing to do,” he tells Sue and his daughter, Donna. He
then adds, with a smile, “For once in my life, I’ll be decent” (00:15:00). Dessayer Porter
stresses that Compassion and Choices is not selling an option or promoting a single
alternative; instead, she says, they are advocating for choice. In all of these interactions,
what is clear is that the individual wishes to control the terms of their exit from the
hospitable relationship. Disease—not life—holds them captive. What also becomes
apparent is that quality of life is completely relative and individualistic. One person’s
livable circumstances are another person’s hell. In offering patients the option to choose
their end-of-life, the Death with Dignity Act is first asking them to seriously consider the
conditions under which they would continue to be a guest.
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In critiques of the film, Cody Curtis, a 54-year-old woman with terminal cancer of
the liver is described as the “beating heart” of How to Die in Oregon. Curtis, an active,
outdoorsy woman who worked as an administrator at MIT and then at the BioInformatics Center in Portland, Oregon, had a terrible stomachache after receiving—and
consuming—four boxes of chocolate for her birthday in 2007 (Curtis). But something
told her that the stomachache was not caused by her birthday celebration, and the next
week she visited her doctor. When the scans came back, her doctor “burst into tears,” and
sent her to surgical oncologist Katherine Morris. Morris found that Curtis’ pain was
caused by an aggressive cancer of the liver “roughly the size of a grapefruit,” and because
of the positioning of it, they only had “one shot” to surgically remove it (00:17:0000:17:45). There were no other viable treatment options. The first surgery went well, but
during recovery, Cody Curtis ended up in the ICU for 50 days—in a coma for many of
them. Cody’s husband Stan tells Richardson in an interview: “the night before her second
procedure, she was supposed to be taking pain medication pills. She was throwing up and
couldn’t keep the pills down. So the pain medication was wearing off, so she said, I don’t
ever want another night like that” (00:18:01-00:18:34). It took 6 months before Cody was
able to walk, use the restroom, and feed herself without the help of others. She was
completely dependent upon her hosts/family, and could not keep up her end of the
hospitable arrangement. She was barely alive. During a checkup a few months after being
released from her lengthy hospital stay, the cancer was back—and it was more
aggressive. Her medical team gave her a prognosis of 6 months or less. At that point,
Cody told Dr. Morris that she wanted to have the Death with Dignity Act “in reserve” in
the event that her health digressed significantly. In the film, Morris tells Richardson: “It
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was strange to think about it in the intellectual realm, where this is a law that supports my
values…I’m actually going to take a pen and write a prescription for something that will
end someone’s life” (00:19:17-00:20:35). Morris’ sister, a breast cancer survivor,
convinced her to help Cody. “You’re her doctor. You have to help her,” she stated
(00:20:45). And so Morris wrote the prescription. “Cody taught me that ‘first, do no
harm,’ is going to be different for every patient. Harm would have meant taking away the
control and saying, no, you’ve got to do this the way your body decides as opposed to the
way you as a person decide” (00:21:20-00:21:41).
Cody shares that one of the worst parts about being as ill as she is—and both
Richardson and Cody’s healthcare team make clear throughout the film that she is
incredibly ill—is the limbo of having a diagnosis and prognosis, but not really knowing
what is going to happen. As the film progresses, Cody ebbs and flows. She has no idea
what the next day will bring, or when things will get bad enough that she can no longer
care for herself. However, “With Death with Dignity, you do know, though, and have
some control over what’s going to happen. You can offer that to your family” (00:24:0100:24-18). As Curtis grows sicker, her husband and daughter are supportive of her
decision to end her life on her terms, but her son has a more difficult time rationalizing
her need for Death with Dignity. He shares his concerns with his mother, who discusses
them with him at length. In the end, though, she convinces him that her pain is severely
inhibiting her experience of her own life, and that she does not need to suffer for
anyone—not even him. “Of course I would if I thought there were a real chance, but
there’s not” (00:26:10-00:26:17).
Struggling-For
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The second chapter of this project dealt with the death of Socrates and the beingtowards-death that he experienced during the final weeks of his life, which I argue
influenced his activities during his imprisonment and immediately prior to his execution.
While waiting for uncontrollable events to come to pass, Socrates was caught between
life and death, freedom and confinement. For the contemporary individuals featured
within How to Die in Oregon, and the innumerable number of terminally ill Americans
who might want to die differently, the period of living dying can be excruciating. While
caught there, individuals are repeatedly forced to come into contact with the limitations
of themselves. These confrontations call one’s entire being into question. Michael Hyde
calls these moments the “call of the conscience,” moments when our existence as Beings,
a thing we take for granted, is shaken. In pursuit of reparation of our fractured sense of
self, we call out to that self through our conscience. In “hearing the call,” we are, in a
sense awakened to begin the process of putting ourselves back together. We become
“concerned with the truth of our temporal existence and with the decisive challenge that
comes with it—trying to determine how to live out this truth” (25). For those who hear it,
“the call of the conscience brings us face-to-face with the fact that we are creatures
whose desire for the ‘good life’ requires us to assume the personal and ethical
responsibility of affirming our freedom through resolute choice” (25). The call of the
conscience, then, forces individuals to fully consider their actions and their motivations.
Acting responsibly requires a kind of rhetorical openness to the Other, a desire to listen
and connect with those who are outside of one’s self but also familiar. This plays out in
real, practical ways when it comes to the issue of end-of-life. One of the most moving
aspects of How to Die in Oregon is the irrefutable way that the individuals featured in the
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film live for one another. For many of them, there is a struggling-for the other that is a
simple, resolute choice. But there are also limitations to that generosity, or a closure to
the rhetorical openness. And this space, betwixt the philosophical and the practical, is
where things become incredibly interesting. It is within this space that hospitality comes
into play, since the overarching intention of the individuals in How to Die in Oregon to
find the “at-home” of the self again.
Every individual featured within How to Die in Oregon wishes to die within their
own home, surrounded by the familiar. At its most basic level, the familiarity of home
offers up safety. Within the known boundaries of the home over which one is sovereign,
the individual can relax and allow itself to be exposed; there is no real threat inside the
home. The threats are within the patron of the house, the person in charge, and they can
be allowed to breathe within the safety of the home. In Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates longheld conception of the soul as a combination of reason and desire is given a new
configuration. For the Socrates of the Phaedo, the body is the site of desire and the soul is
pure reason. Given that Socrates’ death is imminent in the Phaedo, it is interesting and
understandable that he would suddenly consider his body a distracting kind of cage. This
concept, which seems purely theoretical within the pages of Phaedo, comes to life
onscreen within How to Die in Oregon. Bodies are cages that hold in a sovereign Dasein,
a presence of human existence that has literal boundaries. For the individuals who are, in
a way, trapped within those bodies as disease ravages their interiority, dying in a familiar
space offers the possibility for some control over circumstances. By controlling that
sovereign space, the dying individual can possibly regain some control over some of the
conditions of dying.
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In Being and Time, Heidegger writes that, “Dasein is mine to be in one way or
another…That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself
towards its Being as its ownmost possibility…authenticity and inauthenticity are both
grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness” (Being
and Time). Where Heidegger believes that nothing is as personal and internalized as the
Dasein’s own death, Levinas sees death as a kind of communion. Heidegger’s suggestion
is that individuals live for themselves and only know others because that knowledge
helps constitute their separate individuality. But in watching the interactions of the living
dying with the living in How to Die in Oregon, the Heideggerian approach rings false.
The dying do not live for themselves at the end, or at any other time; they live for one
another and adhere to a response-ability that is called forth from them. As Levinas writes
in Totality and Infinity:
To be I is, over and beyond any individuation that can be derived from a system
of references, to have identity as one’s content. The I is not a being that always
remains the same, but is the being whose existing consists in identifying the itself,
in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it. It is the primal identity,
the primordial work of identification” (36).
This calling forth creates a community. For Levinas, identity is fluid because it is
constructed by all interactions with all others. Levinas considered the confrontation
between the fluid self and the others who call it into being to be an ethical one. Blackwell
is careful to point out that when Levinas diverged from the work of Heidegger, it was
because Heidegger viewed death as an opportunity for the Dasein to prove itself, but
“Levinas does not view death, however, in this way. Rather than see it as the ultimate test
of virility and authenticity, as the proof of mineness, his ethical reaction is to view it as
the other’s death, in which we recognize the limits of the possible in suffering”
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(Blackwell 4). In the Preface to Totality and Infinity, Levinas writes, “The visage of
being that shows itself in war,” (and this chapter argues, in all high-conflict
confrontations with the other), “is fixed in the concept of totality, which dominates
Western philosophy. Individuals are reduced to being bearers of forces that command
them unbeknownst to them” (Totality and Infinity 21). While these confrontations open
the individual up to the other, “War does not manifest exteriority and the other as other; it
destroys the identity of the same” (21). So the individual, when met with resistance from
the other during war or conflict, is not fighting just the other, but also his own Being.
This is one piece of Levinas’ larger ethical project. Rather than needing the Dasein to die
in order for it to legitimate its presence and its separateness from the others, death allows
Dasein/Being an opportunity for connection to the others. In dying, there is a rhetorical
opening outwards. That opening creates an opportunity for face-to-face recognition and
real understanding of the suffering of the dying. In breaking with Heidegger, Levinas
“has thought the farthest” of any philosopher “about human mortality not, as one might
imagine, by standing on Heidegger’s shoulders, but rather, more originally, by proposing
a radically different but philosophically superior account of the nature and significance of
human mortality” (Cohen 23). Levinas “radically and completely” opposes Heidegger’s
approach to death; where Heidegger believed that being-towards-death was “the selfunderstanding of being,” Levinas believes death to be “beyond-being and better-than
being” (25-26). Levinas focuses on the death of the self least and the death of the other is
where he invests his analysis since this is the precise point when “care for the other’s
death takes precedence over care for one’s own—all the way to the extreme point of
‘dying for’ the other—that the human subject achieves its true humanity, and hence the
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proper height of a morally and socially responsible selfhood” (25-26). This approach
emphasizes that the “Human consists precisely in opening oneself to the death of the
other, in being preoccupied with his or her death…But above all, it is no longer just a
question of going toward the other when he is dying, but of answering with one’s
presence to the mortality of the living. That is the whole of ethical conduct” (Levinas
164).
The ethical conduct of being present at the death of the other is what viewers offer
the subjects of How to Die in Oregon. Richardson’s documentary is itself a narrative that
traces the decline of its subjects and becomes a living text. As a documentary film, it
embodies a kind of “deep-focus realism,” a style of documentary that, “resembles
everyday experience in that both share a certain spontaneity and freedom in the scanning
of the surrounding area” (Carroll 241, Capdevila 68). Carroll writes that this style, in
attempting to present real life as realistically as possible, gives the illusion of freedom in
the editing of the film; the audience perceives this control as assimilation of “the
succession of images” and calls the freedom “realistic because it is analogous of the kind
of choice and freedom we experience when we scan everyday reality for information on
how things stand” (68). As Capdevila suggests, “if documentary images satisfy our thirst
for reality, it is because they also shape our way of looking at reality” (69). In watching
beings individually come-to-terms with their finitude, a shared experience emerges. The
terminally ill patients and their families are finding the boundaries of themselves on film,
and as viewers, we hold them suspended in their suffering. We are the host who knows
what is coming. Despite our freedom in viewing and how real the documentary feels as it
objectifies its subjects and subject matter, as audience members, we are complicit in the
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violence that holds the terminally ill hostage within their bodies. Documentary films toy
with temporality, weaving and unweaving the narrative in a way that seems real (as in,
something that we are viewing in the now), but is already past. Instead of being able to
connect with the individuals who we hold hostage in our viewing, we are incapable of
freeing them or altering the conditions of their stay within our homes.
As we watch How to Die in Oregon, we are given insights into the lives of guests
who we did not anticipate ever knowing, and who we will never know. At the most basic
level, as viewers we are anxious about having to witness someone die; there is something
about it that seems voyeuristic, as though we are invading upon the most personal and
private of life’s experiences—in a sense, we are the uninvited. But on a deeper level, our
anxiety arises because as hosts to these guests, we are not sure which actions to take. The
reception of How to Die in Oregon is evidence of audience reluctance at even this passive
participation in end-of-life. Brooks Barnes of the New York Times writes that, “Most
screenings at the Sundance Film Festival here are mob scenes…none of that hubbub was
on display at the Sunday premiere of what is without question one of the most difficultto-watch movies of the festival, this year or any year” (Barnes 1). HBO produced the
documentary, and Sheila Nevins, the president of HBO Documentary Films, shared with
Barnes that “she thought people were squeamish. Even half her staff—and this is not a
crew unaccustomed to difficult topics—refused to watch the whole film” (Nevins qtd. in
Barnes 2). Additionally, “the movie’s experienced publicity team said it had never
witnessed such universal can’t-cope-with-that rejection from members of the media at
Sundance, who left some empty seats at the screening.” Some of those who stayed for the
entire film openly sobbed. Nevins adds: “Nobody wants to stare death in the face, and
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that’s the reason nobody wants to see this film…Don’t get me wrong—it’s very harsh, a
very hard watch. But ultimately it’s an important film about courage, about dignity, about
compassion” (Nevins qtd. in Barnes 2). While we might want to look away and leave
death to the dying, How to Die in Oregon forces us to look death in the face and to
consider the next ethical step. While we cannot play an active role in easing the stay of
these guests, can we really deny them our consideration?
***
“What is happening to me?!”
During Cody Curtis’ first cancer diagnosis and treatment, she wound up in the
Intensive Care Unit due to complications that arose from the surgery. “I was in a coma
for quite a while, and all of a sudden, I opened my eyes really wide and said, ‘What is
happening to me?!’” (00:17:30-00:17:59). What is happening to me is the question of the
living dying, the question that the Being asks in order to understand itself again, in an
attempt to re-identify itself to itself. It is a difficult question to ask, and for the terminally
ill, an even more difficult answer to receive. One of the most dramatic aspects of How to
Die in Oregon is how invested the audience becomes in the story of the dying individual,
Cody Curtis in particular, receiving a different type of message. When Richardson first
begins interviewing her on tape, she has just received a second diagnosis of liver cancer,
it has metastasized to other organs, and she has been given a prognosis of 6 months to
live. But after 6 months, Richardson reacquaints us with Cody. We watch her gardening
in her front yard. We hear her excitedly talk about the “golden summer” that she and her
family have shared; it is a summer that they did not think she would live to see. She tells
Richardson that she is no longer worried about dying all the time, and that if she had it to
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do over again, she would not have chosen a date to end her life. Miraculously, she is
feeling better. As an onlooker, we exhale a sigh of relief. When she shares in an interview
that she thinks about not dying now, and finds herself wondering if she might have
“another twenty years” to live, we feel as though we have been let off the hook, because
if she is healthy, we are not responsible/response-able for her choices.
But we are responsible, and response-able. Death is “at once resistance and
urgency of life, or as Levinas put it, ‘healing and impotence’” (Tangjia 143). Tangjia
writes that, “In fact, death takes root in care. For Heidegger, care becomes the way of
humans to escape from the fear of approaching death. Although the person who has died
is not in the world any longer, he is still alive in the image and memory of others, and he
is still the object which others care about” (146). And this care includes the tributes we
pay to the dead in our mourning of them, including the funeral rites and the celebration of
the life they lived. Accordingly, this ethic of care serves as the foundation for Levinas’
discussion of responsibility. For Levinas, the matter of death was one meant to be dealt
with by the living. Meaning is derived from death by the “survivors in the family in
which the dead person lived,” by those hosts who were beholden to their guest in life and,
now that the guest has left, must go through with moving forward. In Levinasian terms,
fear of death is built into our lives from a pre-ontological place. “Our consciousness is
usually occupied with Being and the ‘il-y-a’ to the point that we find ourselves unable to
accept or take over impending death and nothingness” (147). It is beyond our grasp.
When it confronts us and we are forced to consider it more fully, we are forced to ask
what is happening to me?!
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The next time Richardson interviews Cody Curtis, she is talking to Linda Jensen,
her Compassion and Choices volunteer. Cody tells Linda she feels “really guilty” about
feeling healthy months after outliving her prognosis (01:01:08). She shares with Linda
that the guilt arises from her inability to meet the expectations of those around her; there
are expectations of how she should behave and what should happen, and in being alive,
she is not meeting those expectations. When she learned she only had 6 months to live,
Cody made a checklist of the things she wanted to accomplish prior to death. But when
we see her an hour into the documentary, she says she has been “dragging her feet” on
the last few items on that list because she does not know what she will do when it is
finished. There is a fear of the unknown here. For well over six months, Cody has been
spending her days waiting for the cancer to kill her, or for the pain to be so great that she
turns to the medications she has stowed away in a drawer in her home. Much of her
anxiety now stems from not knowing what to do with herself. She is not declining, and
she wants to “conform” to the expectations of illness, or, the narrative that prognosis
layers onto life. She looks at Linda and says:
And then you said something profound when we talked on the phone. You have to
decide what quality of life is. Is it just being able to get up and get dressed and
take a walk, or is it not having pain? I’m coming to think it’s not being able to
take care of myself and not worrying my family. And I feel like I wanna model—
for my children—a kind of grace and acceptance. And I’m really scared of being
a coward at the end. (01:02:03-01:02:39).
Linda answers Cody: “Do you think it’s cowardice to not want to suffer?” (01:02:49).
She goes on, telling Cody that the problem in society is the notion that the “truly
courageous are the ones who suffer the most” (01:03:06-01:03:21). “There’s no logic,
there’s no logic to that,” Linda tells her. Cody considers this and says, “It’s a very human
thing to die…I’m just lucky to know how and when I’ll die and to have more control over
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that then most people do” (01:03:42). And so Cody goes about her life, free from
debilitating symptoms for a few more weeks.
When the decline happens, though, it happens quickly and is excruciating to
watch—even more so to endure. Cody has outlived her diagnosis by 10 months and is on
high doses of morphine for her pain. Richardson follows her into her darkened kitchen
where she opens a deep drawer filled with various prescriptions and vitamin bottles. Her
breathing is audible and labored. “It’s hard to sort out…what’s doing what,” she tells
him. Her fevers are spiking, she is not responding to antibiotics, she is in pain, and she’s
jaundiced (01:13:40-01:14:09). “So yeah…I’m declining the last week and a half”
(01:14:28). Because she is suffering but able to care for herself for the most part, Cody is
now torn; the decision to end her life is one she is not ready to take lightly, even though
she is fully aware of what her decline will look like. She says that there will come a point
where the choice is “easy and obvious and I’ll be grateful,” but she is not there yet
(01:15:08). In an attempt to buy herself a little more time, Cody has another procedure
done in order to remove some obstructions from the tube that allows her liver to function.
Because the tube had become blocked, fluid was building up in her abdomen. Cody is
conscious but under anesthesia while they replace her tube and begin draining her
abdomen of fluid buildup. As liter after liter (four total) is filled with excess fluid from
her abdomen, the doctors tell Cody that she should experience profound relief now that
they have relieved some of the pressure causing her not only physical discomfort, but
rendering her incapable of eating. When she sees the fluid in the jars, a groggy Cody
begins cheering on her doctors. “Pat yourselves on the back. Group hug if necessary,” she
tells them. She then begins to weep. “I’m so happy. Thank you,” she tells a nurse
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(01:20:30). While it cannot save her life, modern medicine has bought her a little more
time. Immediately following this procedure, Cody’s husband Stan does another interview
with Richardson. He shares that this is not about an unwillingness to suffer, or a rejection
of the face of suffering. Stan believes that his wife was willing and ready to suffer in
order to achieve a graceful death; the nature of her disease is what prohibits this kind of
death from happening, not her willpower. And in his support of her decision is a selfproclaimed pride in her, in the family they have created, and a recognition of the her
pride in herself. “I don’t think that gets talked about often enough,” he tells Richardson
(01:21:52).
Unfortunately, the procedure only buys her a little more time. Walking becomes
more difficult, and so does the ability to tolerate the pain. Food begins to lose its taste,
and Cody can barely keep it down, anyway. Cody and Stan visit Dr. Morris, and Cody
asks for the decision tree going forward. Cody tells Dr. Morris, “I’d like to know what
will it be like if I decide not to treat the fevers, because I just feel like I’d just rather drift
away” (01:23:27). The fevers have risen to 104 degrees, which tells Dr. Morris that the
bile in Cody’s liver is infected, and that the infection is life-threatening. Her options are
whittled down to one. She can continue treating the fevers and prolong her current state
of suffering, or she can stop treating the fevers and to fall into a coma induced by the
infection, at which point she will likely only last a few more days. As the reality sinks in,
Richardson keeps the camera focused on Cody while Stan and Dr. Morris try to get
themselves to the point of realization that she has already gotten to. Stan voices his
support of a third option—more draining of fluids, which would possibly buy Cody more
time. “Jill, really, is set on coming home for Christmas on December 23rd. So there’s a
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fair amount of incentive to see if draining helps to get us to there” (01:24:35). Dr. Morris
breaks in, “Certainly, I think we could see if the drainage could help get things through to
Christmas” (01:24:52). Cody then turns to Stan and says, with tears in her eyes, “Well, I
think this is enough. I, I, I can’t do anymore” (01:24:58). And just like that, the decision
has been made. The camera zooms out and we see Dr. Morris, Stan, and Cody all coming
to the same point of recognition. Before we leave them, Richardson zooms back in on the
space between Cody and Stan: their hands are tightly gripped together.
Two weeks after this very difficult conversation, Cody’s liver is failing. A
message on the screen tells us that “the build-up of fluid in her abdomen continues, at a
much faster rate” (01:25:43), and opens onto a scene of Cody getting her final haircut.
Her midsection is extremely bloated due to the collection of fluids. She struggles to get
comfortable in the hairdresser’s chair, a struggle that she will be actively trying to hide
within the rest of the film. A voiceover during the haircut features Dr. Morris. She tells
us: “About three weeks ago, Cody was on a very minimal amount of pain medication.
Within the last three weeks, she’s gone to needing the equivalent of 10 mg of IV
morphine an hour, which is…a lot. Part of the pain is due to the fact that she has literally,
like, 3 two-liter Coke bottles of fluid in her belly. It’s like going from not-pregnant to
nine months pregnant in a week, and she said, ‘This is not what I signed up for. I’m
suffering now. And, um, so, it’s time’” ( 01:26:23-01:26:47). Cody tells Richardson that
she does not wish to “subject her family” to having to watch her needlessly suffer while
she waits to die. While she can “understand that there is a kind of dignity in suffering,
there is a certain grace in accepting the inevitable” (01:26:59-01:27:14). Dr. Morris
guesses that, given the support of the hospital staff, if Cody were to try to die naturally,
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she would need a great deal at the end of life in order to die at home: a hospital bed,
round-the-clock nursing staff, and intravenous medications, among other expensive and
time-sapping endeavors. It is the week before Thanksgiving, and given these ‘extras,’ Dr.
Morris estimates that Cody would still be dead within approximately eight weeks.
Instead, Cody chooses to pass away on Monday, December 7, 2010. Saturday,
December 5, 2010, is spent with friends and family. Cody is trying to have a perfect
weekend. Her daughter Jill flies in early, and in the two days before her death, Cody
teaches her son how to make the family’s favorite cookie bars—a recipe everyone loves
but no one but Cody knows how to prepare. Friends visit and she encourages them to
‘shop her closet.’ She gives a few small gifts to others, at which point both she and her
friends sob. During all of this, her son cooks in the kitchen and every so often, brings in a
pot or a pan for Cody’s approval. She is too sick to stand for very long, and is mostly
confined to laying on her back in bed. After everyone leaves, he brings in an emptied pot
of melted chocolate for her to have the last lick of the spoon, but she is too sick to eat it.
When Monday comes around, Richardson does not take us into the bedroom
where Cody will drink the medications. Instead, the closest we get in a kitchen table
where the medications are prepared. He positions us outside of the house, focused on the
warm light shining through the curtains in Cody and Stan’s bedroom. We can hear the
family singing together. We travel between kitchen table and this outside-looking-in
view. Linda, Cody’s volunteer from Compassion and Choices, pours the secanol capsules
into a shallow bowl, one by one. The mound of medication nearly fills the bowl by the
time she is done. From outside, we hear Dr. Morris arrive. Inside, we see Stan watching
as Linda mixes water into the secanol. Once the mixture is ready, we hear Cody telling
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her friends and family how much she loves them. Sniffling and crying are heard, then
Cody telling everyone that there is “holiday Kleenex in the next room” (01:41:12). Cody
tells Stan she loves him. Linda hands the mixture to Cody, and reminds her that it will
taste terrible. We hear people shuffling. We hear Cody thank Stan for “a great weekend”
(1:43:30). Then, “thank you, momma and daddy for coming” (01:41:20). “And, thanks
for singing me out” (01:41:40). And her final words: “This is so easy. I wish people knew
how easy this was. Thank you, Dr. Kate…I’m drifting, I’m drifting” (01:44:46).
Someone in the room begins to whistle a song, low and slowly, and the film ends.
***
How to Die in Oregon is a brave documentary, and that is perhaps what makes it difficult
to watch. It asks its viewers to become hosts to dying and to give the dying the benefit of
their presence. This interaction is an ethical one; in being present and preoccupied with
the death of the other, viewers come to understand their finitude. In representing the
Death with Dignity Act as an end-of-life option, the film also familiarizes us with things
we do not typically see: patients receiving medical treatments, patients suffering from
their diseases despite medical treatments, and suffering bodies moving around in society.
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas refers to suffering as “the pain lightly called
physical” (69). Cohen writes that in describing pain in this “dramatic” way, Levinas is
defining suffering that comes “from the enforced passivity of the sufferer. That is to say,
pain occurs in a doubling up of pain: there is pain and like a shadow there is also its
inescapability, which is part of and increases the painfulness of pain” (28). In this
suffering resides the fear of death. For Levinas, “The acuity of suffering lies in the
impossibility of fleeing it, of being protected in oneself from oneself; it lies in the being
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cut off from every living spring. And it is the impossibility of retreat” (238). In viewing
the film, the audience is implicit to the suffering of the film’s subjects. And the suffering
is what is most striking within the documentary. For instance, the film makes it plain that
Cody Curtis desperately wants to make it to Christmas for her family, the others who
have given her life meaning and who will live on long after her. When she admits to her
husband and Dr. Morris that she cannot—and will not—go through with more treatments,
the agony is visible on her face. When they each tell her that they will support whatever
decision she makes, that agony is replaced with relief. Death is a “social event” that
connects the dying to those who have come to offer their presence, their community, to
the suffering individual. This is why while looking on and observing the suffering of the
individuals within Richardson’s film we are caught up in hostipitality, Derrida’s Mobiuslike in-between of hospitality and hostility. But in viewing this kind of suffering and
looking directly at it, viewers have an occasion to consider mortality and morality.
Relief is what is offered by the Death with Dignity Act, not death. This is because
the Death with Dignity Act offers users autonomy in medical-decision making and
agency in controlling their own deaths. Individuals who seek out, apply for, and obtain
the life-ending medications often report “the comfort of having the prescription or the
medical in hand” (P. Miller et. al. 27). For those individuals who procure the medications
and do not take them, the ability to access an end-of-life option is enough. It provides
them with the sense of having made an informed, independent decision, and allows them
to utilize that option if and when they are ready. Approximately one-third of the
individuals in Oregon who receive the medications do not use them to end their lives. For
the roughly two-thirds who do, the stakes are different. Through the Death with Dignity
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Act, they are able to consider “the role of suffering and meaning at the end of life,” and
act of their own volition. A group of hospice workers in Oregon who counseled these
individuals write that, “Now, to know that a capable and competent patient could take a
lethal and legal dose of medication to end his or her life on a specified day opened new
clinical challenges to social work’s education and knowledge” of end of life (P. Miller et.
al. 32). Many times, “open conversation about the choice for Death with Dignity in the
context of wishing to hasten death appeared to decrease the patient’s anxiety and
distress” (33). For patients ‘stuck’ there, dwelling in the in-between is an unending
confrontation with finitude and the body’s deterioration. The terminally ill individuals
utilizing the DWDA worry about the effects of their deaths on those around them. Loved
ones are held captive by the illness, too, and their brushes with death leave indelible
marks. The desire to maintain the connection to the Other is natural and human, so it
makes sense that while alive, the loved ones of the dying individual would follow them
anywhere. In Cody Curtis’ case, and in the cases of so many others utilizing the Oregon
law, death with dignity is an end to the struggling-for the other, and is instead a way of
liberating the other from their responsibility.
Dying with dignity under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act is no easy feat. This
law has quietly offered Oregon citizens an alternative to extended suffering for the past
two decades, and has been successful because it is rooted in best practices. In requesting
such an allowance from Western biomedicine, dying individuals must come face-to-face
with their limitations and with their lack of personal agency. But Levinas is correct in
thinking that these confrontations with mortality have a way of crystallizing one’s views.
For the individuals featured in How to Die in Oregon, this clarity puts one’s dignity into
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focus—not into question. For many of them, dignity has little to do with vanity or
personal pride in one’s health. Instead, it has to do with honoring the life one has lived,
the family one will leave behind, an the death that is least painful for all involved.
Through watching the film, it becomes increasingly obvious that the real tragedy would
be in asking these individuals to continue living lives that are so full of suffering. In
asking the living dying to endure deterioration and physical pain, the living put the
possibility of a dignified death at risk. “Because of the waiting periods involved and the
requirement of self-administration of the medications, waiting until far into the disease
process may make use of the law unattainable” for some individuals (P. Miller et. al. 34).
There are examples of this less easy death. When waiting too long to take
advantage of a particular option that is both legal and dignified, other less dignified
options begin to emerge. These are last-ditch efforts at gaining control and agency in the
fact of death. Zoe FitzGerald Carter’s Imperfect Endings is one recent and often
shockingly honest portrayal of such a descent into fewer and fewer options. The memoir
begins when FitzGerald Carter’s mother, Margaret, decides to end her life. She is tired of
suffering from Parkinson’s disease and discusses her end-of-life options with her
physicians and her three daughters. FitzGerald Carter and her sister Hannah support their
mother’s decision, but their sister Katherine is not of the same mind. Katherine chooses
not to participate—in the discussion, carrying out their mother’s plan, or being there for
their mother’s death. This is a common, and very human, response in the face of death.
But Margaret perseveres despite criticism from family and some friends. A native of
California, she has no access to the legal options. When she realizes her lack of legal
options, she devises a plan to skirt the law. She attempts to get enough morphine
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stockpiled so that she can take it all at once when she is ready. But she can never get
enough, and the time just never seems right.
Instead, she starts seeking out other options, carefully choosing which friends to
tell about her decision. There is no consensus. She tells Zoe, “I called Mitzy up on the
Cape. She told me she did not approve of what I was doing. She said I was being selfish”
(196). But in the same breath, she adds, “It’s okay. I don’t expect everyone to
understand” (196). Despite efforts to persuade someone to give her medications to end
her life, she is unsuccessful. And as she cannot gain access to legal life-ending
medications, what transpires is a months long seesaw between trying to weigh the value
of one’s potential future against present suffering. Inevitably, Margaret tries to overdose
on morphine, but doesn’t die because she did not take enough. Ultimately, she realizes
that starvation is her best option—a process that takes nearly two weeks before she
finally succumbs to it. That duration of time takes a tremendous toll on her daughters and
their families. FitzGerald Carter writes, “People die the way they live. Big public gestures
had never been my mother’s style and now that I think about it, I see that the dramatic
deathbed scene with the morphine wasn’t her at all. Slipping away unnoticed in the midst
of an ordinary afternoon was all her” (246). Through her grief, she realizes that, “After all
these months of discussion, the false starts and failed attempts, my proud, determined
mother had died on her terms, grace and dignity intact” (246).
Biggs writes that “human dignity…is a nebulous concept amenable to a range of
interpretations”; for patients who seek dignity at the end-of-life, “living may amount to
little more than survival” (11). Being kept alive at the risk of one’s dignity prolongs
dying but takes a significant toll on the living dying individual. The nebulous nature of
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these circumstances raises questions concerning the definition of life and death, but also
highlights the problematic and nebulous issue of quality of life. It seems that especially
for the terminally ill, being kept alive is not a primary concern. It becomes a secondary or
even tertiary concern in the face of suffering and illness. Of greater concern are the needs
and experiences of family members during the dying, the way that things are left once the
dying person’s life ends, and the circumstances the living are left to deal with when they
are left behind. The living-for Others that is cultivated during entire lives is made strange
by death. For those taking advantage of the Death with Dignity Act, dignity is one last
kindness to offer to family and friends who have stood by during illness, and to one’s
self. In Oregon, this dignity is built into citizens’ rights—they have the right to avail
themselves of the law if their suffering is too great, and the State protects the rights of
those who survive the terminally ill individual. But for those who do not reside in
Oregon, the struggle to attain a dignified death is complicated by abstract geographical
boundaries. We are all going to die; in Western biomedicine, the way that we die has
become controlled by complicated by politics, geography, and our own unwillingness to
have serious conversations about end-of-life. For some individuals, this lack of
hospitality is unacceptable. Instead of accepting their circumstances and limitations, they
work from inside the system that prevents them from fully exercising their rights and,
from that position, effect change. While the dying cannot control their decline, the
documentary provides them with the opportunity to control of their own narratives and to
discuss the death of the other. In doing so, they make a kind of timeless sacrifice in the
vein of what Levinas considered the most extreme sense of mortality and “perhaps the
ultimate sense of morality, living for and caring for others,” that being “dying for the
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other” (Cohen 30, Levinas 216). In dying for the other, we make it our purpose “to not let
the other die alone,” and “worry over death of the other comes before care for self. The
humanness of dying for the other would be the very meaning of love in its responsibility
for one’s fellowman and, perhaps, the primordial inflection of the affective as such”
(216). By putting the comfort of the suffering other ahead of one’s own, the individual
who is other-oriented can perform the most ethical kind of morality, where “concern for
the death of the other is realized, and that ‘dying for him,’ ‘dying his death,’ takes
priority over ‘authentic’ death” (217). In a way, this ‘dying for’ inverts the hospitable
relationship. It gives up one’s own sovereignty for the betterment of society at large; it is
a tremendous sacrifice. But theoretically, in orienting one’s self towards a more caring
kind of morality, Levinas enables individuals to recognize their responsibility at members
of society, a responsibility that is “incumbent on beings as beings, specifically on mortal
and suffering human beings,” who, although they be “separate from one another,” must
“rise to a higher, nobler, responsibility, to care for one another...the other who as a mortal
being suffers and should not face death alone…who imposes the moral demand to be
saved from the violence of death” (Cohen 38). In viewing How to Die in Oregon, the
documentary’s audience is asked to participate in this kind of responsibility and to
confront the death of the other. Inherent within this confrontation lurks the question over
what happens when this sense of responsibility—in being present for the dying of the
other—falls apart.
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Chapter Five
Looking Death in the Face: Brittany Maynard’s Search for Hospitality in Dying
“To undergo an experience with something means that this something befalls us, strikes
us, comes over us, overwhelms us and completely transforms us. When we talk of
‘undergoing’ an experience, we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own
making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and
submit to it.”
Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being
“Bodies/Can’t you see what everybody wants from you?/
If you could want that, too/Then you’d be happy.”
St. Vincent, “Cruel”
Something happened in America in late 2014 that made it difficult for American
society to continue ignoring death’s existence: a young American woman found out that
she had terminal cancer and, rather than opting for experimental and doomed treatments,
chose to access an end-of-life option available only to a select group of Americans living
in states with legal end-of-life options. In the months between diagnosis and death, 29year-old Brittany Maynard became the spokesperson for medical aid in dying and the
American public took unprecedented interest in her decision. Bioethicist Arthur Caplan
attempted to rationalize the public’s fascination with Maynard, speculating that, “because
she's young, vivacious, attractive, a newlywed, has a dog, and is a very different kind of
person from the average middle-aged or older person who has to confront issues about
terminal illness, she changes the optics of the debate” over how terminally ill Americans
should die (“Why Brittany Maynard Changes the Right-to-Die Debate”). Fresh optics
proved vital in Maynard’s positioning as an advocate for aid in dying; she did not fit the
image of terminal illness that Western society is familiar with and so quickly shies away
from, and for the first time, people were listening to a discussion of death.
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In this chapter, Maynard’s position as a suffering subject is examined. Levinas
considered death to be a pre-ontological issue of ethics. In Levinas’ line of thinking, and
in Totality and Infinity in particular, morality is necessarily an obsession with the death of
the other and a preoccupation with caring-for that other in their time of greatest need.
While the prognosis that Maynard received is unfortunately all-too-common, her
handling of her prognosis set her apart and invited the public to encounter death in a more
comfortable way. Rather than denying death, the American public was invited to witness
the overcoming of suffering—to take part in an ethical interaction and, through their
interest in the Maynard’s end-of-life, to reexamine their personal feelings about death.
But in asking the public to allow her to end her suffering, Maynard also asked them to
engage in a kind of hospitality without protective conditions: Maynard’s death engaged in
its own kind of hospitality, too. In sharing her suffering with others and allowing them to
come to terms with their mortality, she required something in return: that more terminally
ill Americans were allowed to legally opt out of their suffering.
No Vacancies
In “Hostipitality,” Derrida discusses the spaces in which hospitality dwells. He
writes that, “There is almost an axiom of self-limitation or self-contradiction in the law of
hospitality. As a reaffirmation of mastery and being oneself in one’s own home, from the
outset hospitality limits itself at its very beginning, it remains forever on the threshold of
itself” (14). He continues unspooling this idea, claiming that in order to understand
hospitality, one must “take up the figure of the door, for there to be hospitality, there
must be a door” (14). Hospitality is defined by the freedoms of both the guest and the
host; both are responsible to one another, and their shared home must have doors and
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windows in order to assure them of their mutually beneficial confinement within the
relationship. But Derrida is clear that there is a difference: “In visitation there is no door.
Anyone can come at any time and can come in without needing a key for the door. There
are no customs checks with a visitation. But there are customs and police checks with an
invitation” (14). The difference, then, is one of entering willingly into a hospitable
relationship and finding oneself already part of a relationship without being complicit.
This distinction, much like the hospitality/hostility struggle described by Derrida in this
article and throughout his work, is fluid. It depends, as always, on context and
circumstances that are often beyond the individual’s control.
As a citizen of the United States, Brittany Maynard was afforded certain rights.
However, since the right to die is left up to individual states, Maynard was beholden to
her home state’s laws on the matter. As a resident of California, she was first and
foremost a guest of that state. But her visitation became complicated when she made an
unexpected request of her host. When Brittany Maynard received her terminal diagnosis,
she initially “considered passing away in hospice care at my San Francisco Bay-area
home,” but chose not to because “even with palliative medication, I could develop
potentially morphine-resistant pain and suffer personality changes and verbal, cognitive,
and motor loss of virtually any kind” (Maynard). Her condition became particularly
frightening when her physicians cautioned her that because she was “young and healthy,”
she was “likely to physically hang on for a long time even though cancer was eating [her]
mind” (Maynard). Like so many of terminally ill citizens in Oregon discussed in chapter
3, Brittany Maynard wanted to approach end-of-life with an option in ‘reserve’. As her
seizures grew more severe and the realization of her imminent, violent death became
125

undeniable, Maynard prepared herself to do what was necessary to access the type of
death that felt dignified to her. It would have to be one that enabled her to maintain
autonomy and quality of life. Additionally, it would need to provide her with a sense of
control in the midst of her unexpected prognosis, decline in health, and overwhelming
anxiety at the thought of suffering. When she considered her options, the laws of
hospitality had a great deal to do with how she weighed the possibilities. Hospitality
plays a significant role in how one is treated in any situation where they come into
contact with others. Derrida defines hospitality in terms of an almost pre-ontological
sense of responsibility towards the stranger, the other, writing, “hospitality is certainly,
necessarily, a right, a duty, and obligation, the greeting of the foreign other as a friend”
(OH 4). But for Maynard, the friendly treatment she longed for was unavailable from her
host state. Frustrated by her lack of access, Maynard very publicly made a decision to
disentangle herself from what had been a lifelong hospitality arrangement. In doing so,
she raised questions about patient autonomy and patients’ rights at end-of-life,
successfully reinvigorating discussions of human rights in the process.
Understanding and alleviating patient frustration is most critical for the terminally
ill, since once diagnosed, they must quickly come to terms with how out of their control
their death is; death is instead controlled—by state and federal governments, Western
biomedicine, and the inescapable tension of hospital-patient co-dependence, for starters.
As Jodi Halpern writes, “The term autonomy refers to both a psychological capacity to
make decisions that reflect one’s own goals and an ethical ideal of self-determination”
(Halpern 101). Modern medicine has long attempted to provide its patients with
autonomy, and within the medical context, the “term is used…to describe an evolving set
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of patients’ rights, extending from rights to determine what happens to one’s own body,
to rights to informed consent and refusal of treatment, to rights to participate more fully
in medical decision-making” (101). But illness manipulates autonomy, since it is a
situation that the individual may not know how to navigate and needs professional help
with. However, studies of how healthcare professionals communicate
responsibility/response-ability to patients with chronic and terminal illness, Thille and
Russell found that most care fell short of providing patients with a care plan that
considered individual needs and concerns. Instead, in attempting to convince patients to
take responsibility for their health, most medical professionals were actually urging them
to think of their illnesses as “measurable” and scientific, rather than sets of occurrences
that could provide insights; “patients’ lived experience” was deemed unreliable and
unscientific precisely because it could not be measured (1348). In these instances, the
patriarchal tradition of medicine seems to be at work. Doctors “give responsibility,”
meaning that they provide “medically defined measures of disease activity” and expect
patients to keep themselves within those measurements. “However, when patients ‘took
control’ in ways that were not allowed by doctors, their actions were presented in
negative terms, as problem behavior,” and they were seen as non-compliant (1349). The
guests had overstepped their boundaries and not acted within the conditions set forth by
the hosts. In instances where illness is serious and threatens to end patient life, patient
agency and autonomy are compromised in significant ways. The ill become dependent
upon the healthcare system and its agents but in trying to perform responsible self-care,
they are often perceived as failing to take responsibility. In this dependent relationship,
where healthcare professionals play host to the suffering guests, “success was constructed
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as more complex than what was observable or measurable, and in some cases, only
known by the patient” and imperceptible to the healthcare professional (1348). In reality,
for healthcare to break out of the doctor-centered model and become more collaborative,
it must strive for more “mutually negotiated goal[s],” since these are the only types of
goals that, because of their dependence on “patient involvement in planning care, in part
because patient concerns were constructed as (often) incongruent with disease-specific,
physician-identified priorities,” can yield satisfying results for both patient/guests and
their conditionally generous caregivers/hosts (1349). But this kind of care requires that
the long-held standards of care be revised in order to provide more hospitable care. Not
all participating parties are convinced that, by decreasing the conditions placed upon
contemporary medical patients, overall healthcare will improve. By removing conditions,
Western biomedicine loses it’s footing: if it is not the all-powerful sovereign, then it is
more susceptible to violence.
The desire for patient-centered care is not new, but Maynard’s requests reached
new audiences. For the terminally ill, “how we die has been an issue mainly fought out
by the elderly, some patient advocacy groups for the severely ill, disability organizations,
pro-life groups, religious organizations and healthcare providers. Most of the combatants
are middle aged or older. Few are especially photogenic. They have been sparring with
one another for a very long time” (“Why Brittany Maynard Changes the Right-to-Die
Debate”, Caplan). When Brittany Maynard went public with her health issues, the results
were dramatic. She welcomed relationships based in hospitality, and in longing for death,
invited it in on her own terms and in agreement with the laws of opening herself up to all
others. “Hospitality can only take place beyond hospitality, in deciding to let it come,
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overcoming the hospitality that paralyzes itself on the threshold of what it is…In this
sense, hospitality is always to come, but a ‘to come’ that does not and will never present
itself as such, in the present <and a future that does not have a horizon, a futurity—a
future without horizon>” (“Hostipitality”, 14).
Agency Transformed
Maynard began suffering from severe, debilitating headaches around New Year’s
Day of 2014. A few months later, she had undergone a partial craniotomy and a partial
resection of her temporal lobe to remove a Grade 2 astrocytoma. However, scans 70-days
post-op revealed that the cancer was actually an aggressive Grade 4 astrocytoma, known
as a glioblastoma, and Maynard was told she had 6 months or less to live. What followed
was a familial scramble to enter into drug trials, to find answers, and Maynard, her new
husband, her mother, and her stepfather quickly realized that no matter which treatment
options she went forward with, Maynard would not buy herself enough time to really
make a change. She was going to die, and her death was going to be a painful one. When
she sought out medicalized solutions to aid her in dying—after all, she was a 29-year-old
Californian who had always previously been able to depend upon modern medicine—she
was told that her home state would offer her no help. They would give her drugs to numb
the pain and drugs to help prevent her increasingly frequent seizures, but they would not
provide her with the kind of ultimate hospitality that she wanted from them. When
considering her options, Maynard came to the conclusion that she wanted to obtain the
medications available through the Death with Dignity Act. However, Maynard’s medical
options were inhibited by location: because she lived in California and not Oregon, she
could not receive the medical care that she desired. Due to their lack of legislation on
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end-of-life, her home state of California could not provide her with anything other than
hospice and palliative care. In order to gain control over her inevitable death, Maynard
and her family uprooted their lives and relocated to the state of Oregon in order to
establish residency and begin the process of utilizing the DWDA.
When asked about end-of-life, a significant number of Americans—roughly 70%-claim that they want to die in their own homes. Individual motivations for wanting to die
at home may vary slightly, but a desire to die while surrounded by familiarity is natural.
Biggs writes that, “In modern Western culture death has traditionally been a private affair
occurring behind closed doors and with minimal observation. Yet in Britain today,” as in
America, “approximately seventy percent of all deaths occur under the bright lights of
hospital where the natural processes of dying are often transformed into a medical event
and subordinated to technology” (Biggs 9). This is a trend among Americans as well.
Despite the desires of the patient, dying within the hospital is what is offered. In lieu of
hospital deaths, the closest thing to choice that patients receive is hospice, which is
heavily controlled and actually quite difficult to be admitted to. But, as one social worker
who specializes in hospice in the state of Oregon stated,
“Do you think there is comfort for physicians because they refer the patient to
hospice? I think that [a referral to hospice] is probably happening more often than
we know it, because I see it from people, too, that the physician wasn’t interested
in discussing” other options with them, “and they didn’t quite know where else to
go…Nobody had given them any direction so it [the desire to utilize Death with
Dignity] was out there with their physician, but it was now too late.” (Norton and
Miller 254)
Physicians who are reticent to discuss end-of-life with terminally ill patients are not
necessarily ignoring their obligations as health professionals; instead, it seems more
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accurate that this group of physicians is not comfortable offering that particular option
because of the expectations inherent within the hospital’s brand of hospitality.
But in not offering a full array of end-of-life options, doctors are exercising an
unethical control over their patients’ deaths. In practical terms, hospitality only functions
because of its intimate relationship to spaces that serve as markers, since “the law of
hospitality as the law of the household…the law of a place (house, hotel, hospital,
hospice, family, city, nation, language, etc.), the law of identity” (4). Hospitals provide
patients with a well-defined and limited agency; they can complain of discomfort, ask for
assistance, undergo treatments, and even move freely through the institution. But their
physicians-hosts trust them to behave as patient-guests, and people die everyday within
the hospitable relationship structured and controlled by the Western biomedical model. In
Life’s Dominion, Ronald Dworkin writes of another daily occurrence: “Every day,
rational people all over the world plead to be allowed to die. Sometimes they plead for
others to kill them. Some of them are dying already…some of them want o die because
they are unwilling to live in the only way left open to them” (Dworkin 179). These
individuals are actually pleading for a Levinasian kind of ethics, as if to say, if you won’t
die for me, won’t you at least watch me while I die? But doctors have an ethical
obligation, even in the face of patient suffering, to keep patients alive. The notion that
guests want to end their lives while under the protection of their hosts calls the
relationship between patients and doctors into question, especially since the purpose of
Western biomedicine is to prolong patients’ lives. Davis writes that “once an uninvited
‘guest’ (a parasite, then) makes its way in, announces itself inside, ‘every element of
hospitality gets disrupted…all the dichotomies presumed by hospitality ‘in the classic
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sense’ collapse: private/public, interior/exterior, self/other, host/guest” (Davis 131).
When these dichotomies collapse, an individual’s sense of being is changed; they may
become protective of the life that they live, but as research has shown, it’s more likely
that that will collapse, too. And in Brittany Maynard’s case, when these collapsed
constructs were made public through her activism, they ruptured the blissful ignorance
that many Americans enjoyed concerning end-of-life issues. In reality, what doctors are
fighting against is disease and illness that is inextricably linked to the body. The fact that
the Dasein, the person’s humanity and soul, reside within that body is not medicine’s
primary concern. In a sense, individual need gets in the way of the entire mission of
curative medicine.
California’s ability to meet Brittany Maynard’s needs as a guest was
impossible—and in their rejection of her request, they rejected her as they would an
unwelcome foreign visitor. For her entire life, Maynard seems to have existed in a
pleasurable hospitable relationship with her home state. However, in her moment of
greatest need, the state did not meet its ethical obligation: it refused to be present for her
at her time of death. In “Hostipitality,” Derrida suggests that, “One can turn the person
who arrives away on condition that this does not lead to his death…If the stranger
behaves himself, however, we cannot turn him away. But this also means there is
conditionality. What are the limits? What is the content of these conditions?” (16,
emphasis my own). In turning Maynard down/away, California forced Maynard into a
peculiar hospitable relationship with the state of Oregon. In demanding that this need be
not only recognized, but met, Maynard altered the conditions of her stay as a guest. She
was able to extricate herself from one hospitality and change the terms that all future
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guests will have to abide by. Maynard’s individualized approach to death was motivated
by her own needs as a dying person, but it was also done in order to be there for others—
to meet the ethical need in dying-for others.
The conflicts here are real. There are ethical, moral, and legal issues within the
issue of an individual’s right to not only the death of their choosing, but to die at all. In
the case of terminally ill Americans residing in one of the 45 American states without
death with dignity legislation, the limits are physical and geographical. These limits
violated Maynard’s sense of her rights; in requesting something of her host, a host that
had supported her and allowed her ample freedom for a lifetime, the host had rejected her
conditions. In order to achieve an end to her suffering, Maynard had to break the laws of
hospitality. In this breaking is violence, which Levinas stated, “is necessarily a trauma, a
shattering of the self and world, not an appropriation but an experience of depropriation
and alteration from which there is no return” (74). While these lessons altered Maynard
irrevocably, California was not entirely to blame. By providing her with that type of
medical care, Maynard’s physicians would have been breaking state law and opening the
host/hospital up to substantial legal risk. They would have essentially murdered a guest
who was under their care and violated their position within the structure of hospitality. In
playing God in order to help Maynard gain control, they would have engaged in a kind of
hospitality that was without conditions.
When Brittany Maynard relocated to Oregon from California in order to gain
access to DWDA, she went public with her decision, and was featured in People
magazine and PeopleMagazine.com the morning of October 6, 2014. Within the first 24
hours of the 6-minute video being posted, over 400,000 people viewed it—the most
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attention of any publication on that website to date (Compassion & Choices). The
headline, “Terminally Ill 29-Year-Old Woman: Why I’m Choosing to Die on My Own
Terms,” was widely shared in the United States and abroad, and garnered a great deal of
media attention for the cause of aid in dying. In addition to her contributions to popular
magazines, Maynard was interviewed on most of the major news outlets and attempted to
explain her decision-making process: “I've had the medication for weeks. I am not
suicidal. If I were, I would have consumed that medication long ago. I do not want to die.
But I am dying. And I want to die on my own terms” (Shoichet). After the initial
announcement of her decision, Maynard refocused her message: she did not just want to
die on her terms. She wanted others to have the option for medicalized aid in dying, too.
And she did not want them to have to uproot their lives in order to gain that access.
Like Cody Curtis in How to Die in Oregon, illness and the treatment of it had left
her physically altered. In the interviews leading up to her death, Maynard looked
different from her pre-diagnosis photos: she shared with interviewers that “Medication
had drastically changed her appearance” (CBS). While Maynard had chosen not to
undergo complete brain radiation because of the physical side effects, stating, “The hair
on my scalp would have been singed off. My scalp would be left covered with firstdegree burns. My quality of life, as I knew it, would be gone” (Maynard), the decision to
stave off disease through approved pharmaceutical treatment ravaged her body in
undignified ways. Her internal pain and suffering had been made visible to all others who
came into contact with her; she was now distinguishably foreign and strange. But her
appearance was not the only thing at risk of being altered by her disease. In an interview
in October of 2014, Maynard stated: “I still feel good enough, and I still have enough joy,
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and I still laugh and smile with my friends enough that it doesn’t seem like the right time,
right now. But it will come, because I feel myself getting sicker…” (Shoichet,
Compassion & Choices). She went on to discuss the foreign sensation of being in a body
that was not healing from illness, but growing weaker by the day. She said she no longer
felt like herself and that she did not enjoy being photographed, filmed, or looking in the
mirror—not because of “self-loathing,” but due to a complete lack of recognition
(Compassion & Choices). In expanding upon her experience, Maynard shared her
personal worst-case medical scenario:
The worst thing that could happen to me is that I wait too long because I’m trying
to seize each day, but then I somehow have my autonomy taken away from
me…most recently my most terrifying set of seizures, about a week or so ago, I
had two in a day—which is unusual. I remember looking at my husband’s face
and thinking: I know this is my husband, but I can’t say his name. (Compassion &
Choices)
The prospect of being confined within a space against her will—held hostage by a dying
body and a terminal illness that would rob her of her identity—was unfathomable for
Brittany Maynard. Going through with that kind of death would have necessitated an
unconditional welcoming of a particularly gruesome death. And her fear resonated with a
death-averse American public who, for reasons unknown, were open to hearing her
message.
Maynard made her intentions to end her life on November 1, 2014 (just 5 days
after her husband’s birthday), public as early as October 14. As the ‘due date’ drew near,
public interest in Maynard reached its zenith. Medical ethicists weighed in on the debate
on various news outlets, the Catholic Church condemned Maynard’s activism, and
various terminally ill Americans who did not support the Death with Dignity Act reached
out to Maynard in attempts to change her mind. However, on November 1, 2014,
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Maynard followed through with her plan and consumed the lethal prescriptions intended
to end her life. Her family reported that she passed away “peacefully” (“Why Brittany
Maynard’s Death Was an Ethical Choice”, Caplan). Maynard’s death was popular news
in the days that followed—as was the Catholic Church’s official condemnation of her
actions (McKenna). Upon receiving news of Maynard’s death, Monsignor Ignacio
Carrasco de Paula, the Vatican’s top ethicist, told Italian news agency ANSA, “We don’t
judge people, but the gesture in itself is to be condemned” (de Paula qtd. in McKenna).
He continued, calling her death an “assisted suicide,” and claiming that such an act was
an “absurdity,” stating: “Killing yourself is not a good thing; it’s a bad thing because it
says no to life and to all that means in relation to our duty in the world and to those close
to us” (de Paula qtd. in McKenna). de Paula’s official statement illuminates the power of
Maynard’s decision. Some noted that her approach to the end-of-life movement contained
“no new arguments,” but also that her critics were not bringing anything “novel” to the
debate (Caplan, “Bioethicist: Why Brittany Maynard Changes the Right-to-Die Debate”).
de Paula’s concerns reflect that Maynard’s death had more of an impact than even she
anticipated. Condemned or not, change had already begun.
Scott Graham and others have begun to trace patterns of change within Western
biomedicine, and have found evidence of paradigmatic shifts being possible within what
is a very rigid structure. When they do occur, these shifts begin on the level of changing
opinions. If there is scientific proof to support the change, then changes are likely to
begin. For example, Graham notes that contemporary theories about agency “provide
rhetorical scholarship with the following” parameters for measuring substantial change:
1. Agency is the process of instantiating change in the status quo.
2. Change arises from series of rhetorical events over time.
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3. Although the overall agentive program resists authoritative forces, the
constitutive rhetorical events frequently rely on those same authoritative
forces.
4. A change becomes the status quo when the (new) authoritative structures
operate to maintain the change. (Graham 379-80)
When taken together, these pieces make collective efforts to effect change possible. (This
pattern of change is not just theoretical, but practical, such as when a group of engineers
found their work to be the “result of a conjunction of opportunities” (Winsor 427)).
Change is really the result of “taking advantage of a series of events, over time” (Graham
381). Changes do not necessarily need large buy-in to begin; they can also be
implemented by the actions of individuals within a small sphere. For Maynard, diagnosis
presented access to medical facilities and treatments; terminal illness provided the kairos,
and Maynard seized the moment. Maynard’s decision to advocate on her own behalf was
one facet of changing the status quo; the more substantial impetus behind change was
Maynard’s advocacy and petitions to other American states. Maynard’s message was
widely disbursed by the Compassion & Choices, a nonprofit organization advocating for
patients’ rights at the end of life—primarily medical aid in dying. A former Sunday Times
reporter, Derek Humphry, started the Compassion & Choices Organization, originally the
Hemlock Society, in 1980. Humphry had relocated to the US in the 1970s, and became an
advocate for aid-in-dying when he assisted his terminally ill wife in committing suicide
after a terminal breast cancer diagnosis in 1975 (Gabriel). In 2003, Hemlock Society was
swallowed up by two advocacy groups—End-of-Life Choices out of Denver, Colorado,
and Compassion in Dying, out of Portland, Oregon. What emerged was Compassion &
Choices, an advocacy group with a somewhat sordid history and an investment in issues
that had long been debated but not worked through. Medical aid in dying, also called
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physician-assisted suicide, is their primary cause. They had worked under the radar for
nearly two decades before Brittany Maynard approached them and became their new
spokesperson.
Towards Ethical Hospitality
Just three days before her death, Maynard shared a phone call with California
Governor Jerry Brown while she was in Oregon (McGreevy). While the specific details
of their conversation are impossible to know, Maynard’s family and Brown’s office both
stated that Maynard was “appreciative of the opportunity to give Governor Brown a
firsthand account of why she was in favor of similar legislation in California” (Diaz qtd.
in McGreevy). The Governor’s official statement was careful to point out that Brown
“did not make any commitment on legislation” during or immediately after the phone
call. His discussion with Maynard can be read as an act of hospitality, though, since he
opened himself up to the conversation and allowed her to exercise a great deal of
autonomy in pleading her case. It seems implausible that Maynard’s situation did not
influence Brown’s feelings on the topic. While alive, Maynard was articulate, calm, and
warm. There is no reason to think that she was any different while conversing with the
governor of her beloved home state—a place she had always lived and had hoped to
spend a full life. While speaking, the two must have both realized that Maynard would
never see California again, and that she died feeling as though she had been turned away
in her moment of greatest need.
For individuals seeking end-of-life alternatives, the inflexibility of the Western
biomedical model reads as hostile. Derrida writes: “Anyone who encroaches on my ‘at
home,’ on my ipseity, on my power of hospitality, on my sovereignty as host, I start to
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regard as an undesirable foreigner, and virtually as an enemy. This other becomes a
hostile subject, and I risk becoming their hostage” (Of Hospitality, Derrida 54-55). This
encroachment holds both guests and hosts hostage in their responsibilities to one another.
Despite the interdependence between host and guest, when individuals wish to take
advantage of an alternative that is not legal within their home state, decision-making
power is severely imbalanced. The right to hospitality has been denied, and the guest is
not protected within the host’s domain. Skewed power structures prevent progress, and
leave it up to frustrated individuals to either disregard the systems that leave them bereft
of autonomy and/or find ways to work within systems to regain that agency. Maynard’s
efforts circumnavigated the system preventing her from dying the way she wanted to; her
experience also drastically increased public attention to the issue of aid in dying during
the height of the controversy she created. After her death, small changes started
happening, and these changes provide possible avenues for substantial reform in end-oflife care.
Eleven months after Maynard’s death, Governor Brown signed California’s ABx2
15, a controversial bill known as the End of Life Option Act. The bill, modeled on
Oregon’s 1997 Death with Dignity Act, makes it possible for “an adult who meets certain
qualifications, and who has been determined by his or her attending physician to be
suffering from a terminal disease, as defined, to make a request for a drug prescribed
pursuant to these provisions for the purpose of ending his or her life” (Assembly Bill No.
15). When Governor Brown signed the bill, his office issued a statement, which was
called “unusually personal in nature” by news sources (Megerian). In it, Brown stresses
the care and consideration taken in his decision to support the bill. Brown writes that he
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had discussed the bill with “doctors, religious leaders and those who champion disability
rights,” considered the “theological and religious perspectives,” and even “discussed this
matter with a Catholic bishop, two of [his] own doctors and former [seminary school]
classmates who take varied, contradictory and nuanced positions” (Brown). Brown, who
had studied to become a priest, was 77 years old when he signed the bill. By 2015, he had
endured three separate cancer experiences—basal cell carcinoma that was removed from
his ear in 2008, a cancerous growth removed from his nose in 2011, and treatment for
early stage prostate cancer that began in 2012 (York). Brown closes the official document
by stating:
“In the end, I was left to reflect on what I would want in the face of my own
death. I do not know what I would do if I were dying in prolonged and
excruciating pain. I am certain, however, that it would be a comfort to be able to
consider the options afforded by this bill. And I wouldn’t deny that right to
others.” (Brown)
Since California is the most populous state in the US, with approximately 38.8 million
residents, when Brown signed the bill into law, he essentially provided 1 in 10 Americans
with access to an additional end-of-life option (“Population”; Coombs qtd. in McGreevy).
Brown’s discussion of his motivations calls to mind Levinas’ thinking on death—that the
individual comes to terms with death by making the death of the other his business. In
considering the needs of the other and using his position to stress the obligation that
states/hosts have towards their residents/guests, Brown, too, became an advocate for
increased end-of-life rights.
California’s bill was made into law less than a year after Brittany’s death. All
parties involved credited Brittany Maynard with the legislative change. Barbara Lee
Coombs, the president of the Compassion and Choices organization describes the
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relationship between Maynard and her organization as “a perfect match.” She shares that,
“Brittany was a captivating personality,” and upon meeting her, people generally felt as
though they were “meeting a friend” (“Brittany Maynard’s Legacy” 00:00:13-00:00:23).
When Brittany came forward with her desire to end her life through the Death with
Dignity Act, there were only a handful of bills like Oregon’s in other states. In the weeks
and months directly after Maynard’s death, that number ballooned. Lee Coombs shares:
“Brittany’s emergence made lawmakers all over the country want to introduce
bills to solve the problems that she illustrated. To give you an example: in 2014,
there were aid in dying bills in 4 states. Immediately after Brittany’s emergence,
lawmakers in 25 jurisdictions, plus the District of Columbia, introduced bills.”
(00:04:42-00:05:01)
It was a feat that the Compassion and Choices organization had been striving for in its
various manifestations since 1991; by broadening the message’s audience, Brittany
Maynard accomplished it in under a year. What Maynard realized was that death impacts
everyone and denying it does not ease one’s confrontation with death when it finally does
occur. Rather than rejecting it, an ethical approach is to give it one’s full consideration.
By refusing to openly acknowledge death, Western culture actually gives death
tremendous power over human life. Individuals are held hostage by their fear and anxiety
over what death will be like. As evidenced by Maynard’s efforts and her impact on endof-life legislation around the United States, this does not have to be the case. Maynard’s
success in spreading her message is wrapped up in who she was as a person and how she
lived her life. First of all, she was educated and independent. When her prescription for
the life-ending medications was filled in May 2014, she was in Alaska on a trip with
friends and her husband had to pick up the life-ending medicines for her (“Brittany
Maynard’s Legacy”). In life, Maynard was invested in a wide range of experiences and
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had already learned to cultivate and nurture interpersonal relationships. She referred to
the friends and family who shared her final moments with her as the “ring of love,” and
the majority of her final months were spent traveling and making memories with these
individuals. Maynard knew not only her own value, but the value of her one short life.
In addition to this is a more obvious but less inspiring reason: Maynard’s youth
and relative attractiveness. For a majority of Americans, the advantages available to
citizens of Oregon State were only well-known to individuals in that part of the country.
The “Brittany Maynard’s Legacy” video on the Compassion and Choices website
features Dr. Robert Olvera, a California physician whose daughter died just months shy
of the California End of Life Option Act being signed into law. Dr. Olvera’s daughter had
already died, but he shares that even as a physician, he had no idea that the End of Life
Option Act was legal in other states. When his daughter asked him to provide her with
“sleeping pills so that she could sleep forever,” he had to deny her request; it was illegal.
(00:05:03). After her death, he joined Maynard’s family in their efforts to make end-oflife alternatives available to all Americans. But Maynard opened the door. Perhaps the
sense that those who came into contact with Brittany Maynard has something to do with
this; if, as Coombs Lee suggests, Maynard was consciously making an effort to be more
open to the other—to all others—then her interactions allowed for a greater sense of
connection. Due to her illness, these otherwise friendly interactions presented those who
came into contact with Maynard with responsibility: they had now come face-to-face
with the living dying. Would they deny this obviously suffering individual the right to a
dignified death? Would they demand that the other who had welcomed them continue ot
exist in pain?
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Much has been made of what I will refer to as Maynard’s potential for suffering.
Other terminally ill Americans wrote letters and made public videos begging Maynard to
reconsider ending her life with the Death with Dignity Act. In ending her life through
legal alternatives, they felt that Maynard was playing god and taking on too much power
over her choices. But as Levinas makes clear, suffering is an individualized experience.
We might witness its manifestation on the face and body of the other, but the other
suffers alone. Others cannot suffer in one’s stead; they might sacrifice themselves for the
other’s well-being, but in terms of terminal illness, dying-for does not eliminate disease.
For Maynard, the looming fear was this: that she would be locked in, incapable of
actively participating in her own dignified death. She would be held hostage without the
possibility of being released, except through death. And this possibility was made
especially unsavory when the strength of her very young body was taken into
consideration. After weighing the possible outcomes, Maynard decided there was no
acceptable amount or method of suffering once that suffering crossed a boundary and
became a complete loss of agency.
In considering Maynard’s approach to end-of-life, research done on hospice
workers dealing with Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act and from the perspective of
compliant healthcare professionals is useful. In “Conversations at End of Life: The
Challenge to Support Patients who Consider Death with Dignity in Oregon,” Pamela J.
Miller et. al. find that the basic factors influencing the varied responses to end-of-life
assistance fall into four categories: “mental health, education, and choice; team concerns;
family issues; values, ethics, and restricted conversations” (P. Miller 31). Miller’s
research, as well as Tolle’s, points out that “long before Oregon’s DWDA legislation,
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terminally ill patients have considered hastening their death and pondered under what
circumstances they might feel compelled to do so” (31). Some patients end their lives
while under hospice care, a practice that is legal in Oregon under the DWDA, but
happens less often than patients dying in their own homes. Of this practice, Miller writes
“Because of the unique challenges of dealing with” DWDA, “it is vital that staff work
closely together to address their concerns and feelings and to be thorough and thoughtful
in their assessments, so that no one person on the team feels a greater burden or
responsibility” (35). Care plans are an integral part of hospice care, and Death with
Dignity forces caregivers to expand their care offerings and their approaches to end-oflife discussions with patients. In hospice and other compassionate end-of-life settings
outside of the home, the responsibility to fulfill the patients’ end-of-life choice becomes
shared by all caregivers.
Healthcare professionals employed by Oregon’s religiously affiliated hospitals
experienced the most significant issues in dealing with the Death with Dignity Act (P.
Miller 38-39). In Oregon, one hospital with doctors on polar opposite sides of the Death
with Dignity debate experienced a “bitter and visible debate” that led to the hospital and
doctors’ frequent inclusion in local media and attempts by both sides to utilize their
positions to “recruit others to their points of view” (38). This seismic debate occurred at
just one hospital; the divisions at others are strong but less destructive. For social workers
who come into hospitals in order to work with patients and healthcare professionals on
DWDA issues, conflicts between doctors and nurses over their views on DWDA created
occasions where “what felt like conflicting mandates of the health system to not discuss
DWDA that in turn collided with the profession’s code of ethics which aims for patient
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self-determination and access to information, resources, and services” (39). Ultimately,
patient self-determination is what is at stake in the Death with Dignity Act. Brittany
Maynard’s activism on behalf of herself and other terminally ill Americans casts this endof-life option in a new light and potentially shifts the very difficult positions that
healthcare professionals and caregivers find themselves in when all entities are not
focused on the patient’s personal desires for end-of-life. By choosing not to participate in
treatments and trials that would extend her life only by weeks, Maynard took the burden
of decision-making into her own hands. Her doctors only had to write a prescription and
allow her to exercise her legal options.
Brittany Maynard’s experiences pushed for the type of paradigmatic shift
described by Graham. Agency was gained through increased awareness about end-of-life
and the experiences of terminally ill Americans in particular. Then, that agency was
channeled into informative, rhetorical events. Maynard created a set of rhetorical artifacts
that were convincing and persuasive. Once her advocacy had a narrative, Maynard was
careful to situate her cause in terms of the other available options. Likewise, while she
resisted the condemnation of religious and political entities, she utilized existing power
structures in order to obtain the medications and the type of death that she desired. She
did not break any state laws; in fact, she relocated so as to obey the laws of her home
state. But in doing so, she expressed her dissatisfaction as this lack of hospitality. While
her personality might have endeared her to those who came in contact with her, the factor
that seems to have made significant change possible was Maynard’s reasonable approach.
She was able to articulate her desire for hospitality and used what was left of her life to
channel her agency into advocacy. Maynard had to re-learn her position and to spend her
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final months fighting for her right to die, but through her death, she eased the struggle of
Others, and provided them with an access to a different kind of hospitality. She opened
up and altered state legislature, illuminated the dark corners of the end-of-life
conversation, and irrevocably changed the way that death is approached by the living
dying dependent upon Western biomedicine.
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Chapter Six
A Second Opinion: Medical “Games” Offer an Alternative Perspective
“Confronted with the end of the world, we simply tune out or enter the realm of fantasy.”
–George J. Annas, Worst Case Bioethics
I could remember how my father used to say that the reason for living was to get ready to
stay dead for a long time.
--Addie Bundren, William Faulker’s As I Lay Dying
Thus far, this project has analyzed the positions of various stakeholders in the
end-of-life debate. As shown throughout the preceding chapters, concerns over the
procurement of a ‘good death’ can be traced as far back as ancient Athens. Essentially,
for as long as groups of individuals have lived together in communities, they have been
concerned with how the ill are treated. And once they have passed, virtually all cultures
have some investment in the funerary rights of their dead. But as technological
intervention has increased human lifespans, a great deal of cultural pride has been taken
in Western biomedicine’s ability to prolong life and avoid considerations of death
altogether. To this point, the perspectives discussed in this project have given attention to
perspectives that are supportive of increased end-of-life options, and death with dignity in
particular. Whether from a medical, legislative, or personal perspective, reasons for
increasing the dignity of the living dying abound. This chapter, however, is rooted in a
different kind of idea about end-of-life situations: what if living is the anxiety-inducing
state of being than an individual hopes to avoid? What if dying is a more enticing
alternative to the individual’s life?
In thinking through these questions, this chapter analyzes a particular interaction
between doctors and patients depicted in an episode of the American television show
House, M.D. There are a number of reasons for selecting this particular a television show
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as a site for analysis. House, M.D. ran for 8 seasons from 2004-2012 on the Fox network.
It was extremely popular and most Americans are familiar with it. Additionally, the show
is a fictionalized medical drama that emphasizes the power of the medical gaze and
diagnostic medicine. Jonathan Gottschall claims that although “Plato tried to ban fiction
from his ideal republic,” fiction does change human psychology in ways that are
becoming measurable. The “research consistently shows that fiction does mold us,” and
“fiction seems to be more effective at changing beliefs than nonfiction, which is designed
to persuade through argument and evidence” (1). The research shows that in reading texts
that are “nonfiction, we read with our shields up. We are critical and skeptical. But when
we are absorbed in a story, we drop our intellectual guard. We are moved emotionally,
and this makes us rubbery and easy to shape” (2). The research on the psychology of
fiction-consumption suggests that overwhelmingly, “fiction shapes us for the better, not
for the worse” (2). This is a reasonable suggestion, given the manner in which fiction
allows its viewers/readers to engage with perspectives that are different from their own;
in consuming fiction, viewers also consume—and must digest—swaths of contemporary
culture that cut “across religious and political creeds,” and deepen our sense of morality
(3).
In “Games,” the fictitious hospital’s head of oncology, Dr. James Wilson, is
confronted with a strange situation: he gets to tell a patient whom he had previously
diagnosed with inoperable cancer and given 3 months to live that there was a mistake in
the scans and tests and that he is actually not dying of cancer. Using this encounter as a
starting place, this Chapter argues that end-of-life confrontations have the power to
dramatically shape the individual’s desire to live. In terms of hospitality, being given an
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‘expiration date’ via a medical prognosis is akin to being given an eviction notice.
Essentially, the guest is being told that their stay is limited, and they are given time in
which to prepare for departure. Much of this situation echoes Socrates’ final weeks of
life. While confined to a prison cell and awaiting trial, Socrates knew that death was
imminent and kept himself busy making amends for past wrongs, creating music, and
speaking with friends about the meaning and value of his life’s work. These are reflective
practices, meant to give us a sense of accomplishment: if we have completed all of the
things we were supposed to, then we can depart on good terms. In Western culture, these
efforts now fall into the category of “bucket list” items. If these “bucket list” items give
purpose to the final months or days of a dying person’s life, it is necessary to question
what gave that life meaning prior to a diagnosis and prognosis. However, when presented
with death, not all individuals are driven to create, to harness their anxiety and beingtowards-death and produce something meaningful. These are the individuals of interest
within this chapter.
By and large, hospitals are believed to “dehumanize patients by silencing their
voices and stripping them of their biographies” (Kaufman 95). In submitting to a
healthcare professionals prescribed conditions, the patient acts as a pliable and compliant
guest. But this submission does not maintain the suffering individual’s identity. Not only
do patients and families experience deindividuation within these constructs, but “less
visible and more insidious are the ways in which hospital structure itself organizes and
routinizes dying and life-prolongation,” beginning with the notion that “individuals can
only act within systems of classification that already exist,” to the alarming insight that
“neither those who work in the hospital nor those who travel through it control the
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classifying systems or define the frameworks through which medical problems and their
solutions are understood” (95-96). Western biomedicine’s endeavors are deeply
contingent upon the spaces they inhabit and the individuals who enter those spaces.
While, “Forty years ago, hospitals were looked at as trusted friends,” in recent years,
“there has been a relative decline in positive feeling about hospitals, because of all the
attention to medical errors, the fear of hospital-acquired infections and the
commercialization of medicine” (Salvador qtd. in Pear). Additionally, doctors struggle
with the ethical imperatives of their jobs, as suggested by a recent study of 7,000 doctors.
Over half of the survey respondents felt that end-of-life issues placed them in the most
difficult ethical dilemmas and presented “the biggest [ethical] quandaries,” with over a
third of the respondents answering with “it depends” to questions about providing lifesustaining therapy when it was futile, and ceasing or providing life-sustaining therapy
due to familial demands (Kane 2). Additionally, 45.8% believed that physician-assisted
suicide should be allowed “in some cases,” and 13.5% answered “it depends” to the same
question, meaning that almost two-thirds of the respondents felt that their role as a
medical professional could include either making decisions about ending a patient’s life
or providing patients with access to life-ending materials (2). Within contemporary
medicine, both patients and doctors are held hostage by the laws of hospitality, and by
their prescribed roles within the imbalanced doctor-patient relationship. In Western
biomedicine, struggles like these play out in very real doctor-patient interactions daily.
For the sake of this chapter, though, we will consider a fictional account of doctor-patient
hospitality in order to analyze a depiction of doctor-patient stakes in healthcare and how
the differing goals of the host and guest intensify conflict.
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Mind Games
House, M.D. is named for its main character, Dr. Gregory House, a “pain
medication-dependent, unconventional, misanthropic medical genius who leads a team of
diagnosticians at the fictional Princeton-Plainsboro Teaching Hospital” (Jensen 1).
House, who is results- and ego-driven, has virtually no bedside manner or rapport with
colleagues, and constantly straddles the line between experimental medicine and
malpractice due to his methods. His personal mantra is “Everybody lies,” and he
generally treats his patients and colleagues with a mix of disdain and suspicion. For a
majority of the episodes, House does not actually interact with patients face-to-face; he
has a team of doctors who work under him and serve as his intermediaries, thereby
allowing him to dilute his sense of responsibility to individual patients. Instead, he treats
them as sets of curable symptom-puzzles. Throughout the series, House is shown to be
difficult to work with and a difficult host to submit to; the show’s success hinges on
House’s brilliance—his ability to use his highly skilled medical gaze to see things that
others (including medical tests and advanced technologies), either miss or are not
experienced enough to see. British actor Hugh Laurie’s portrayal of House is
simultaneously irritating and captivating, leading Jeff Jensen to begin a 2005 article about
the success of House, M.D. by stating “Hugh Laurie isn’t a bastard, but he plays one on
TV” (Jensen). There is a sense that House represents many within the medical profession:
determined and intelligent enough to succeed as a doctor, but ruthless in their methods.
This ruthlessness is a source of consternation for more ethically-oriented doctors and
hospital administrators on the show; in trying to save lives and care for others, it is
assumed that the healthcare profession will at least try to put on a good face for its
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interaction with the other. But House confound that belief and although he does appear to
love some part of his profession, helping people does not seem to fulfill him. He is bound
to welcome in the others who need his help, but in entering a hospitable relationship with
him, they might find the conditions (the dealings with this host) too painful.
House’s foil within the show is Dr. James Wilson, Princeton-Plainsboro’s head of
the Department of Oncology. Wilson is described by House as, “a buddy of mine people
say ‘Thank you’ to when he tells them they are dying” (“Three Stories”). Wilson is
dedicated to his patients in a way that House does not understand. He often becomes
emotionally invested in his patients’ cases, and despite dealing with cancer on a daily
basis, is portrayed as a happy, well-adjusted human being. The relationship between
characters of House and Wilson was modeled after Sherlock Holmes & Dr. John Watson.
In most publications about the series, Wilson is described as the “only true friend” of the
misanthropic House; critics of the show wrote that Wilson was the only irreplaceable
supporting character within the show and that he should “never, never, never, never”
leave (Ryan). The dynamics between the two doctors are complex, but put simply: House
is innovative where Wilson is traditional; House takes risks where Wilson follows the
rules. This dynamic is well-known to viewers of the show by the time they see “Games.”
The episode follows a familiar narrative structure: two seemingly contrasting storylines
are weaved through, and together, the similarities or differences in the two stories end up
allowing some medical mystery to be solved. The show is not a whodunit, but a
“whatdunit” in which “germs and diseases are suspects and culprits” (Jensen). Season 4
of House, M.D., including this episode, shows House parting with his original team of
three interns. In attempts to replace them, the season sees House force dozens of talented,
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accomplished doctors to jump through a never-ending series of diagnostic, professional,
and even personal hoops in order to become his new interns. But the games they play are
not the focal point of this episode. Instead, in “Games,” the main story involves Jimmy
Quidd, an aging, drug addicted punk rocker who wound up House’s patient because he
had so many symptoms related to drug use that House was convinced there was
something more nefarious going on. The secondary storyline involves a patient who
Wilson diagnosed with terminal cancer; upon reviewing new scans, Wilson realizes that
the patient does not have cancer at all, and is completely healthy.
When we are introduced to this secondary storyline, we follow House to Wilson’s
office to find Wilson not behind his desk, but in a chair in the corner. House enters, peeks
behind the door to where Wilson is sitting, enters, and then takes a seat behind Wilson’s
desk. In Wilson’s hands are scans and a folder. House asks, “What do you think of
Amber?” (00:07:10), to which Wilson replies, slowly, “I screwed up a diagnosis”
(00:07:18). House says, “You don’t seem that upset by it.” (00:07:21). Wilson rises from
his chair, walks over to an illuminator (X-Ray lamp), near him, and says, “I diagnosed a
guy with adenocarcinoma three months ago, told him he had six months” (00:07:28).
House: “So now you’ve gotta tell him that he’s way behind on his Christmas shopping”
(00:07:32). Wilson ignores this remark, and continues: “He didn’t get worse. I rechecked
everything, and the biopsy was a false positive. Harmless lesions, caused by talc
inhalation” (“Games,” 7:33-7:46). House responds, “Medical clemency. Interesting.”
Clemency is a term typically reserved for legal pardons; clemency is a mercy, lenience,
or a forgiveness of sins. It is less common within medical scenarios, but medical
clemency is akin to a ‘medical miracle,’ where the patient no longer has to die. Instead of
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making a mistake that is going to negatively impact someone’s life, Wilson’s mistake is
one of mercy. Wilson wants House to “just be happy” for this felicitous mistake, but
House cannot. As always, he is wary of the human element and is suspicious of sudden
pardons. Being given life when one was previously on the brink of death is too good to be
true for House, and the happiest of accidents for Wilson.
Within this scenario, the expectations of the players within the hospitable
relationship have lasting, significant impact. Wilson’s position as the cancer authority
(and a master in the delivery of bad news), within the hospital leans heavily on static,
structured doctor-patient relationships rooted in a patriarchal type of medicine. Within his
hospital, he is the head of oncology and the head host of his patient/guests. While he is a
good host, and is careful to help his guests to feel welcome within his domain, he is a
host with rigid expectations. So, this occasion—one where he gets to deliver good
news—causes him to anticipate at least a heartfelt ‘thank you’ from his patient. And this
expectation is warranted since the audience is aware of his reputation and his skill in the
delivery of bad news. For Dr. Wilson, possessing the medical gaze allows him to serve as
a messenger between the individual and the laws of nature; he is the ultimate host and his
hospital is a place where hospitality’s laws to be put into action in the most benevolent
ways possible.
When Wilson meets with the misdiagnosed patient, Mr. McKenna, House inserts
himself into the conversation as a ‘consulting colleague.’ The following conversation
transpires:
Dr. Wilson: I got your new test results back.
Mr. McKenna: I know the prognosis.
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Dr. Wilson: Mr. McKenna, I can’t believe I’m able to say this, but you’re cancerfree. The biopsy looked like adenocarcinoma, but it wasn’t. Harmless lesions on
your lungs. You’re fine.
Mr. McKenna: I don’t get it.
House: Cool.
Dr. Wilson: No, it’s, I know this must come as a shock, but, I’ve double-checked
the labs.
Mr. McKenna: I just accepted an offer on my house. I’ve had three goodbye
parties. I’m buying plane tickets to Venice.
House: You can still use those if you’re alive.
Mr. McKenna: I have to pay a $6,000 broker commission on a house I’m not
selling. Money I don’t have. (Sighs). Thank you, for letting me know. (Gets up
and leaves).
Dr. Wilson: I would’ve thought the living would mean more than the expenses.
House: It’s not about the money. (9:00-10:10)
This interaction illustrates an unexpected turn in host-guest relations. When the host
opens up the doors and frees the guest/hostage, the guest refuses. And this refusal is
double-edge; in expressing his dissatisfaction, Mr. McKenna refuses to accept the long
life ahead of him, and he undermines the doctor-patient, host-guest relationship. Mr.
McKenna’s experience as a living dying person was unique in that he was actually
healthy, so he was well enough to achieve goals that he had left undone. When one’s
future is infinite, then the future self can always accomplish whatever cannot be done
today. It is the limitation of that futurity that offers perspective; the perspective produces
anxiety and causes actions to happen. In his anxiety, Mr. McKenna had begun to really
live, potentially for the first time in his entire life. And this new living, in the face of
death, had virtually no consequences because Mr. McKenna was not anticipating living
long enough for consequences to matter. So in hearing that life is now not just an option,
but a certainty, Mr. McKenna’s identity as a living dying man was called into question, as
were his commitments and consequences for his actions while under anxiety’s spell.
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When Mr. McKenna leaves, Wilson is confused and dejected. His sense of
himself as the benevolent host has also been called into question through this interaction.
Rather than being a good guest, Mr. McKenna had been, in Wilson’s mind, unreasonable.
Mr. McKenna’s reaction also hints at the type of discipline that most of Dr. Wilson’s
patients adhere to in their interactions with him; his role as doctor and interpreter of signs
within the body causes his patients to respect him and interact with him in a certain way.
Mr. McKenna’s unhappiness at his new prognosis not only breaks with typical guest-host
relations, but also with the idea of the patient’s disciplined acceptance and adherence to
medical diagnoses/prognoses. Additionally, when given the bio-power and knowledgepower that many other individuals fight for, Mr. McKenna is deeply unsatisfied. He
wishes to return to a life of blissful ignorance where his actions are motivated by his
limited time and where the worries of day-to-day life are no longer significant.
Born to Die
In contrast to Mr. McKenna’s medical scenario is the Jimmy Quidd narrative.
Quidd fully embodies the lifestyle associated with punk rock rebellion; he is reckless and
has no concern for his own wellbeing. He is admitted after throwing up profuse amounts
of blood in a back alley before a show; once he enters the hospital, dozens of other
symptoms present, and they are of increasing seriousness, such as when blood clots
collect in the tips of his fingers. After House and the other doctors hook him up to an
oxygen tank, he sneaks into a bathroom and lights a cigarette—an action that causes an
explosion, damages property, and nearly kills Quidd. Minutes later, he resists a procedure
because he has plastered one of his arms with nicotine patches and does not want the
physicians to find out. Late in the episode, it comes out that he has been sharing needles
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with other drug users (00:22:27); he even admits to Amber, one of the doctors in the
running to be House’s intern, “I’m not an adult. I never wanted to be. So if the choice is
running out the clock with a walker or a bedpan…” (00:31:36-00:32:01). “You don’t
regret anything,” a surprised Amber asks him. Quidd responds, “Well, there was a lot of
drugs, a lot of drinking, a lot of fights. I regret everything else. You hate me, don’t you? I
don’t care…it means you have no regrets” (00:32:07-00:32:46).
House, who rarely speaks directly to patients, spends time with Quidd and asks
him about his music, which is a cacophonous, raucous, and difficult to listen to collection
of stops, starts, and screeches. Quidd pushes back: “I don’t do it for you, I do it for me”
(00:24:47). House refuses to accept this, telling Quidd that, “There are three choices in
this life: be good, get good, or give up. You’ve gone for Column D. Why? Simple answer
is, if you don’t try you can’t fail. You really that simple? “ (00:24:50-00:25:09). Quidd
responds: “Some people, they like my music, but most people can’t stand it. They just
sort of just shrug and ignore me, but a few, they feel like they have to tell me what I’m
screwing up, what I’m wasting. Why do they care?” (00:25:10-00:25:35). As opposed to
Mr. McKenna, Jimmy Quidd’s way of life violates the laws of hospitality. He enters into
the hospital/house, and at every turn, attempts to kill himself to spite the host. What’s
more, he also wants to burn the house down in the process. Frustrated by his resistance
while trying to provide him with life-saving treatment, Amber admits to House that she
hates Quidd because of his drug addiction, and feels that he is “throwing his life away”
(00:14:20). House presses her on this, saying, “Why? Because he’s setting his own
terms? Not living in fear of every pop quiz?” (00:14:20-00:14-28). Amber and House
then engage in a discussion of happiness: she believes that winning and living within the
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rules are integral to achieving happiness, and her disdain for Jimmy Quidd’s inability to
be a proper guest is tied to her perception of his actions. Someone that reckless and that
drug-addled cannot possibly be happy. But this is Amber’s worldview, not necessarily
House’s. House reminds her that their patient is happy. “He’s an idiot,” she retorts
(00:15:01). But House hopes to complicate this, possibly because of his own abuse of
painkillers. “There’s something freeing about being a loser, isn’t there?” he asks Amber
(00:15:07). This is a rhetorical question worth considering. For medical professionals
tasked with saving patients’ lives—hosts obligated with the safekeeping of guests within
their domain—rebellion from the patient makes the job more difficult, even impossible.
The standards of interaction, the modicums of respect that are guaranteed within the
relationship are ruptured, and what is left for the host is a deep concern over power. If
patients/guests do not feel an obligation to obey or to, at the very least, comply, the
dynamics of the laws of hospitality become strained. They, too, turn into something
strange, something more accurately described as hostipitality. But even hostipitality, that
hostility-hospitality struggle, falls short. In subverting the hospitable relationship,
patient/guests reject the doctor/host and the power of the gaze. They become unshackled
from the hospitable relationship and its requirements; the unknown of that freedom is
what is troublesome to those whose status and identities are deeply rooted in a
controllable hospitality.
For Dr. Wilson, his shaken identity as the good doctor only grows worse when an
attempt at reparation is made. Because Dr. Wilson feels guilt over Mr. McKenna’s
reaction (one that he wrongly predicted, one that left him feeling as though he had failed
in the performance of a good deed), he later attempts to financially compensate Mr.
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McKenna with an accompanying ‘liability release form’ in order to correct his wrong
diagnosis turned right—an overcorrection in every sense. House knows his friend, and
confronts him before he can go through with paying off his patient. House shouts at
Wilson, “You’re gonna pay the guy the six grand, aren’t you? There’s no negligence
without injury!” Wilson replies, “I handed the guy a death sentence!” to which House
responds, “He’s not distressed with the death sentence, he’s distressed with the life
sentence.” Wilson’s guilt, though, is larger than his ability to see the logic and the lack of
real harm done. He tells House, “I gave him three months of misery.” House is careful to
point out to Wilson that this is not true: what Wilson did was give Mr. McKenna an
illness and a timeframe that forced him to live, that made him “special”; Mr. McKenna’s
anger stemmed from releasing him from his diagnosis, giving him his old humdrum life
back, a change that effectively “made him boring again” (18:00-19:00). For Mr.
McKenna, being confronted with the finitude of life creates opportunities for significant
personal agency. As it is portrayed in the episode, death gave Mr. McKenna something to
live for, and a sense of urgency for his accomplishments. While it also released him from
the obligations of hospitality, that was of secondary interest to him. The freedom he had
never had before, and cherished in his status as a living dying man, was the freedom to
live with intention. He had finally said all that he needed to say, done what he needed to,
and unleashed himself from the obligations of a mortgage and a job and relationships that
left him wanting more. In cluing him in on his mortality, Wilson provided him with a
timeframe in which to harness his anxiety in being-towards-death. In removing that, he
rendered Mr. McKenna’s anxiety impotent, directionless, and purposeless.
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Purposelessness is an endeavor that Jimmy Quidd calls his “purpose.” As opposed
to Mr. McKenna, Quidd is unafraid of consequences, and welcomes opportunities to push
the limits of his Being and the grace and generosity of the Other. In a sense, his actions
welcome annihilation of the self. Everything he does propels him into a state of beingtowards-death. More so than other manifestations of Being, an individual as reckless as
Quidd embodies the risks associated with unconditional hospitality. Derrida warns of the
dangers of unconditional hospitality because without boundaries, each party is
completely vulnerable to threats from the inside. Quidd does nothing to protect his body
or his Being, and instead welcomes in all threats—all drugs, all violence, all high-risk
behaviors. He is simultaneously the worst possible landlord/host for his own body and
being and a terrible guest in the larger scheme of society. His motivations are purely the
satisfaction of his addictions…or so the doctors under House’s supervision assume
(00:20:00). What they find is that Quidd cares for no one and nothing except abandoned
children, children who no one else wants and who have a worse existence than Quidd. He
routinely volunteers with and attempts to entertain these forgotten children, and it is this
close proximity to them that gives him the measles which have made him so sick. If he
had taken care of his body/house, the disease would never have penetrated his body’s
natural defenses. But his lack of investment in his own being invites illness in, making it
at home within him and encouraging it to take root. This is his only redeemable quality:
his desire to make the circumstances of those less fortunate than him better through
human connection. And it almost kills him. In another sense, though, this unconditional
openness to the Other allows him to connect more meaningfully to those around him.
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While there is a risk inherent within that connection, it is one that Quidd is willing to
take.
The reckless aspects of Quidd’s personality that make others so uncomfortable are
easy for him to bear; there is no being-at-home for someone who burns their own home
down, and Quidd accepts this. Wilson, however, cannot. In their final interaction, Wilson
follows through in his attempt to compensate Mr. McKenna for the false diagnosis. The
following interaction takes place:
Dr. Wilson: I can’t apologize enough—to you, to your family. There may not be
any technical liability here, but…
Mr. McKenna: (Tears up Dr. Wilson’s check)
Dr. Wilson: You’re ripping it up because you think it would be wrong to take
money from me?
Mr. McKenna: I think it’d be wrong to take so little money from you.
Dr. Wilson: You’re out $6,000…
Mr. McKenna: You ruined my life.
Dr. Wilson: I ruined your three months.
Mr. McKenna: For the first time in my life, I was living in the present. ‘Cause
that’s all it was.
Dr. Wilson: You’re suing me, not for the wrong diagnosis, but for the right one?
Have you spoken to a lawyer?
Mr. McKenna: You gave me happiness, and then you took it away. (Gets up and
leaves.) (00:26:11-00:26:57)
Dr. Wilson’s overwhelming sense of response-ability prevents him from being able to
simply let the situation play out naturally; he must find a way to control the
uncontrollable. This is ironic because his status as a medical professional allows him to
diagnose without requiring that he remain involved for the psychological and emotional
tailspin his diagnoses leave his patients in. It is his desire to provide high-quality care that
keeps him invested long after he should remove himself from the situation. As the main
controller in most diagnostic situations, Wilson’s inability to either predict or control Mr.
McKenna’s perception of this new diagnosis places Wilson in the hostage position. He
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cannot believe that he is not being treated as he is always treated and, more than that, that
his good intentions are not being met with the standard appreciation. This is one of the
negative side effects of Western biomedicine’s history of being patronizing towards
patients. Wilson approaches Mr. McKenna in order to reset the host-guest relationship; if
Wilson can get Mr. McKenna to let him off the hook, then he will not be held responsible
and can go back to being the ‘good doctor’. For possibly the first time in his career, his
guest, a guest that he cannot seem to please or to make at-home, holds Wilson hostage.
His drive to ‘fix things’ is really an attempt to provide his guest-turned-host with a type
of justice—or at least monetary compensation—that is in line with McKenna’s new
moral code and which will allow them both to return to their previous roles. When Mr.
McKenna rejects the offer because Wilson had taken away his “happiness,” a bewildered
Wilson defends his attempts at recompense, telling House, “I’m trying to take
responsibility” (00:33:42). House responds that by intervening and not allowing Wilson
to pay McKenna, House is “trying to teach [Wilson] that everyone is out for theirs and
you might as well keep yours” (00:33:48). “You have to control everything!” Wilson
shouts at House. The two argue about these mechanisms of control that they each battle
with in their role as healthcare professionals. But their coping styles are more an aspect of
their personalities than their professions. “You wanna know why you offered that guy six
grand? You think you can cure pain,” House tells Wilson. “Life just happens,” Wilson
tells house, “and it scares the hell out of you. You think you can avoid pain!” (00:34:28).
As they argue, Wilson finally tells House, “You don’t want to face it any more than my
patient does: Dying is easy. Living is hard” (00:34:33). There is a pause in their
conversation, and the two doctors stand, looking at one another. House speaks first: “That
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can’t possibly be as poignant as it sounded” (00:34:38). Before they can continue, they
are interrupted by more extreme symptoms from Quidd, and both men leave the room to
“do their jobs” (00:35:21).
The Ethical Turn
The purpose of this project is to examine the ‘good death,’ and the factors that can
inhibit individuals from attaining one. The rules and regulations of Western biomedicine
play a significant role in these permissions and limitations, but as this project has argued,
it is face-to-face human contact that complicates end-of-life. When someone who is other
to us recognizes our suffering, that suffering becomes at least partially the other’s
responsibility. This is the same responsibility that doctors willingly take on when
entering a profession that is constituted by the responsibility of face-to-face encounters
with patients. “In medicine, doctors can do far more than they could in the past. They can
do interventions that were unimaginable a few decades ago. Every time you give those
kinds of power they come with difficult situations and tough ethical choices” (Murray
qtd. in Kane). In terms of ethics, Americans view Western biomedicine as a ready and
able agent in whom to place not only their faith, but their control. This giving-over of
control, which is essentially a giving-over and opening-up of the self that invites
violence, ruptures patient agency. For advocates of increased end-of-life options, this
desire for increased agency is the intangible worth fighting for.
But as this chapter has shown, there is an alternative even to this understanding of
end-of-life. In this particular episode of House, M.D., the insights into doctor-patient,
host-guest relations are easily accessible and provide thoughtful viewers with an occasion
for encountering different points of view. In end-of-life encounters, insecurity of the self
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is prevalent. What is troubling is that, “In any institutional setting individuals may be
unusually insecure, and unfamiliar surroundings with unknown personnel and routines
will almost inevitably impinge upon a person’s ability to act as an autonomous agent. In
situations involving medical care, illness, lack of understanding, and fear may compound
and intensify these insecurities” (Biggs 99). The laws of hospitality govern our
experiences as patients within the hospital’s structured setting, and provide us with a set
of behaviors that will help us to achieve our goals. These experiences are made strange
by our unfamiliarity with the hospital as an institution, and this has long been considered
the primary source of patient dissatisfaction. Simply put, patients have no power and
doctors have too much. But as “Games” illustrates, this typical hospitable structure is
complicated when doctors who are used to serving as hosts find their authority
challenged; in not accepting the doctor’s word as law, patients throw off the laws of
hospitality and plunge both doctor and patient into a hostipitality struggle. This is a
generative struggle, though, since it provides both parties with introspection and
opportunity to reconstitute identity—either their previous identity, or their newly
discovered one.
The layers of control within “Games” allow for a more nuanced analysis of this
struggle, and yield surprising results. First and foremost, “Games” puts the volatile nature
of contemporary healthcare on display. While not all health emergencies are ones that
will wind up in front of a team of diagnosticians, as patients within the hospital setting,
the bodies figuratively and literally “opened up” before the eyes of medical professionals
are vulnerable. While healthcare professionals might like to consider their work scientific
and measurable, medicine is messy and unpredictable. It is not a perfect science, and its
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practitioners are all too human. For the terminally ill, their vulnerable hospitality is
necessary in order for suffering and pain to end. In opening-up and asking for assistance
from their hosts, they can shift some of the responsibility for their suffering onto their
doctors. Vulnerability allows for the host-guest, doctor-patient relationship to work. But
for doctors, this vulnerability puts tremendous responsibility and pressure upon their
training and expertise. In these instances, the medical gaze must not fail—meaning, the
healthcare professional in possession of the medical gaze must consider himself infallible
in order to perform the duties of his job. The gravity of the situation is not taken for
granted by either party. In good health and poor, both parties are held hostage by
expectations and by their sense of responsibility. “Hospitality is opposed to what is
nothing other than opposition itself, namely, hostility…The welcomed guest is a stranger
treated as a friend or ally, as opposed to the stranger treated as an enemy (friend/enemy,
hospitality/hostility)” (4). The relationship between enemy/friend, hospitality/hostility,
represents a blurring of the fluid boundary between the two, “hostipitality.” Derrida states
that, “hospitality is certainly, necessarily, a right, a duty, and obligation, the greeting of
the foreign other as a friend …on the condition that he maintains his own authority in his
own home” (4).
But in “Games,” no one has any authority within the hospital. Wilson, House, Mr.
McKenna, and Jimmy Quidd are all locked together in an endless struggle between
hospitality and hostility. So, in addition to illustrating the struggle of medical
professionals in providing adequate care, “Games” forces us to consider our position as
hosts and that position’s potential for violence, or, its inherent capacity for turning into
something strange and rendering us hostage. Derrida stated that, “I am the hostage of the
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other insofar as I welcome the face of the other, insofar as I welcome infinity. For
Levinas the welcoming of the other is the welcoming of an other who is infinitely other
and who consequently extends beyond me infinitely,” to the extent that “when I
consequently welcome beyond my capacity to welcome. In hospitality I welcome an
other greater than myself who can consequently overwhelm the space of my house” (17).
And it is this overwhelming quality of the other, the other who will not behave, that is at
work within “Games.” In addition to this capacity for violence, “Games” allows us to
interrogate the ‘good life,’ a stone left undisturbed in this project, but a stone with
overturning here. It is easy to accept that the ‘good life’ is equated to actually being alive,
and to having a sense of one’s life as a “futurity without horizon,” as Derrida called it
(“Hostipitality”, 17). For most, the ‘good life’ is constructed by the individual’s pursuit of
the good and the virtuous. In connecting with Others and treating them not as strangers,
but as welcome friends, individuals inch closer to this ‘good.’ But there is a sense that the
‘good life’ is something to be chased and never caught; it, too, is an impossibility. The
struggle towards it is an admirable one in that it is focused on the ethical treatment of
humanity. In turning towards the other case studies featured in this project, an image of
the pursuit of the ‘good life’ emerges: it is one that is lived alongside and for the
betterment of others; it is one that includes adventure and education; it will allow one to
be ‘sung out’ in the event of death.
But there are those for whom the call of the conscience is unsavory. These are the
ones who struggle against the living-for others. The patients within “Games” are each
caught in a different kind of responsibility, which Levinas referred to as a “traumatic
hold”; for Mr. McKenna, the trauma resonates from returning to a life that was unhappy
166

before diagnosis, and is now completely disrupted by his not-dying. For Jimmy Quidd,
his reckless behavior has somehow made him immune to death; it is his immortality that
causes trauma. Together, these narratives allow for a theoretical turn, and force us to
consider whether life might actually be the most traumatic hold of them all.
Worth Living For
If being given life is not enough to make hospitality satisfying, then what is?
Davis explores how the notion of being-towards-death in Heidegger, Levinas, and
Derrida is an integral component of the hospitality offered by the Dasein to the Other.
She writes: “Heidegger is clear that Dasein names (a) being that is first of all in-the-world
and with-others—‘world’…being always a ‘shared world’” (Davis 90). The concern over
the shared world is also a concern over identity—over the delineations of the Dasein, or
Being. Because in sharing the world with all the Others, the individual is required to
endlessly answer and respond to the call of the Others. In these confrontations, hospitality
forces Dasein to “relate to other Daseins and objects” (3). But there are factors that can
complicate the repetition of the call and answer. Death is one of them; “The time
necessary to such self-awareness is obviously most crucially perceived in the advent of
one’s own death. The fact of dying for and by ourselves is what gives the self authenticity,
making it a ‘being-toward-death’” (3, emphasis my own). So, recognition of Otherness is
also necessarily the recognition of the similarities between the self and all Others, and as
such, a recognition of the completeness—and the possibility of end—of the self. Selfawareness is a part of identity formation, but it is most prevalent in situations where the
self becomes held hostage by its own finitude. Death forces the Dasein into selfawareness.
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Recognition of death pushes us to “reach absolute authenticity in an ecstatic
being-toward-death,” revealing “less a sense of alterity than the area in which I come into
what is absolutely and precisely mine, mineness” (3). And this mineness reveals the
individual’s limitations and their unique, singular existence. In “Games,” what is offered
to Mr. McKenna is an authenticity in dying. Heidegger refers to this “as the end of
Dasein” and claims that this kind of “death is the most nonrelational, certain and as such,
indefinite and unsurpassable possibility of Dasein. As the end of Dasein, death is in being
of this being towards its end” (Being and Time 245). So, while the individual can attain a
being-towards-death, all of the Others who come into contact with him cannot fully relate
to it. Death creates a barrier between the living and the dying, and in practical terms, has
a way of removing the living dying’s support system.
Per this definition, “death is explained as the end of Dasein, through which
Dasein comes into its completeness. The end of Dasein implies that Dasein is not in the
world any longer…death is not a fixed point in the horizon of time, but is a living process
that awakes and reawakes constantly the original consciousness of time in man” (Tangjia
144). Death awakens Mr. McKenna to the possibility of life—and thrusts him into the
action of being alive. For the first time, it seems, he is exercising agency in his decisionmaking and acting of his own volition. The energy fueling this burst of life and agency is
finite, though, because it is confined by his imminent death. Death has separated him
from the herd, made him special. He cannot possibly go on living as though he were
dying; he has neither the capacity nor the identity as the living dying subject to fuel him.
Jimmy Quidd, on the other hand, is all energy and no thought. He is entirely being-
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towards-death; his life is all mineness, all the time, and as such, it is empty of meaningful
connections and relations. He cannot stand to be under he gaze of the Other; the face-toface renders him too vulnerable, and causes him to pause in his quest for being-towardsdeath. Where Mr. McKenna finds reasons to live, Jimmy Quidd finds boundaries
preventing him from achieving death. Mr. McKenna’s identity is shattered by his
prognosis and then re-prognosis; Jimmy Quidd’s identity is virtually nonexistent already,
since he lives with the purpose of not living, not making connections, and not producing
meaning. In considering the distinctions between these two men, a phrase from Zoe
FitzGerald Carter is helpful: “People die the way they lived” (246). The fact that neither
Mr. McKenna nor Jimmy Quidd achieves death suggests that they had never really lived.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion
A narrative achieves closure when its elements come to fit together in a pattern that
extends over time and that confers a distinctive significance to those elements. But the
completion of the pattern—the closure that is reached when all the elements are properly
fitting into place—does not have to bring the narrative, and what the narrative describe
and explains, to a temporal stop.
--Luca Ferrero, “Agency, Scarcity, Mortality”
In “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Practice,” Raymie McKerrow writes that a
critical rhetoric “seeks to unmask or demystify the discourse of power” (92). In order to
accomplish this task, a critical rhetoric must piece together “disparate scraps of discourse,
which, when constructed as an argument, serve to illuminate otherwise hidden or taken
for granted social practices” (92). This project has done precisely this work of collecting
and arranging in the hopes of developing a critical rhetoric of end-of-life. If some patients
in Western biomedicine are receiving more lenient conditions during their hospital
visits—the option to refuse medication or treatment, the right to withdraw life support—
then it seems that other permissions might be possible. In order to propose a starting
place for increased patient-centered care, this project pulled together a variety of
discourses, including ancient philosophical texts, documentary film, popular media, and
fictionalized medical television. From these disparate scraps emerges an understanding of
all human interactions as being rooted in hospitality, a pre-ontological recognition of the
countless others who surround an individual and to whom an individual is responsible.
What becomes apparent is that while normal instances of hospitality often successfully
protect both the sovereign host and the dependent guest from a violence which is always
possible, when individuals encounter unanticipated and therefore abnormal situations,
their needs change. These changing needs do not necessarily persuade the host to alter the
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conditions that were placed upon the guest at the beginning of the visit. Rather, these
conditions create conflicts within the host-guest arrangement. In asking for added
permissions, the guest runs the risk of overstepping the invisible boundaries that have
allowed for him to be a guest at all. This thrusts the guest into an unknown territory—a
space where all moves come with tremendous risk and where the hospitality relationship
could be undone at any time. For the host, unforeseen changes in the identity or status of
the foreign guest change the dynamics of the relationship in a different way. If the host is
uncertain of the ways in which the guest has been altered, it becomes more dangerous to
provide shelter. What if these new changes bring about a violence that shatters the
precarious hospitality arrangement?
Hospitality undoubtedly plays a role in these pre-ontological evaluations of risk
and reward, hospitality and hostility. Through the encounters the individual experiences
otherness and singularity, recognizing its individual limits and the face of the other
simultaneously. But hospitality is also seen on larger scales, where power is dispersed in
such a way as to become unfocused and not completely discernable. This is especially
true in Western biomedicine, where the overarching industry of medicine is the ultimate
host and its healthcare workers/agents and patients are all guests with different rights to
different kinds of experiences. In performing their roles on behalf of the hospital,
healthcare professionals inhabit a fluid position as guest of their industry but host to their
patients. From this position, they can greatly benefit and ethically care for those seeking
treatment and comfort. But in situations of terminal illness, the guest offers the host a
limited hospitality: I am dying, but will you let me come in so that you can watch? This
hospitality does not protect the host from the violence of being near death, of having to
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dwell under the same roof as death—nor does it prevent the ethical preoccupation with
death that shapes one’s views on mortality and morality. In fact, in asking to be
welcomed in by the host, the terminally ill guest is asking them to be open to this kind of
emotional threat and a hospitality that is imbalanced from the outset. For hosts who work
on behalf of industrialized biomedicine, the reaction to this invitation has long been to
place boundaries on the patient and to require that the patient enter and keep trying to
live. This imbalance does not mean either group’s request malicious, but it does prevent
the medical profession from ethically engaging with patient concerns and acting upon
those experiential needs and wishes that patients share. For the medical professional to be
the best possible host, those individual needs are often sublimated in favor of rationality
and objectivity. In its current iteration, Western biomedicine is caught in a rigid
hospitality that, in trying to function, has forgotten the ethical imperatives that allow it to
act as host in the first place. There is currently no real discourse with which to discuss the
general subject of death and dying or the more specific instances of terminal illness that
serve as case studies in this project. This lack of discourse has not come about because
death is not happening; instead, it has become commonplace because the hospital-host is
unwilling to discuss it in any real way. In refusing the discussion, or rejecting the call of
the other, Western biomedicine has left its guests with no other viable option for attaining
the conditions that they desire: if they want to receive the right to die, they will need to
rupture the current conception of hospitality and force a renegotiation of conditions. The
success of society is dependent upon the “populations,” which represent a cumulative
bio-power that moves society forward as it gives it structure (Britt 211). Bio-power is
constructed by these masses, and because of this, it determines the “success or failure of
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governments, countries, or species,” institutions that offer individuals protection in return
for allegiance. Change can be effected if members of society’s populations become more
open in their discussions of death and more demanding of certain conditions.
In negotiating for a more dignified, hospitable death, end-of-life and right-to-die
advocates are seeking institutionalized recognition of their rights. McDorman writes that
when addressing the right-to-die, “the law has frequently granted the uncommunicative,
vegetative patient subject status while denying agency to competent, terminal individuals.
While such a construction is consistent in maintaining order and control over the body,”
this approach is actually counterintuitive within a contemporary society devoted to
individualism and control over one’s own life (268). McDorman suggests that the deeper
motive behind these rulings is tied to the state’s sovereignty over its subjects: “at issue is
not actually the vegetative patient but the state’s ability to exert controlling authority over
the life—and death—of the active subject. The vegetative subject can be granted rights,
without compromising the state’s power, because he/she lacks the direct means for their
exercise” (269). Within the context of hospitality, this means that the states provide nonactive agents with dignity at the end-of-life primarily because they are not active,
meaning that the state cannot be held accountable for violence towards the vegetative
individual. The host’s intervention in the form of removing life support releases them
from hospitality more quickly than if the patient was to linger and require support from
the state. In granting these rights to individuals who cannot, at the time they are granted,
either request them or assure the host that the rights are desired, the state values its
obligations to the non-threatening guest over those of its more autonomous, response-able
ones. “That the incompetent could be filled with agency while the competent is rendered
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powerless reveals the reach of the state apparatus” (269). Unless the state empowers the
position of its competent but vulnerable citizens, it is not acting ethically. It is, instead,
protecting its own sovereignty at the cost of the rights guests who are in indispensable
part of the bio-power that makes up the state in the first place.
In opening up to death by more closely examining its place in American culture
and providing many different perspectives on end-of-life, this project hopes to guide its
readers through their own processes of consideration and discovery. It is unfortunate to
think that there are only two approaches to end-of-life for the terminally ill: either an
unattainable standard of rationality in the face of a death that feels unfair, or a slow and
unending suffering that slowly robs individuals of all of the experiences that individuate
and singularize them. While the activism in the state of Oregon can be seen as an
aggressive push against the state’s sovereignty, it is actually a more compromised
hospitality. The Death with Dignity Act provides Oregon citizens with the knowledge
that their deaths do not have to be either fully rational or filled with physical agony.
Instead, the Death with Dignity Act offers control and a backup plan that is ‘in reserve,’
but in no way mandated by the state. Those who taken advantage of this plan have
removed themselves, already, from the structure of Western biomedicine. Oregon’s law
has been successful thus far because it balances its responsibilities to citizens with its
sovereignty as a state; the state carefully evaluates the patients who seek out the Death
with Dignity option and monitors whether they eventually consume the medications or
not. The Death with Dignity Act ensures that in their dying, they can effectively achieve
the act’s purpose and do so in a way that dignifies and values human life rather than
robbing it of its agency.
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The fact that Brittany Maynard had to disengage from her lifelong hospitable
arrangement shows just how determined the terminally ill are in dying in a dignified way.
Maynard’s end-of-life blends the two competing human urges that Socrates locates in
distinctly different parts of the body in Plato’s Phaedo: reason and desire. Maynard made
her decision after having received all of the information, and having weighed her options.
In her analysis of the situation, dying on her own terms was more ethical than allowing
herself to linger indefinitely in a body that her soul no longer inhabited. If the purpose of
living is philosophical exploration, then Maynard accomplished that when she made the
well-reasoned choice in departing before she would become a fully dependent, out of
control guest. In a vegetative state, she would be putting her fate in the hands of loved
ones who she did not want to incorporate into the very difficult predicament she found
herself in. Instead, she negotiated for her own terms and found a legal option for ending
her suffering.
This project is not solely invested in the type of death made possible by the Death
with Dignity Act. Instead, it is invested in following in Oregon’s footsteps. One of the
main ways to extend the reach of the conversations happening in Oregon is to engage in
discussion and to listen to the experiences and concerns of the terminally ill. Medical
professionals dealing with end-of-life cannot remain the only members of society who are
actively listening to the experiences of the terminally ill. It must become a concern of
healthcare on a much larger scale, since “The importance of team work in end-of-life care
cannot be stressed enough. On-going dialogue between the professionals involved in
patient care strengthens what each individual professional has to offer” (P. Miller 41).
“Ideally, the most successful team work is when all members contribute to the plan of
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care in a way that honors each professional and allows for coordinated service to help
patients die in the way they choose” (41). Progress in end-of-life care in the United States
can only be realized if more than a handful of states begin taking pains to revisit their
current methods.
According to P. Miller et. al., “Conversations can build bridges, heal wounds, and
create understanding and meaning for both patients and [healthcare] professionals alike”
(41). And this kind of compassionate, dialogue-oriented care is only made possible
through “experience, education, and commitment over time” from all involved parties
(41). In one respect, healthcare professionals are responsible for offering these kinds of
conversations to patients; in another, it is the patient’s responsibility to demand more
thoughtful, individualized end-of-life care. But neither the individual nor the institution
of Western biomedicine can accomplish its goals if it takes on or rejects full
responsibility. The burden, then, is on both parties to participate and weigh the full range
of available options with care and compassion. In providing not just adequate but
dignified end-of-life care to all Americans, Western biomedicine will provide its citizens
with access to a more compassionate kind of death.
Conversations about end-of-life and the process of dying are necessary not only
because of the ethical necessity to provide individuals with a full understanding of their
options, but because of the shifts in population that are currently happening. It is
extremely likely that most Americans will experience a serious health concern during the
aging process. Confronting one’s finitude has other benefits, too. In confronting our
future, individuals have the opportunity to examine the “horizon of temporal
identification” and to rid the self of “pressures (both motivational and rational) toward
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temporal integration” of the self (Ferrero 355). Instead of waiting for a future that may
self that never be realized, this identification allows for individuals to become their future
selves now, or to at least embody a more fully realized synthesis of the future and current
selves. “Very distant selves might be taken to be outside the reach of one’s present
commitments, projects, cares, and values,” but giving these imagined present selves some
consideration provides the individual with a chance to think about not only what they
wish to accomplish before there is no longer time, but how they want death to play out
(357). Recognizing the end of life as a set of opportunities rather than a death sentence
can alleviate some of the anxiety affiliated with those obligations, and allows for a more
thorough understanding of one’s identity and legacy.
Simone de Beauvoir writes in The Coming of Age: “We must stop cheating: the
whole meaning of our life is in question in the future that is waiting for us. If we do not
know what we are going to be, we cannot know what we are: let us recognize ourselves
in this old man or in that old woman” (4). In this recognition, we enter into a hospitable
relationship with that future self—the future self that, at some point, will be in need of
our compassionate consideration. This offering to the future self allows us to “take upon
ourselves the entirety of our human state,” and “when it is done we will no longer
acquiesce in the misery of the last age; we will no longer be indifferent, because we shall
feel concerned, as indeed we are” (5). Spending time in calm consideration of that old
man or old woman who we will eventually become is an act of hospitality in which we
provide ourselves with unmatched agency. Thinking about old age and the infinite selves
that old age could reveal to us readies us for a time when we must be good hosts to
whichever self is made manifest. So much of end-of-life is dependent upon receiving
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permission, or a ‘call’ back from the Others who we have spent our life answering and
calling out to. In order to put everyone in the best possible situation for making decisions
about death in the face of death, Western biomedicine must foster a space in which
members of Western culture cannot cheat themselves, and cannot cheat death.
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